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CTRI, Centuri Holdings Inc.
We are a leading North American utility and energy infrastructure services company with over 115 years of operating history, and we partner with regulated utilities to maintain, upgrade and expand the energy network that powers millions of homes and businesses.
We serve as a long-term strategic partner to, and an extension of, North America's electric, gas, and combination utility providers, delivering a wide range of infrastructure solutions that ensure safe, reliable and environmentally sustainable energy operations.
Our service offerings primarily consist of the modernization of utility infrastructure through the replacement, maintenance, retrofitting, and installation of electric and natural gas distribution and utility-scale transmission networks and building capacity to meet current and future demands.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Master Services Agreement (78%) and Bid Contract (22%).
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 8.4% and operating margin about 3.1% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −2.7% to 3.3% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 3 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Master Services Agreement is 78% of revenue, with Bid Contract the other meaningful line at 22%.
- Master Services Agreement78%$2.3B
- Bid Contract22%$656M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2023–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||
| $2.9B | $2.6B | $3.0B | $3.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| 9% | 8% | 8% | 8% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($78M) | $87M | $93M | $101M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −2.7% | 3.3% | 3.1% | 3.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($186M) | ($7M) | $22M | $31M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||
| $167M | $158M | $78M | $26M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $119M | $109M | $112M | $111M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $233M | $54M | ($64M) | ($124M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $107M | $99M | $86M | $82M | CapexCapex |
| 3.7% | 3.8% | 2.9% | 2.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $61M | $59M | ($8M) | ($56M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 2.1% | 2.2% | −0.3% | −1.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $61M | $59M | ($8M) | ($56M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 2.1% | 2.2% | −0.3% | −1.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $46M | $46M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $15M | $0 | — | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| -4% | 5% | 6% | 7% | ROICROIC |
| -48% | -1% | 3% | 4% | Return on equityROE |
| −52% | −1% | — | 4% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||
| $33M | $49M | $127M | $60M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $347M | $281M | $315M | $353M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $117M | $126M | $194M | $142M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $231M | $156M | $121M | $211M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $683M | $601M | $881M | $806M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $421M | $382M | $496M | $429M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.6× | 1.6× | 1.8× | 1.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $376M | $368M | $396M | $394M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $2.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.2B | $874M | $738M | $729M | Total debtDebt |
| $1.1B | $825M | $611M | $668M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $387M | $556M | $873M | $862M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.3% | 0.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||
| 71.7M | 83.3M | 90.3M | 101M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $40.46 | $31.66 | $33.03 | $31.31 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-2.60 | $-0.08 | $0.25 | $0.31 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.85 | $0.71 | $-0.09 | $-0.55 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.85 | $0.71 | $-0.09 | $-0.55 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.21 | $0.00 | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $1.49 | $1.19 | $0.96 | $0.82 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $5.40 | $6.67 | $9.67 | $8.55 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The record, charted
FY2023–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $22M of profit but ($8M) of owner earnings: $31M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $22M | ($7M) | ($186M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$112M | +$109M | +$119M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$8M | +$2M | +$2M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$64M | +$54M | +$233M |
| Cash from operations | $78M | $158M | $167M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$86M | −$99M | −$107M |
| Owner earnings | ($8M) | $59M | $61M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 0% | 2% | 2% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $8M), owner earnings is nearer ($16M).
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $611M · 6.6× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $127M − debt $738M
What this means
Netting $127M of cash and short-term investments against $738M of debt leaves $611M owed, about 6.6× a year's operating profit (7.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 39 + DIO 0 − DPO 26 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle3-yr median, range -4%–6%; 6% latest = NOPAT $93M ÷ invested capital $1.5BIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle3-yr median margin, range -0%–2%; latest ($8M) = operating cash $78M − maintenance capex $86MIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -0% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 3 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $8M of SBC) leaves ($16M).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $78M ÷ net income $22M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.77×HarvestingCapex $86M ÷ depreciation $112M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $3.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.78×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $738M vs $385M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.56/share (latest year $0.22), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.65/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 29, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$60M
- Receivables$353M
- Other current assets$392M
- Debt due within a year$30M
- Accounts payable$142M
- Other current liabilities$257M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 3-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$214M written down across 1 year (2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 3-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Stock-based compensation$8M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 9% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$2.1B · 65% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Our top 20 customers are almost exclusively investment-grade utilities and represented 65% of our revenues during fiscal 2025.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Construction & Engineering
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WESWestern Midstream Partners LP Common | $3.8B | 73% | 43.1% | — | 38% |
| NGLNGL ENERGY PARTNERS LP Common | $3.2B | 14% | 2.8% | — | 1% |
| CTRICenturi Holdings Inc. | $3.0B | 8% | 3.1% | 5% | 2% |
| TLNTalen Energy Corporation | $2.6B | — | 3.5% | 2% | 4% |
| OGSONE Gas | $2.6B | 57% | 17.9% | 6% | -6% |
| SRSpire | $2.5B | 53% | 18.5% | 6% | 12% |
| NJRNew Jersey Resources | $2.0B | 37% | 12.5% | 7% | 1% |
| SWXSouthwest Gas Holdings | $1.9B | 51% | 12.6% | 6% | 8% |
| Group median | — | 51% | 12.6% | 6% | 3% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Centuri Holdings Inc. has delivered.
Centuri Holdings Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ($56M) on 101M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $668M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
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