Owner Scorecard


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AIR, AAR Corp.

Aerospace & Defense capital-intensive

We offer a broad line of products and services to commercial and government aerospace customers.

In fiscal 2025, we continued our efforts to optimize our products and services portfolio to position us for continued strong growth as well as to respond to the industry's increased demand for aftermarket services.

As part of our portfolio optimization efforts, we divested our Landing Gear Overhaul ("LGO") business to better focus on our core segments and highest margin offerings.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
AIR · AAR Corp.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.8B
+19.9% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.1B 5-yr avg $2.1B
Operating margin 40.9% 5-yr avg 5.3%
Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 2%
Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Parts Supply (40%) and Repair and Engineering (32%), with 2 more segments behind.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 19% and operating margin about 4.9% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. Inventory runs near 29% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the backlog and program execution. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest Parts Supply at 40%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Parts Supply40%$1.1B
  • Repair and Engineering32%$885M
  • Integrated Solutions25%$695M
  • Expeditionary Services4%$101M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMFeb 2026
Income statement
$1.6B$1.7B$2.1B$2.1B$1.7B$1.8B$2.0B$2.3B$2.8B$3.1BRevenueRevenue
16%17%19%19%19%Gross marginGross mgn
11%12%10%11%11%11%12%13%13%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$82M$86M$99M$43M$85M$110M$137M$102M$114M$1.3BOperating incomeOp. inc.
5.2%4.9%4.8%2.1%5.1%6.0%6.9%4.4%4.1%40.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$57M$16M$8M$4M$36M$79M$90M$46M$13M$171MNet incomeNet inc.
31%18%40%56%34%25%26%21%27%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$22M$64M$67M($36M)$105M$75M$23M$44M$36M$95MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$36M$41M$43M$44M$36M$33M$27M$40M$55M$65MDepreciationDeprec.
($81M)($7M)$4M($92M)$24M($45M)($108M)($58M)($52M)($159M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$25M$22M$17M$24M$11M$17M$30M$30M$35M$35MCapexCapex
1.6%1.3%0.8%1.1%0.7%1.0%1.5%1.3%1.2%1.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($3M)$42M$50M($60M)$94M$58M($6M)$14M$1M$60MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−0.2%2.4%2.4%−2.9%5.7%3.2%−0.3%0.6%0.1%1.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($3M)$42M$50M($60M)$94M$58M($6M)$14M$1M$60MFree cash flowFCF
−0.2%2.4%2.4%−2.9%5.7%3.2%−0.3%0.6%0.1%1.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$13M$23M$2M$103M$723M$2M$226MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$10M$10M$11M$11M$100K$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$20M$13M$10M$4M$42M$50M$5M$10MBuybacksBuybacks
5%5%8%8%4%3%ROICROIC
6%2%1%0%4%8%8%4%1%10%Return on equityROE
5%1%−0%−1%4%10%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$10M$31M$21M$405M$52M$54M$68M$86M$97M$79MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$235M$202M$198M$172M$167M$214M$241M$287M$355M$426MReceivablesReceiv.
$433M$461M$524M$623M$541M$551M$574M$733M$809M$958MInventoryInvent.
$164M$170M$188M$192M$127M$156M$159M$238M$303M$324MAccounts payablePayables
$504M$493M$534M$603M$580M$608M$657M$782M$861M$1.1BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$888M$943M$953M$1.4B$937M$1.0B$1.1B$1.4B$1.5B$1.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$335M$333M$358M$383M$337M$348M$352M$467M$555M$653MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.7×2.8×2.7×3.8×2.8×2.9×3.1×3.0×2.7×2.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$106M$119M$116M$116M$119M$116M$176M$555M$531M$552MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$2.1B$1.5B$1.6B$1.8B$2.8B$2.8B$3.3BTotal assetsAssets
$156M$179M$143M$602M$135M$100M$272M$985M$968M$888MTotal debtDebt
$146M$148M$122M$197M$83M$47M$204M$900M$872M$810MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
15.5×10.7×10.4×4.6×17.0×45.8×11.2×2.3×1.5×17.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$914M$936M$906M$903M$974M$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%0.9%0.7%0.4%0.6%0.5%0.7%0.7%0.7%0.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
34.3M34.6M34.9M35.0M35.3M36.0M35.1M35.4M35.8M38.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$46.38$50.53$58.79$59.20$46.81$50.56$56.71$65.51$77.67$82.49Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.65$0.45$0.21$0.13$1.01$2.19$2.57$1.31$0.35$4.50EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.10$1.22$1.43$-1.71$2.66$1.61$-0.18$0.39$0.04$1.58Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.10$1.22$1.43$-1.71$2.66$1.61$-0.18$0.39$0.04$1.58Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.30$0.30$0.30$0.31$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.73$0.64$0.50$0.67$0.32$0.48$0.84$0.84$0.97$0.91Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$26.65$27.06$25.96$25.79$27.60$28.74$31.31$33.61$33.84$43.25Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.7%/yr+5.6%/yr
EPS−17.6%/yr+22.7%/yr
Dividends / share−68.8%/yr (4-yr)−68.8%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share+3.5%/yr+7.5%/yr
Book value / share+3.0%/yr+5.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
36Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
3%low FY2025
Gross margin
19%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
622.5×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1Mowner earningsvs.$13Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $13M of profit but $1M of owner earnings: $11M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$13M
Owner earnings$1M · 0% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$13M$46M$90M$79M$36M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$55M+$40M+$27M+$33M+$36M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$20M+$15M+$14M+$8M+$9M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$52M−$58M−$108M−$45M+$24M
Cash from operations$36M$44M$23M$75M$105M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$35M−$30M−$30M−$17M−$11M
Owner earnings$1M$14M($6M)$58M$94M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue0%1%0%3%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $20M), owner earnings is nearer ($19M).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $927M ÷ interest expense $75M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $872M · 0.9× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $97M − debt $968M
    What this means

    Netting $97M of cash and short-term investments against $968M of debt leaves $872M owed, about 0.9× a year's operating profit (1.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 47 + DIO 131 − DPO 49 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    6-yr median, range 3%–8%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range -3%–6%; latest $1M = operating cash $36M − maintenance capex $35M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 0% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $20M of SBC) leaves ($19M).

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $36M ÷ net income $13M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $10M ÷ Owner Earnings $1M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $1M of Owner Earnings, $10M (729%) went back to shareholders, $100K dividends, $10M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($20M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.63×
    Harvesting
    Capex $35M ÷ depreciation $55M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.8B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.72×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $968M vs $956M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +87%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.25/share (latest year $0.31), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $30.47/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 9
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 5% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 5% early, 5% lately, median 5%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 2%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth −11%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 11% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 2.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.5%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Feb 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$79M
  • Receivables$426M
  • Inventory$958M
  • Other current assets$301M
Current liabilities$653M
  • Debt due within a year$100K
  • Accounts payable$324M
  • Other current liabilities$329M
Current ratio2.70×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.23×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.12×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$100K due · $79M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Feb 28, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+24.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.0× → 2.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$803Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$1.8BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$992M$104M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$88Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $401M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$211M · 53%
  • Dividends$42M · 10%
  • Buybacks$155M · 39%
  • Returned to owners$197M

    104% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $42M as dividends and $155M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $732M and cash and short-term investments rose $68M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$43.75

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $53M, about $43.75 each.

  • Net change in share count10.8%

    The diluted count rose from 34M to 38M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 69% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained−18%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($151M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $27M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.18 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$750M26% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity44%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$865Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $211M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021John M. Holmes$4.1M$12.8M$94M
2022John M. Holmes$12.3M$13.4M$58M
2023John M. Holmes$6.7M$10.7M($6M)
2024John M. Holmes$7.9M$16.9M$14M
2025John M. Holmes$8.1M$7.5M$1M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$20M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why AAR Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

4 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?0.1% vs 1.5%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 1.5% early in the record and 0.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?10.8%

    Diluted shares grew 10.8% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent $155M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$156M → $888M

    Debt rose from $156M to $888M while owner earnings went from about $30M to $3M — about 5.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 293 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 9 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 9 years, $160M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Aerospace & Defense

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
SAROStandardAero Inc.$6.1B14%7.5%9%-0%
HEIHeico Corp.$4.5B39%21.1%14%18%
ALSNAllison Transmission Holdings Inc.$3.0B48%29.0%21%23%
WGOWinnebago Industries$2.8B15%7.9%14%6%
AIRAAR Corp.$2.8B19%4.9%5%1%
CPSCooper-Standard Holdings Inc.$2.7B12%3.2%7%1%
GNTXGentex$2.5B36%23.7%22%21%
AVAVAeroVironment Inc.$2.0B40%9.5%6%-1%
Group median27%8.7%11%3%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what AAR Corp. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, AAR Corp. earns about $17M on its 0.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−44%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25−11%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $60M on 40M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-02-28; net debt $810M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "AAR Corp. (AIR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AIR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AIP its page in the Manual AIRS →

Industry order: ← ACHR the Aerospace & Defense chapter ATRO →