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F, Ford Motor Company
Ford designs, builds, and sells trucks, SUVs, and cars — under the Ford and Lincoln names — to retail buyers and commercial fleets, mostly through independent dealers. The great bulk of its revenue comes from making and selling the vehicles themselves. A captive lender, Ford Credit, supplies the rest by financing dealers' inventory and customers' purchases and leases.
The Company's Ford+ plan for growth and value creation combines existing strengths, new capabilities, and always-on relationships with customers to enrich experiences for customers and deepen their loyalty.
Ford Model e also includes EV and related sales not considered core to Ford Pro to commercial, government, and rental customers in Europe, China, and Mexico.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Company excluding Ford Credit (93%) and Ford Credit (7%).
- What moves the needle
- The whole question is franchise versus commodity. Building cars is a capital-hungry, cyclical trade where intense competition and excess capacity press on price, so the test is whether Ford can charge more than the next maker for the same metal — pricing power that would show up in durable margins, not in units sold. Watch the cost position against rivals, the residual values the lender must guess right on the leases it owns, and the cash kept on hand for the downturn that always comes. The figures are in the record below.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Company excluding Ford Credit is 93% of revenue, so this is largely a single-segment business.
- Company excluding Ford Credit93%$174.0B
- Ford Credit7%$13.3B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $151.8B | $156.8B | $160.3B | $155.9B | $127.1B | $136.3B | $158.1B | $176.2B | $185.0B | $187.3B | $189.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 17% | 16% | 15% | 14% | 11% | 16% | 15% | 15% | 14% | 7% | 8% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 7% | 7% | 7% | 7% | 8% | 9% | 7% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 5% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 6% | 6% | 5% | 5% | 4% | 5% | 5% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $5.8B | $4.9B | $3.2B | $574M | ($4.4B) | $4.5B | $6.3B | $5.5B | $5.2B | ($9.2B) | ($7.2B) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 3.8% | 3.1% | 2.0% | 0.4% | −3.5% | 3.3% | 4.0% | 3.1% | 2.8% | −4.9% | −3.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $4.6B | $7.7B | $3.7B | $47M | ($1.3B) | $17.9B | ($2.0B) | $4.3B | $5.9B | ($8.2B) | ($6.1B) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 32% | 5% | 15% | — | — | -1% | — | -9% | 19% | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $19.9B | $18.1B | $15.0B | $17.6B | $24.3B | $15.8B | $6.9B | $14.9B | $15.4B | $21.3B | $18.9B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $2.1B | $9.2B | $9.4B | $10.5B | $8.8B | $7.3B | $7.7B | $7.7B | $7.6B | $16.0B | $16.0B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $12.9B | $878M | $1.8B | $6.9B | $16.6B | ($9.8B) | $824M | $2.4B | $1.5B | $13.0B | $8.5B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $7.0B | $7.0B | $7.8B | $7.6B | $5.7B | $6.2B | $6.9B | $8.2B | $8.7B | $8.8B | $9.4B | CapexCapex |
| 4.6% | 4.5% | 4.9% | 4.9% | 4.5% | 4.6% | 4.3% | 4.7% | 4.7% | 4.7% | 4.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $17.7B | $11.0B | $7.2B | $10.0B | $18.5B | $9.6B | ($13M) | $6.7B | $6.7B | $12.5B | $9.5B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 11.7% | 7.0% | 4.5% | 6.4% | 14.6% | 7.0% | −0.0% | 3.8% | 3.6% | 6.7% | 5.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $12.9B | $11.0B | $7.2B | $10.0B | $18.5B | $9.6B | ($13M) | $6.7B | $6.7B | $12.5B | $9.5B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 8.5% | 7.0% | 4.5% | 6.4% | 14.6% | 7.0% | −0.0% | 3.8% | 3.6% | 6.7% | 5.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $3.4B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $2.4B | $596M | $403M | $2.0B | $5.0B | $3.1B | $3.0B | $2.4B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $145M | $131M | $164M | $237M | $0 | $0 | $484M | $335M | $426M | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 16% | 22% | 10% | 0% | -4% | 37% | -5% | 10% | 13% | -23% | -16% | Return on equityROE |
| 4% | 14% | 2% | −7% | −6% | 36% | −9% | −2% | 6% | −31% | −23% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $38.8B | $38.9B | $34.0B | $34.7B | $50.0B | $49.6B | $44.1B | $40.2B | $38.3B | $38.5B | $30.5B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $11.1B | $10.6B | $11.2B | $9.2B | $10.0B | $11.4B | $15.7B | $15.6B | $14.7B | $15.4B | $17.2B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $8.9B | $11.2B | $11.2B | $10.8B | $10.8B | $12.1B | $14.1B | $15.7B | $15.0B | $15.3B | $16.5B | InventoryInvent. |
| $21.3B | $23.3B | $21.5B | $20.7B | $22.2B | $22.3B | $25.6B | $26.0B | $24.1B | $25.8B | $26.0B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($1.3B) | ($1.5B) | $895M | ($650M) | ($1.4B) | $1.1B | $4.2B | $5.3B | $5.5B | $4.9B | $7.7B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $108.5B | $116.8B | $114.6B | $114.0B | $116.7B | $109.0B | $116.5B | $121.5B | $124.5B | $123.5B | $116.3B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $90.3B | $94.6B | $95.6B | $98.1B | $97.2B | $90.7B | $96.9B | $101.5B | $106.9B | $114.9B | $106.7B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $50M | $75M | $264M | $278M | $258M | $619M | $603M | $683M | $658M | $483M | $483M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $238.5B | $258.5B | $256.5B | $258.5B | $267.3B | $257.0B | $255.9B | $273.3B | $285.2B | $289.2B | $282.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| 6.5× | 1.1× | 0.6× | 0.1× | -0.9× | 1.0× | 1.4× | 0.7× | 4.7× | -7.3× | -5.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $29.2B | $35.6B | $35.9B | $33.2B | $30.7B | $48.5B | $43.2B | $42.8B | $44.8B | $36.0B | $37.5B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 4.00B | 4.00B | 4.00B | 4.00B | 3.97B | 4.03B | 4.01B | 4.04B | 4.02B | 3.98B | 4.07B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $37.96 | $39.21 | $40.10 | $38.94 | $32.00 | $33.80 | $39.38 | $43.60 | $46.01 | $47.06 | $46.64 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.15 | $1.93 | $0.92 | $0.01 | $-0.32 | $4.45 | $-0.49 | $1.08 | $1.46 | $-2.06 | $-1.50 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $4.43 | $2.76 | $1.81 | $2.50 | $4.66 | $2.37 | $-0.00 | $1.65 | $1.68 | $3.13 | $2.34 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $3.22 | $2.76 | $1.81 | $2.50 | $4.66 | $2.37 | $-0.00 | $1.65 | $1.68 | $3.13 | $2.34 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.84 | $0.65 | $0.73 | $0.60 | $0.15 | $0.10 | $0.50 | $1.24 | $0.78 | $0.75 | $0.59 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $1.75 | $1.76 | $1.95 | $1.91 | $1.45 | $1.54 | $1.71 | $2.04 | $2.16 | $2.22 | $2.30 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $7.29 | $8.90 | $8.99 | $8.29 | $7.72 | $12.03 | $10.77 | $10.58 | $11.15 | $9.04 | $9.20 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +2.4%/yr | +8.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −3.8%/yr | −7.6%/yr |
| Dividends / share | −1.3%/yr | +38.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +2.7%/yr | +8.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +2.4%/yr | +3.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $8.2B loss into $12.5B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($8.2B) | $5.9B | $4.3B | ($2.0B) | $17.9B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$16.0B | +$7.6B | +$7.7B | +$7.7B | +$7.3B |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$510M | +$511M | +$460M | +$336M | +$305M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$13.0B | +$1.5B | +$2.4B | +$824M | −$9.8B |
| Cash from operations | $21.3B | $15.4B | $14.9B | $6.9B | $15.8B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$8.8B | −$8.7B | −$8.2B | −$6.9B | −$6.2B |
| Owner earnings | $12.5B | $6.7B | $6.7B | ($13M) | $9.6B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 7% | 4% | 4% | 0% | 7% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $510M), owner earnings is nearer $12.0B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -7.3×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($9.2B) ÷ interest expense $1.3B
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Debt under-captured — leverage unknown, not low
What this means
This company pays far more interest than its tagged debt implies (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so its net cash or net debt cannot be read honestly: the gap is unknown, not zero, and 'net cash' here would be exactly the fiction the figure is meant to prevent. Judge it on the record and owner earnings instead.
- TightDSO 30 + DIO 32 − DPO 54 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Debt under-capturedIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
This company's interest bill implies far more debt than its filings tag at the consolidated level (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so invested capital, and the return on it, cannot be read honestly. Judge this one on Owner Earnings and the record instead.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -0%–15%; latest $12.5B = operating cash $21.3B − maintenance capex $8.8BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $510M of SBC) leaves $12.0B.
- Are earnings backed by cash? $21.3BLoss, but cash-generativeNet income ($8.2B) · cash from operations $21.3B
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $3.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $12.5B
What this means
Of $12.5B Owner Earnings, $3.0B (24%) went back to shareholders, $3.0B dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.55×HarvestingCapex $8.8B ÷ depreciation $16.0B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $187.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.07×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt —Debt ≤ working capital · —
What this means
The filings tag only a fraction of the debt this company's interest bill implies (much of it sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so this test can't be run honestly.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −87%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.17/share (latest year $-2.05), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $9.01/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin 3% → 0% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 3% early to 0% lately, median 3% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Owner earnings growth −4%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 4% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · −4.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −0.1%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$30.5B
- Receivables$17.2B
- Inventory$16.5B
- Other current assets$52.1B
- Accounts payable$26.0B
- Other current liabilities$80.6B
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.8B, of which the leases are 87%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $169.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.
- Reinvested$74.0B · 44%
- Dividends$25.4B · 15%
- Buybacks$1.9B · 1%
- Retained (debt / cash)$67.8B · 40%
- Returned to owners$27.3B
27% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $25.4B as dividends and $1.9B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $142.5B and cash and short-term investments fell $8.3B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $1.9B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count1.8%
The diluted count rose from 3999M to 4071M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.75/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 1% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained−62%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($5.5B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $3.4B, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.62 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | James D. Farley, Jr. | $22.8M | $73.8M | $9.6B |
| 2022 | James D. Farley, Jr. | $21.0M | −$14.9M | ($13M) |
| 2023 | James D. Farley, Jr. | $26.5M | $29.4M | $6.7B |
| 2024 | James D. Farley, Jr. | $24.9M | $14.2M | $6.7B |
| 2025 | James D. Farley, Jr. | $27.5M | $49.2M | $12.5B |
| 2025 | James D. Farley, Jr. | $27.5M | $49.2M | $12.5B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- CEO pay ratio295:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$510M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Ford Motor Company is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?4.7% vs 7.7%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 7.7% early in the record and 4.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?13% → 18% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $20.0B to $33.8B while revenue grew 25%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (13% of revenue then, 18% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Automobiles
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FFord Motor Company | $187.3B | 15% | 3.0% | — | 7% |
| GMGeneral Motors Company | $168.0B | 11% | 5.9% | 4% | 6% |
| TSLATesla Inc. | $94.8B | 19% | 5.5% | 6% | 10% |
| BABoeing Company (The) | $89.5B | 6% | -1.8% | -8% | 1% |
| RTXRTX Corporation | $88.6B | 65% | 8.2% | 5% | 8% |
| LMTLockheed Martin Corporation | $75.0B | 13% | 12.9% | 34% | 9% |
| GDGeneral Dynamics Corporation | $52.5B | 19% | 10.9% | 14% | 8% |
| PCARPACCAR Inc. | $28.4B | 21% | 11.6% | 23% | 11% |
| Group median | — | 17% | 7.1% | — | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ford Motor Company has delivered.
Through the cycle, Ford Motor Company earns about $12.2B on its 6.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.7% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $9.5B on 3991M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $30.0B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← EZPW its page in the Manual FA →
Industry order: ← DCX the Automobiles chapter GGR →