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BA, Boeing Company (The)

Aerospace & Defense capital-intensive Distress / turnaround

Boeing makes large aircraft: commercial jetliners it sells to airlines and aircraft-leasing companies, and defense and space systems it sells to the U.S. government and allied governments. It also runs a services arm that supports the fleet already flying, with parts, maintenance and support over the planes' long lives. Most of the money comes from selling the hardware, with a smaller slice from servicing the installed fleet.

We are organized based on the products and services we offer.

We own numerous patents and have licenses for the use of patents owned by others, which relate to our products and their manufacture.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

BA · Boeing Company (The)

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$89.5B

+34.5% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $92.2B 5-yr avg $72.5B

Gross margin 5% 5-yr avg 4%

Operating margin 4.6% 5-yr avg −4.4%

ROIC 7% 5-yr avg −7%

Owner-earnings margin −1% 5-yr avg −4%

Free cash flow margin −1% 5-yr avg −4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Products (84%) and Services (16%).
Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: The first test is whether the commercial-jet business is the franchise it appears to be — one of a handful of makers of large airliners — or a capital-devouring commodity: watch whether years of plane-building actually convert into owner earnings and a return above the cost of the capital sunk into it, because the record below shows thin margins and cash going out, not in. The governing variable is execution under a regulator's eye: safety, quality and certification decide whether airplanes ship, and one fault can ground a program and invite the lawsuits the filing flags. On the defense side the customer is a handful of governments, so watch how concentrated that backlog is. Keep the bad case in view — net debt, litigation, and an industry exposed to fuel and tariff shocks no contract can hedge — and read the figures below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −8%, above 15% in 1 of 8 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Products is 84% of revenue, with Services the other meaningful line at 16%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Products84%$75.4B
Services16%$14.1B

By geographyUnited States54%Asia18%Europe13%Middle East8%Canada2%Africa2%Other3%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$93.5B	$94.0B	$101.1B	$76.6B	$58.2B	$62.3B	$66.6B	$77.8B	$66.5B	$89.5B	$92.2B	RevenueRevenue
15%	19%	19%	6%	−10%	5%	5%	10%	−3%	5%	5%	Gross marginGross mgn
4%	4%	5%	5%	8%	7%	6%	7%	8%	7%	7%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
5%	3%	3%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	6%	4%	4%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$6.5B	$10.3B	$12.0B	($2.0B)	($12.8B)	($2.9B)	($3.5B)	($773M)	($10.7B)	$4.3B	$4.3B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
7.0%	11.0%	11.9%	−2.6%	−22.0%	−4.6%	−5.3%	−1.0%	−16.1%	4.8%	4.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$5.0B	$8.5B	$10.5B	($636M)	($11.9B)	($4.2B)	($4.9B)	($2.2B)	($11.8B)	$2.2B	$2.3B	Net incomeNet inc.
13%	16%	10%	—	—	—	—	—	—	15%	12%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$10.5B	$13.3B	$15.3B	($2.4B)	($18.4B)	($3.4B)	$3.5B	$6.0B	($12.1B)	$1.1B	$2.5B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$1.9B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.3B	$2.2B	$2.1B	$2.0B	$1.9B	$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.1B	DepreciationDeprec.
$3.4B	$2.6B	$2.5B	($4.3B)	($9.0B)	($2.2B)	$5.7B	$5.6B	($2.5B)	($3.5B)	($2.3B)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$2.6B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.3B	$980M	$1.2B	$1.5B	$2.2B	$2.9B	$3.5B	CapexCapex
2.8%	1.8%	1.7%	2.4%	2.2%	1.6%	1.8%	2.0%	3.4%	3.3%	3.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$7.9B	$11.6B	$13.6B	($4.3B)	($19.7B)	($4.4B)	$2.3B	$4.4B	($14.3B)	($1.9B)	($1.0B)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
8.4%	12.3%	13.4%	−5.6%	−33.9%	−7.1%	3.4%	5.7%	−21.5%	−2.1%	−1.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$7.9B	$11.6B	$13.6B	($4.3B)	($19.7B)	($4.4B)	$2.3B	$4.4B	($14.3B)	($1.9B)	($1.0B)	Free cash flowFCF
8.4%	12.3%	13.4%	−5.6%	−33.9%	−7.1%	3.4%	5.7%	−21.5%	−2.1%	−1.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$297M	$324M	$3.2B	$455M	—	$6M	—	$70M	$50M	$1.2B	$1.2B	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$2.8B	$3.4B	$3.9B	$4.6B	$1.2B	—	—	—	—	$331M	$345M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$7.0B	$9.2B	$9.0B	$2.7B	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	165%	-15%	-26%	-6%	-9%	-2%	-23%	6%	7%	ROICROIC
616%	511%	3086%	—	—	—	—	—	—	41%	38%	Return on equityROE
279%	304%	n/m	—	—	—	—	—	—	35%	32%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$10.0B	$10.0B	$8.6B	$10.0B	$25.6B	$16.2B	$17.2B	$16.0B	$26.3B	$29.4B	$20.9B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$8.8B	$2.9B	$3.9B	$3.3B	$2.0B	$2.6B	$2.5B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.9B	$3.5B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$43.2B	$61.4B	$62.6B	$76.6B	$81.7B	$78.8B	$78.2B	$79.7B	$87.5B	$84.7B	$87.2B	InventoryInvent.
$11.2B	$12.2B	$12.9B	$15.6B	$12.9B	$9.3B	$10.2B	$12.0B	$11.4B	$13.1B	$13.7B	Accounts payablePayables
$40.8B	$52.1B	$53.5B	$64.3B	$70.7B	$72.2B	$70.5B	$70.4B	$78.8B	$74.5B	$77.0B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$62.5B	$85.2B	$87.8B	$102.2B	$121.6B	$108.7B	$109.5B	$109.3B	$128.0B	$128.5B	$124.1B	Current assetsCur. assets
$50.1B	$74.6B	$81.6B	$97.3B	$87.3B	$82.0B	$90.1B	$95.8B	$97.1B	$108.1B	$105.5B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×	1.1×	1.1×	1.1×	1.4×	1.3×	1.2×	1.1×	1.3×	1.2×	1.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$5.3B	$5.6B	$7.8B	$8.1B	$8.1B	$8.1B	$8.1B	$8.1B	$8.1B	$17.3B	$17.6B	GoodwillGoodwill
$90.0B	$112.4B	$117.4B	$133.6B	$152.1B	$138.6B	$137.1B	$137.0B	$156.4B	$168.2B	$164.8B	Total assetsAssets
$10.0B	$11.1B	$13.8B	$28.3B	$65.1B	$59.2B	$62.0B	$57.3B	$54.9B	$62.3B	$54.1B	Total debtDebt
($77M)	$1.1B	$5.3B	$18.3B	$39.5B	$43.0B	$44.8B	$41.3B	$28.6B	$32.9B	$33.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
21.3×	28.7×	25.2×	-2.7×	-5.9×	-1.1×	-1.4×	-0.3×	-3.9×	1.5×	1.6×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$817M	$1.7B	$339M	($8.6B)	($18.3B)	($15.0B)	($15.9B)	($17.2B)	($3.9B)	$5.5B	$6.0B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.3%	0.4%	1.3%	1.1%	0.9%	0.6%	0.5%	0.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
643M	610M	586M	565M	569M	588M	595M	606M	647M	762M	788M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$145.45	$154.11	$172.72	$135.41	$102.28	$106.00	$111.97	$128.42	$102.82	$117.36	$116.98	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$7.83	$13.87	$17.87	$-1.12	$-20.88	$-7.15	$-8.30	$-3.67	$-18.27	$2.93	$2.88	EPS (diluted)EPS
$12.26	$19.03	$23.23	$-7.57	$-34.67	$-7.48	$3.85	$7.32	$-22.12	$-2.46	$-1.32	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$12.26	$19.03	$23.23	$-7.57	$-34.67	$-7.48	$3.85	$7.32	$-22.12	$-2.46	$-1.32	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$4.29	$5.60	$6.74	$8.19	$2.04	—	—	—	—	$0.43	$0.44	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$4.07	$2.85	$2.94	$3.24	$2.29	$1.67	$2.05	$2.52	$3.45	$3.86	$4.50	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.27	$2.71	$0.58	$-15.24	$-32.21	$-25.53	$-26.70	$-28.45	$-6.04	$7.15	$7.60	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−2.4%/yr	+2.8%/yr
EPS	−10.3%/yr	—
Dividends / share	−22.5%/yr	−26.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	−0.6%/yr	+11.0%/yr
Book value / share	+21.2%/yr	—

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

762Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

6%low FY2020

Gross margin

5%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

9.3×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($1.9B)owner earningsvs.$2.2Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $2.2B of profit but ($1.9B) of owner earnings: $4.1B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$2.2B	($11.8B)	($2.2B)	($4.9B)	($4.2B)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$2.0B	+$1.8B	+$1.9B	+$2.0B	+$2.1B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$426M	+$407M	+$690M	+$725M	+$833M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$3.5B	−$2.5B	+$5.6B	+$5.7B	−$2.2B
Cash from operations	$1.1B	($12.1B)	$6.0B	$3.5B	($3.4B)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$2.9B	−$2.2B	−$1.5B	−$1.2B	−$980M
Owner earnings	($1.9B)	($14.3B)	$4.4B	$2.3B	($4.4B)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-2%	-22%	6%	3%	-7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $426M), owner earnings is nearer ($2.3B).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 1.5×

Thin

Operating income $4.3B ÷ interest expense $2.8B

What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $32.9B · 7.7× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $10.9B + ST investments $18.5B − debt $62.3B

What this means
Netting $29.4B of cash and short-term investments against $62.3B of debt leaves $32.9B owed, about 7.7× a year's operating profit (14.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 319d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 12 + DIO 363 − DPO 56 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -9%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range -26%–165%; 6% latest = NOPAT $3.6B ÷ invested capital $56.8B

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -2%

Consumes cash through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -34%–13%; latest ($1.9B) = operating cash $1.1B − maintenance capex $2.9B

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -2% of revenue this year, a -2% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $426M of SBC) leaves ($2.3B).
Are earnings backed by cash? 0.48×

Thinly cash-backed

Cash from ops $1.1B ÷ net income $2.2B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 1.51×

Expanding

Capex $2.9B ÷ depreciation $2.0B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $89.5B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.19×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $62.3B vs $20.3B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 6 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −149%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-4.99/share (latest year $2.84), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.92/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 4 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 10% → −4% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 10% early to −4% lately, median −3% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −28%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2020 · −22.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +1.9%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 6 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$124.1B

Cash & short-term investments$20.9B
Receivables$3.5B
Inventory$87.2B
Other current assets$12.5B

Current liabilities$105.5B

Debt due within a year$2.9B
Accounts payable$13.7B
Other current liabilities$89.0B

Current ratio1.18×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.35×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.20×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$18.6Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$2.9B due · $20.9B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+14.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($13.2B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($34.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$52.1B$2.3B of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$62.6Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$8.4B

'27$4.4B

'28$2.7B

'29$2.5B

'30$5.3B

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$8.4Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$12.8Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$8.4Bin 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Due over the next five years$23.3Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $62.3B of debt in all

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$20.9B

Together, against $8.4B due next year2.5×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 comes to $20.9B against the $8.4B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 2.5 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $13.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$18.1B · 136%
Dividends$16.2B · 122%
Buybacks$27.9B · 209%

Returned to owners$44.1B
$16.2B as dividends and $27.9B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$48.9B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $48.9B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $10.0B to $54.1B.
Average price paid for buybacks$203.50
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 137M shares were bought for $27.9B, about $203.50 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $125.36 (2016) to $352.08 (2019); its heaviest year, 2017, paid $197.10 ($9.2B).
Net change in share count22.6%
The diluted count rose from 643M to 788M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.43/sh
Paid in 6 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 37% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	David Calhoun	$21.2M	$17.8M	($4.4B)
2022	David Calhoun	$22.6M	$15.2M	$2.3B
2023	David Calhoun	$32.8M	$44.4M	$4.4B
2024	David Calhoun	$15.1M	−$23.9M	($14.3B)
2024	Robert K. Ortberg	$18.4M	$19.9M	($14.3B)
2025	Robert K. Ortberg	$23.6M	$31.9M	($1.9B)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio166:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$426M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Boeing Company (The) is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

All 5 tests turned up something to look into. A record that trips every wire is one to understand slowly.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−6.0% vs 11.4%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 11.4% early in the record and −6.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?22.6%
Diluted shares grew 22.6% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $27.9B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$10.0B → $54.1B
Debt rose from $10.0B to $54.1B while owner earnings went from about $11.0B to ($3.9B): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?56% → 98% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $52.0B to $90.7B while revenue grew −1%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (56% of revenue then, 98% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $1.6B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Aerospace & Defense

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
FFord Motor Company	$187.3B	15%	3.0%	—	7%
GMGeneral Motors Company	$168.0B	11%	5.9%	4%	6%
TSLATesla Inc.	$94.8B	19%	5.5%	6%	10%
BABoeing Company (The)	$89.5B	6%	-1.8%	-8%	1%
RTXRTX Corporation	$88.6B	65%	8.2%	5%	8%
LMTLockheed Martin Corporation	$75.0B	13%	12.9%	34%	9%
GDGeneral Dynamics Corporation	$52.5B	19%	10.9%	14%	8%
HONHoneywell International Inc.	$37.4B	35%	21.5%	23%	14%
Group median	—	17%	7.1%	6%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Boeing Company (The) has delivered.

Boeing Company (The)’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Boeing Company (The) earns about $599M on its 0.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −2.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($599M) Net of stock comp (−$452M) Steady-state · maintenance capex (($440M))

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($1.0B) on 788M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-15; net debt $33.2B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($3.5B) runs well above depreciation ($2.1B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($440M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh BA against another business →

The owners of BA: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Boeing Company (The) (BA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AZZ its page in the Manual BAC →

Industry order: ← AXON the Aerospace & Defense chapter BETA →