Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← GLXY Manual GME → ← GGR Automobiles HMC →

GM, General Motors Company

Automobiles capital-intensive

General Motors designs and builds cars, trucks, and SUVs and sells them, mostly through independent dealers, to retail buyers and fleets. It also runs a financing arm that lends to those buyers and to the dealers who stock its vehicles, so it earns money both on the metal it ships and on the loans that move it. Making vehicles takes heavy plant, tooling, and engineering spending, which must be earned back sale by sale.

We provide automotive financing services through our General Motors Financial Company, Inc.

Our strong product portfolio exemplifies our deep design and engineering expertise, iconic brands, award winning vehicles, and clear outlook for the future, leading the U.S. auto industry in sales.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
GM · General Motors Company
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$168.0B
−2.1% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $167.5B 5-yr avg $151.0B
Operating margin 1.5% 5-yr avg 6.1%
ROIC 1% 5-yr avg 4%
Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin 9% 5-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
The governing question is whether GM sells a franchise or a commodity: in a business this capital-hungry, the test is whether the brands and the product command enough price, over the cost of the steel and the factories, to earn back what it costs to retool and keep the lineup fresh. Watch the cost position against rivals who compete on the same ground — price, quality, technology, and fuel economy — because vehicles are easy to cross-shop and a buyer faces little to hold him to the badge. Keep the bad case in plain view: demand swings with the credit cycle, a single supplier can halt a line, and the debt has to be rolled on terms the lenders set. The record below carries the margins, the returns on capital, and the debt that say which way it has gone.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$149.2B$145.6B$133.0B$122.7B$108.7B$113.6B$144.0B$157.7B$171.6B$168.0B$167.5BRevenueRevenue
18%20%9%10%10%11%40%Gross marginGross mgn
7%7%7%7%6%8%5%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$8.7B$8.7B$4.4B$5.5B$6.6B$9.3B$10.3B$9.3B$12.8B$2.9B$2.5BOperating incomeOp. inc.
5.8%5.9%3.3%4.5%6.1%8.2%7.2%5.9%7.4%1.7%1.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$9.4B($3.9B)$8.0B$6.7B$6.4B$10.0B$9.9B$10.1B$6.0B$2.7B$2.5BNet incomeNet inc.
23%6%10%22%22%16%5%30%11%9%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$16.6B$17.3B$15.3B$15.0B$16.7B$15.2B$16.0B$20.9B$20.1B$26.9B$23.8BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$9.7B$12.0B$13.1B$14.1B$12.7B$12.0B$11.3B$11.7B$11.5B$12.0B$12.1BDepreciationDeprec.
($2.5B)$9.2B($5.9B)($5.8B)($2.4B)($6.9B)($5.2B)($934M)$2.7B$12.2B$9.2BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$8.4B$8.5B$8.8B$7.6B$5.3B$7.5B$9.2B$11.0B$10.8B$9.3B$9.0BCapexCapex
5.6%5.8%6.6%6.2%4.9%6.6%6.4%7.0%6.3%5.5%5.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$8.2B$8.9B$6.5B$7.4B$11.4B$7.7B$6.8B$10.0B$9.3B$17.6B$14.8BOwner earningsOwner earn.
5.5%6.1%4.9%6.1%10.5%6.8%4.7%6.3%5.4%10.5%8.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$8.2B$8.9B$6.5B$7.4B$11.4B$7.7B$6.8B$10.0B$9.3B$17.6B$14.8BFree cash flowFCF
5.5%6.1%4.9%6.1%10.5%6.8%4.7%6.3%5.4%10.5%8.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$804M$41M$83M$83MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$2.4B$2.2B$2.2B$2.4B$669M$186M$397M$597M$653M$657M$705MDividends paidDiv. paid
$2.5B$4.5B$190M$0$90M$0$2.5B$11.1B$7.1B$6.0BBuybacksBuybacks
6%4%3%4%4%5%5%5%5%2%1%ROICROIC
22%-11%21%16%14%17%15%16%10%4%4%Return on equityROE
16%−17%15%10%13%16%14%15%8%3%3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$24.4B$23.8B$26.8B$19.1B$20.0B$20.1B$19.2B$18.9B$19.9B$20.9B$27.1BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$6.8B$8.0B$7.4B$13.3B$12.4B$12.8B$13.1B$16.4BReceivablesReceiv.
$11.0B$10.7B$9.8B$10.4B$10.2B$13.0B$15.4B$16.5B$14.6B$14.5B$15.6BInventoryInvent.
$23.3B$23.9B$22.3B$21.0B$19.9B$20.4B$27.5B$28.1B$25.7B$23.9B$27.9BAccounts payablePayables
($12.3B)($13.3B)($12.5B)($3.8B)($1.7B)($9M)$1.2B$725M$1.7B$3.6B$4.1BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$76.2B$68.7B$75.3B$75.0B$80.9B$82.1B$100.5B$101.6B$108.5B$108.8B$109.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$85.2B$76.9B$82.2B$84.9B$79.9B$74.4B$91.2B$94.4B$96.3B$93.3B$94.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×0.9×0.9×0.9×1.0×1.1×1.1×1.1×1.1×1.2×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9BGoodwillGoodwill
$221.7B$212.5B$227.3B$228.0B$235.2B$244.7B$264.0B$273.1B$279.8B$281.3B$281.0BTotal assetsAssets
$85.6B$95.3B$106.1B$104.0B$110.0B$109.9B$116.2B$123.5B$131.8B$131.6B$131.6BTotal debtDebt
$61.2B$71.5B$79.3B$84.9B$90.0B$89.8B$97.1B$104.6B$111.9B$110.6B$104.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
3.4×2.8×1.1×1.2×1.6×0.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$43.8B$35.0B$38.9B$41.8B$45.0B$59.7B$67.8B$64.3B$63.1B$61.1B$62.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
1.57B1.49B1.43B1.44B1.44B1.47B1.45B1.37B1.13B973M926MShares out (diluted)Shares
$95.02$97.58$92.97$85.27$75.36$77.38$99.02$115.16$152.00$172.63$180.84Revenue / shareRev/sh
$6.00$-2.59$5.60$4.68$4.46$6.82$6.83$7.40$5.32$2.77$2.74EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.24$5.95$4.54$5.16$7.88$5.23$4.68$7.28$8.24$18.05$15.94Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.24$5.95$4.54$5.16$7.88$5.23$4.68$7.28$8.24$18.05$15.94Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.51$1.50$1.57$1.63$0.46$0.13$0.27$0.44$0.58$0.68$0.76Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$5.34$5.67$6.12$5.28$3.68$5.12$6.35$8.01$9.59$9.56$9.72Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$27.92$23.46$27.16$29.04$31.23$40.70$46.62$46.96$55.87$62.82$67.67Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.9%/yr+18.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+14.7%/yr+18.0%/yr
EPS−8.2%/yr−9.1%/yr
Dividends / share−8.5%/yr+7.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+6.7%/yr+21.1%/yr
Book value / share+9.4%/yr+15.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
973Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
2%low FY2025
Gross margin
11%low FY2018
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
6.3×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$17.6Bowner earningsvs.$2.7Bnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $2.7B of profit into $17.6B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$2.7B
Owner earnings$17.6B · 10% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$2.7B$6.0B$10.1B$9.9B$10.0B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$12.0B+$11.5B+$11.7B+$11.3B+$12.0B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$12.2B+$2.7B−$934M−$5.2B−$6.9B
Cash from operations$26.9B$20.1B$20.9B$16.0B$15.2B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$9.3B−$10.8B−$11.0B−$9.2B−$7.5B
Owner earnings$17.6B$9.3B$10.0B$6.8B$7.7B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue10%5%6%5%7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $2.9B ÷ interest expense $4.1B
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $104.7B · 36.0× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $20.9B + ST investments $6.0B − debt $131.6B
    What this means

    Netting $26.9B of cash and short-term investments against $131.6B of debt leaves $104.7B owed, about 36.0× a year's operating profit (45.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 28 + DIO 53 − DPO 87 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 2%–6%; 2% latest = NOPAT $2.6B ÷ invested capital $171.7B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 5%–10%; latest $17.6B = operating cash $26.9B − maintenance capex $9.3B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $26.9B ÷ net income $2.7B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $6.7B ÷ Owner Earnings $17.6B
    What this means

    Of $17.6B Owner Earnings, $6.7B (38%) went back to shareholders, $657M dividends, $6.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.78×
    Harvesting
    Capex $9.3B ÷ depreciation $12.0B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $168.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.17×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $131.6B vs $15.4B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +39%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.96/share (latest year $2.99), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $67.78/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 5% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 5% early, 5% lately, median 6%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 3%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 1.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −5.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“Building on a century of innovation, we are leveraging software, hardware, artificial intelligence (AI), and sensors to produce safer, smarter, and more fuel efficient vehicles.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$109.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$26.8B
  • Receivables$16.4B
  • Inventory$15.6B
  • Other current assets$50.3B
Current liabilities$94.7B
  • Accounts payable$27.9B
  • Other current liabilities$66.8B
Current ratio1.15×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.99×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.28×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$14.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−0.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$58.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($107.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.3B$1.3B of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$11.0Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $180.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$86.3B · 48%
  • Dividends$12.4B · 7%
  • Buybacks$34.0B · 19%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$47.4B · 26%
  • Returned to owners$46.3B

    49% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $12.4B as dividends and $34.0B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $46.0B and cash and short-term investments rose $2.4B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$35.82

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 203M shares were bought for $7.3B, about $35.82 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $30.00 (2020) to $63.33 (2018); its heaviest year, 2017, paid $37.43 ($4.5B).

  • Net change in share count−41.0%

    The diluted count fell from 1570M to 926M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.68/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 9% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained23%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($19.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $4.4B, so each retained $1 added about 0.23 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Ms. Barra$29.1M$76.1M$7.7B
2022Ms. Barra$29.0M−$17.0M$6.8B
2023Ms. Barra$27.8M$21.7M$10.0B
2024Ms. Barra$29.5M$65.5M$9.3B
2025Ms. Barra$29.9M$87.8M$17.6B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why General Motors Company is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?7% → 9% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $11.0B to $15.6B while revenue grew 12%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (7% of revenue then, 9% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $4.9B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Automobiles

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
FFord Motor Company$187.3B15%3.0%7%
GMGeneral Motors Company$168.0B11%5.9%4%6%
TSLATesla Inc.$94.8B19%5.5%6%10%
BABoeing Company (The)$89.5B6%-1.8%-8%1%
RTXRTX Corporation$88.6B65%8.2%5%8%
LMTLockheed Martin Corporation$75.0B13%12.9%34%9%
GDGeneral Dynamics Corporation$52.5B19%10.9%14%8%
PCARPACCAR Inc.$28.4B21%11.6%23%11%
Group median17%7.1%6%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what General Motors Company has delivered.

General Motors Company’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, General Motors Company earns about $10.2B on its 6.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+17%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $14.8B on 902M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-17; net debt $104.5B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "General Motors Company (GM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GLXY its page in the Manual GME →

Industry order: ← GGR the Automobiles chapter HMC →