← All companies ← RSVR Manual RUM → ← RKLB Aerospace & Defense SARO →

RTX, RTX Corporation

RTX builds and services the hardware of flight and defense. It sells jet engines through Pratt and Whitney, aircraft systems and components through Collins Aerospace, and missiles, radars and related defense systems through Raytheon, and the three carry the load in broadly comparable measure. Its customers are the commercial planemakers and airlines and the governments and militaries that buy weapons, and it earns money twice: once when it sells the original equipment, and again, over the long service life of that equipment, on the spare parts, repairs and services it needs to keep running.

We serve commercial and government customers in both the original equipment and aftermarket parts and services segments of the aerospace industry.

Our defense business serves both domestic and international customers as a prime contractor or subcontractor on a broad portfolio of defense and related programs for military and government customers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

RTX · RTX Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$88.6B

+9.7% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $90.4B 5-yr avg $73.9B

Gross margin 65%

Operating margin 10.9% 5-yr avg 8.0%

ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 5%

Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 8%

Free cash flow margin 9% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Pratt and Whitney (37%), Raytheon (31%) and Collins Aerospace (31%).
What moves the needle: The test that governs this business is whether the installed base of engines and systems throws off a long, captive aftermarket — parts and service the operator cannot easily buy elsewhere — or whether each new program is won by underbidding and subsidized up front, which the filing itself flags as highly competitive pricing. Watch the buyer side too: on the commercial end the work leans on a short list led by Boeing and Airbus, and on the defense end on government budgets, so concentration cuts both ways, and a single source of supply can choke the line from the other side. It is a capital-heavy trade carrying debt that must periodically be refinanced, so the question is whether the returns clear the cost of all that iron — the bad case is a commodity contractor that builds magnificent machines and keeps little of the cash. The margins, returns on capital, and the debt are in the record below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest Pratt and Whitney at 37%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Pratt and Whitney37%$32.9B
Raytheon31%$27.9B
Collins Aerospace31%$27.6B
Other0%$210M

By geographyUnited States53%Europe21%Asia Pacific16%Other regions6%Middle East and North Africa4%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$57.2B	$59.8B	$34.7B	$45.3B	$56.6B	$64.4B	$67.1B	$68.9B	$80.7B	$88.6B	$90.4B	RevenueRevenue
47%	48%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	65%	Gross marginGross mgn
10%	11%	8%	8%	10%	8%	8%	8%	7%	7%	7%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
4%	4%	5%	5%	5%	4%	4%	4%	4%	3%	3%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$8.2B	$8.1B	$2.9B	$4.9B	($1.9B)	$5.1B	$5.5B	$3.6B	$6.5B	$9.3B	$9.8B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
14.4%	13.6%	8.3%	10.8%	−3.3%	8.0%	8.2%	5.2%	8.1%	10.5%	10.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$5.1B	$4.6B	$5.3B	$5.5B	($3.5B)	$3.9B	$5.2B	$3.2B	$4.8B	$6.7B	$7.3B	Net incomeNet inc.
25%	38%	17%	7%	—	20%	13%	12%	20%	20%	19%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$6.4B	$5.6B	$2.7B	$5.8B	$4.3B	$7.1B	$7.2B	$7.9B	$7.2B	$10.6B	$11.1B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$2.0B	$2.1B	$1.9B	$2.7B	$4.2B	$4.6B	$4.1B	$4.2B	$4.4B	$4.4B	$4.4B	DepreciationDeprec.
($757M)	($1.3B)	($4.7B)	($2.7B)	$3.4B	($1.7B)	($2.6B)	$52M	($2.4B)	($1.1B)	($1.1B)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$1.7B	$2.0B	$1.5B	$1.9B	$1.8B	$2.1B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.7B	CapexCapex
3.0%	3.4%	4.2%	4.1%	3.2%	3.3%	3.4%	3.5%	3.3%	3.0%	2.9%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$4.7B	$3.6B	$1.2B	$4.0B	$2.5B	$5.0B	$4.9B	$5.5B	$4.5B	$7.9B	$8.5B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
8.2%	6.0%	3.5%	8.7%	4.5%	7.8%	7.3%	7.9%	5.6%	9.0%	9.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$4.7B	$3.6B	$1.2B	$4.0B	$2.5B	$5.0B	$4.9B	$5.5B	$4.5B	$7.9B	$8.5B	Free cash flowFCF
8.2%	6.0%	3.5%	8.7%	4.5%	7.8%	7.3%	7.9%	5.6%	9.0%	9.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$710M	$231M	$15.0B	$9M	$419M	$1.1B	$66M	$0	$0	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.4B	$2.7B	$3.0B	$3.1B	$3.2B	$3.2B	$3.6B	$3.6B	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$2.3B	$1.5B	$325M	$151M	$47M	$2.3B	$2.8B	$12.9B	$444M	$50M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
14%	10%	3%	6%	-2%	4%	5%	3%	5%	8%	8%	ROICROIC
18%	15%	14%	13%	-5%	5%	7%	5%	8%	10%	11%	Return on equityROE
11%	8%	8%	7%	−9%	1%	3%	−0%	3%	5%	5%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$7.2B	$9.0B	$3.7B	$4.9B	$9.7B	$8.8B	$7.0B	$7.3B	$6.4B	$8.2B	$7.5B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$11.5B	$12.6B	$14.3B	$8.7B	$9.3B	$9.7B	$9.1B	$10.8B	$11.0B	$14.7B	$12.9B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$8.7B	$9.9B	$10.1B	$9.0B	$9.4B	$9.2B	$10.6B	$11.8B	$12.8B	$13.4B	$14.2B	InventoryInvent.
$7.5B	$9.6B	$11.1B	$7.8B	$8.6B	$8.8B	$9.9B	$10.7B	$12.9B	$15.9B	$16.0B	Accounts payablePayables
$12.7B	$12.9B	$13.3B	$10.0B	$10.0B	$10.1B	$9.8B	$11.9B	$10.8B	$12.2B	$11.1B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$28.6B	$32.9B	$35.5B	$61.6B	$43.4B	$42.0B	$42.4B	$48.4B	$51.1B	$60.3B	$60.0B	Current assetsCur. assets
$21.9B	$24.4B	$31.4B	$46.6B	$35.8B	$35.4B	$39.1B	$46.8B	$51.5B	$58.8B	$58.6B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×	1.3×	1.1×	1.3×	1.2×	1.2×	1.1×	1.0×	1.0×	1.0×	1.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$27.1B	$27.9B	$48.1B	$36.6B	$54.3B	$54.4B	$53.8B	$53.7B	$52.8B	$53.3B	$53.3B	GoodwillGoodwill
$89.7B	$96.9B	$134.2B	$139.6B	$162.2B	$161.4B	$158.9B	$161.9B	$162.9B	$171.1B	$170.4B	Total assetsAssets
$23.3B	$27.1B	$44.1B	$41.0B	$31.6B	$31.4B	$31.3B	$43.6B	$41.1B	$37.7B	$41.1B	Total debtDebt
$16.1B	$18.1B	$40.4B	$36.0B	$21.9B	$22.6B	$24.3B	$36.3B	$34.7B	$29.5B	$33.6B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
7.9×	9.0×	2.8×	3.1×	-1.4×	3.9×	4.3×	2.4×	3.5×	—	5.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$27.6B	$29.6B	$38.4B	$41.8B	$72.2B	$73.1B	$72.6B	$59.8B	$60.2B	$65.2B	$66.3B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%	0.3%	0.5%	0.6%	0.6%	0.7%	0.6%	0.6%	0.5%	0.6%	0.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
1.24B	1.20B	1.22B	1.30B	1.36B	1.51B	1.49B	1.44B	1.34B	1.36B	1.36B	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$46.20	$49.92	$28.56	$35.00	$41.68	$42.68	$45.14	$48.01	$60.09	$65.32	$66.23	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$4.08	$3.80	$4.34	$4.27	$-2.59	$2.56	$3.50	$2.23	$3.55	$4.96	$5.32	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.80	$3.02	$0.99	$3.05	$1.87	$3.32	$3.28	$3.81	$3.37	$5.85	$6.20	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.80	$3.02	$0.99	$3.05	$1.87	$3.32	$3.28	$3.81	$3.37	$5.85	$6.20	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.67	$1.73	$1.79	$1.88	$2.01	$1.96	$2.11	$2.26	$2.39	$2.63	$2.67	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.37	$1.68	$1.21	$1.44	$1.32	$1.41	$1.54	$1.68	$1.95	$1.94	$1.95	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$22.26	$24.70	$31.64	$32.24	$53.15	$48.44	$48.88	$41.66	$44.77	$48.10	$48.57	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2020 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.9%/yr	+9.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+4.9%/yr	+25.6%/yr
EPS	+2.2%/yr	—
Dividends / share	+5.2%/yr	+5.5%/yr
Capital spending / share	+3.9%/yr	+7.9%/yr
Book value / share	+8.9%/yr	−2.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

1.4Bpeak FY2021

ROIC

8%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

3.7×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$7.9Bowner earningsvs.$6.7Bnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $6.7B of profit into $7.9B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$6.7B

Owner earnings$7.9B · 9% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$6.7B	$4.8B	$3.2B	$5.2B	$3.9B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$4.4B	+$4.4B	+$4.2B	+$4.1B	+$4.6B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$519M	+$437M	+$425M	+$420M	+$442M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$1.1B	−$2.4B	+$52M	−$2.6B	−$1.7B
Cash from operations	$10.6B	$7.2B	$7.9B	$7.2B	$7.1B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$2.6B	−$2.6B	−$2.4B	−$2.3B	−$2.1B
Owner earnings	$7.9B	$4.5B	$5.5B	$4.9B	$5.0B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	9%	6%	8%	7%	8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $519M), owner earnings is nearer $7.4B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 5.0×

Adequate

Operating income $9.3B ÷ interest expense $1.9B

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $32.9B · 3.5× operating profit

Meaningful net debt

Cash $7.4B + ST investments $750M − debt $41.1B

What this means
Netting $8.2B of cash and short-term investments against $41.1B of debt leaves $32.9B owed, about 3.5× a year's operating profit (4.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 31d

Tight

DSO 61 + DIO 157 − DPO 187 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 5%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -2%–14%; 8% latest = NOPAT $7.5B ÷ invested capital $98.9B

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 7%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 3%–9%; latest $7.9B = operating cash $10.6B − maintenance capex $2.6B

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $519M of SBC) leaves $7.4B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.57×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $10.6B ÷ net income $6.7B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 46%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $3.6B ÷ Owner Earnings $7.9B

What this means
Of $7.9B Owner Earnings, $3.6B (46%) went back to shareholders, $3.6B dividends, $50M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($519M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.60×

Harvesting

Capex $2.6B ÷ depreciation $4.4B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $88.6B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.03×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $41.1B vs $1.5B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −1%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.64/share (latest year $5.00), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $48.45/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 12% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to 8% lately, median 8% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 2%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +5%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −3.3% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +5.7%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“These risks relate to, among other things, product safety and reliability, personal injuries, intellectual property rights, contract-related claims, government contracts, taxes, environmental matters, the use of chemical substances, the use of artificial intelligence, export control, sanctions, employment matters, secu…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$60.0B

Cash & short-term investments$7.5B
Receivables$12.9B
Inventory$14.2B
Other current assets$25.4B

Current liabilities$58.6B

Accounts payable$16.0B
Other current liabilities$42.6B

Current ratio1.02×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.78×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.13×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($18.5B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($42.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$43.0B$2.0B of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$22.1Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$3.4B

'27$2.9B

'28$3.5B

'29$922M

'30$1.6B

later$25.4B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$3.4Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$6.3Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$3.5Bin 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$37.8Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$7.5B

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$7.9B

Together, against $3.4B due next year4.5×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $15.5B against the $3.4B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 4.5 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $64.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$20.9B · 32%
Dividends$27.6B · 43%
Buybacks$22.7B · 35%

Returned to owners$50.3B
115% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $27.6B as dividends and $22.7B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$6.5B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $6.5B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $23.3B to $41.1B.
Average price paid for buybacks$82.29
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 276M shares were bought for $22.7B, about $82.29 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $46.52 (2016) to $209.83 (2024); its heaviest year, 2023, paid $90.82 ($12.9B).
Net change in share count10.1%
The diluted count rose from 1239M to 1365M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$2.63/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 5% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$85.2B50% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity82%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$17.6Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $20.9B of capital spent building

$3.2B written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 18% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Gregory J. Hayes	$23.3M	$39.7M	$5.0B
2022	Gregory J. Hayes	$22.6M	$45.2M	$4.9B
2023	Gregory J. Hayes	$21.9M	−$3.8M	$5.5B
2024	Christopher T. Calio	$18.0M	$43.2M	$4.5B
2024	Gregory J. Hayes	$14.6M	$48.6M	$4.5B
2025	Christopher T. Calio	$24.8M	$88.6M	$7.9B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$519M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why RTX Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?10.1%
Diluted shares grew 10.1% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $22.7B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Aerospace & Defense

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
FFord Motor Company	$187.3B	15%	3.0%	—	7%
GMGeneral Motors Company	$168.0B	11%	5.9%	4%	6%
TSLATesla Inc.	$94.8B	19%	5.5%	6%	10%
BABoeing Company (The)	$89.5B	6%	-1.8%	-8%	1%
RTXRTX Corporation	$88.6B	65%	8.2%	5%	8%
LMTLockheed Martin Corporation	$75.0B	13%	12.9%	34%	9%
GDGeneral Dynamics Corporation	$52.5B	19%	10.9%	14%	8%
HONHoneywell International Inc.	$37.4B	35%	21.5%	23%	14%
Group median	—	17%	7.1%	6%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what RTX Corporation has delivered.

RTX Corporation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, RTX Corporation earns about $6.7B on its 7.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($6.7B) Net of stock comp (−$540M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+6%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+5%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $8.5B on 1347M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $33.6B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh RTX against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "RTX Corporation (RTX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RTX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← RSVR its page in the Manual RUM →

Industry order: ← RKLB the Aerospace & Defense chapter SARO →