Owner Scorecard


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BZ, KANZHUN LIMITED

Software asset-light

A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · figures as filed, in CNY · 1 ADS = 2 ordinary shares
BZ · KANZHUN LIMITED
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
CN¥8.3B
+12.4% YoY · 34% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue CN¥8.3B 5-yr avg CN¥6.1B
Gross margin 85% 5-yr avg 84%
Operating margin 29.8% 5-yr avg 5.7%
ROIC 13% 5-yr avg 5%
Owner-earnings margin 54% 5-yr avg 40%
Free cash flow margin 54% 5-yr avg 34%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 30% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −2.9%) on a 85% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −62 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 37% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
CN¥999MCN¥1.9BCN¥4.3BCN¥4.5BCN¥6.0BCN¥7.4BCN¥8.3BCN¥8.3BRevenueRevenue
86%88%87%83%82%83%85%85%Gross marginGross mgn
(CN¥512M)(CN¥945M)(CN¥1.0B)(CN¥130M)CN¥581MCN¥1.2BCN¥2.5BCN¥2.5BOperating incomeOp. inc.
−51.3%−48.6%−24.3%−2.9%9.8%15.9%29.8%29.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
(CN¥502M)(CN¥942M)(CN¥1.1B)CN¥107MCN¥1.1BCN¥1.6BCN¥2.7BCN¥2.7BNet incomeNet inc.
8%10%14%16%16%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
(CN¥106M)CN¥396MCN¥1.6BCN¥1.0BCN¥3.0BCN¥3.5BCN¥4.6BCN¥4.6BOperating cash flowOp. cash
CN¥18MCN¥41MCN¥80MCN¥140MCN¥259MCN¥468MCN¥518MCN¥259MDepreciationDeprec.
CN¥378MCN¥1.3BCN¥2.6BCN¥756MCN¥1.7BCN¥1.5BCN¥1.3BCN¥1.6BWorking capital & otherWC & other
CN¥64MCN¥138MCN¥260MCN¥340MCN¥956MCN¥856MCN¥119MCN¥119MCapexCapex
6.4%7.1%6.1%7.5%16.1%11.6%1.4%1.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
(CN¥124M)CN¥355MCN¥1.6BCN¥863MCN¥2.8BCN¥3.1BCN¥4.4BCN¥4.4BOwner earningsOwner earn.
−12.4%18.2%36.7%19.1%46.8%41.8%53.6%53.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
(CN¥170M)CN¥258MCN¥1.4BCN¥663MCN¥2.1BCN¥2.7BCN¥4.4BCN¥4.4BFree cash flowFCF
−17.0%13.3%32.4%14.7%35.1%36.5%53.6%53.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
CN¥563MCN¥553MCN¥553MDividends paidDiv. paid
CN¥0CN¥0CN¥12MCN¥919MCN¥72MCN¥1.7BCN¥143MBuybacksBuybacks
-6%5%8%13%13%ROICROIC
-10%1%8%11%13%13%Return on equityROE
4%11%11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
CN¥407MCN¥4.5BCN¥12.2BCN¥12.4BCN¥6.0BCN¥9.2BCN¥13.6BCN¥13.6BCash & investmentsCash+inv
CN¥7MCN¥1MCN¥10MCN¥17MCN¥41MCN¥33MCN¥33MReceivablesReceiv.
CN¥3MCN¥2MCN¥2MInventoryInvent.
CN¥42MCN¥53MCN¥185MCN¥629MCN¥111MCN¥120MCN¥120MAccounts payablePayables
(CN¥35M)(CN¥52M)(CN¥175M)(CN¥612M)(CN¥67M)(CN¥84M)(CN¥84M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
CN¥4.7BCN¥13.0BCN¥13.8BCN¥13.4BCN¥15.1BCN¥20.4BCN¥20.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
CN¥1.7BCN¥2.8BCN¥3.0BCN¥4.4BCN¥4.2BCN¥4.4BCN¥4.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.8×4.7×4.6×3.1×3.6×4.7×4.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
CN¥6MCN¥6MCN¥7MCN¥7MCN¥7MGoodwillGoodwill
CN¥5.1BCN¥13.6BCN¥14.8BCN¥17.9BCN¥19.3BCN¥24.6BCN¥24.6BTotal assetsAssets
(CN¥407M)(CN¥4.5B)(CN¥12.2B)(CN¥12.4B)(CN¥6.0B)(CN¥9.2B)(CN¥13.6B)(CN¥13.6B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
(CN¥1.7B)(CN¥2.3B)CN¥10.7BCN¥11.6BCN¥13.4BCN¥14.9BCN¥20.0BCN¥20.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
10.7M11.1M52.9M91.2M90.3M90.9M92.7M100MShares out (diluted)Shares
CN¥93.24CN¥174.89CN¥80.46CN¥49.46CN¥65.93CN¥80.90CN¥89.19CN¥82.61Revenue / shareRev/sh
CN¥-46.87CN¥-84.72CN¥-20.23CN¥1.18CN¥12.18CN¥17.23CN¥29.02CN¥26.88EPS (diluted)EPS
CN¥-11.55CN¥31.92CN¥29.49CN¥9.46CN¥30.89CN¥33.81CN¥47.82CN¥44.30Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
CN¥-15.84CN¥23.18CN¥26.10CN¥7.27CN¥23.17CN¥29.55CN¥47.82CN¥44.30Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
CN¥6.24CN¥5.97CN¥5.53Dividends / shareDiv/sh
CN¥5.98CN¥12.43CN¥4.91CN¥3.73CN¥10.58CN¥9.42CN¥1.29CN¥1.19Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
CN¥-155.06CN¥-206.90CN¥201.65CN¥127.62CN¥148.76CN¥163.52CN¥216.08CN¥200.15Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×4.76 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.72 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Share counts before TTM are restated ×1/10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
6-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−0.7%/yr−12.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+8.4%/yr
Dividends / share−2.2%/yr (2-yr)−2.2%/yr (2-yr)
Capital spending / share−22.6%/yr−36.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
927Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
13%low FY2022
Gross margin
85%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

CN¥4.4Bowner earningsvs.CN¥2.7Bnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2020FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned CN¥2.7B of profit into CN¥4.4B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net incomeCN¥2.7B
Owner earningsCN¥4.4B · 54% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net incomeCN¥2.7BCN¥1.6BCN¥1.1BCN¥107M(CN¥1.1B)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+CN¥518M+CN¥468M+CN¥259M+CN¥140M+CN¥80M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+CN¥1.3B+CN¥1.5B+CN¥1.7B+CN¥756M+CN¥2.6B
Cash from operationsCN¥4.6BCN¥3.5BCN¥3.0BCN¥1.0BCN¥1.6B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−CN¥119M−CN¥468M−CN¥259M−CN¥140M−CN¥80M
Owner earningsCN¥4.4BCN¥3.1BCN¥2.8BCN¥863MCN¥1.6B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−CN¥388M−CN¥697M−CN¥200M−CN¥180M
Free cash flowCN¥4.4BCN¥2.7BCN¥2.1BCN¥663MCN¥1.4B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue54%42%47%19%37%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash CN¥4.1B + ST investments CN¥9.5B − debt CN¥0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by CN¥13.6B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 1 + DIO 1 − DPO 35 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median -0%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • High through the cycle
    7-yr median margin, range -12%–54%; latest CN¥4.4B = operating cash CN¥4.6B − maintenance capex CN¥119M
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 54% of revenue this year, a 37% median across 7 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops CN¥4.6B ÷ net income CN¥2.7B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks CN¥696M ÷ Owner Earnings CN¥4.4B
    What this means

    Of CN¥4.4B Owner Earnings, CN¥696M (16%) went back to shareholders, CN¥553M dividends, CN¥143M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.46×
    Harvesting
    Capex CN¥119M ÷ depreciation CN¥259M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size
    Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · CN¥8.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.66×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (7-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 2 of 6 tagged yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design. One year of this record is untagged in the data, with the dividend paid on both sides; a lone missing tag is treated as unknown, not a suspension, so the streak is judged on the tagged years.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are CN¥1.93/share (latest year CN¥2.90), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is CN¥21.61/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 7
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −41% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −41% early to 19% lately, median −3% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Owner earnings growth +79%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 79% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · −51.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 2 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assetsCN¥20.4B
  • Cash & short-term investmentsCN¥13.6B
  • ReceivablesCN¥33M
  • InventoryCN¥2M
  • Other current assetsCN¥6.8B
Current liabilitiesCN¥4.4B
  • Accounts payableCN¥120M
  • Other current liabilitiesCN¥4.3B
Current ratio4.66×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio4.66×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio3.10×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capitalCN¥16.0Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueCN¥19.9Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset valueCN¥15.9BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesCN¥94MCN¥94M of it operating leases
Deferred revenueCN¥3.2Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated CN¥14.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

  • ReinvestedCN¥2.7B · 19%
  • DividendsCN¥1.1B · 8%
  • BuybacksCN¥2.8B · 20%
  • Retained (debt / cash)CN¥7.4B · 53%
  • Returned to ownersCN¥3.9B

    30% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, CN¥1.1B as dividends and CN¥2.8B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose CN¥13.1B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran CN¥2.8B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count834.3%

    The diluted count rose from 11M to 100M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend recordCN¥5.97/sh

    Paid in 2 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 4% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why KANZHUN LIMITED is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?834.3%

    Diluted shares grew 834.3% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent CN¥2.8B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
FLUTFlutter Entertainment plc$16.4B48%-0.4%-0%8%
CACICACI International Inc.$8.6B7%8.0%9%6%
BZKANZHUN LIMITEDCN¥8.3B85%-2.9%6%37%
SNAPSnap Inc.$5.9B55%-32.4%-24%-4%
APPAppLovin$5.5B70%19.6%10%17%
ZMZoom$4.9B76%11.6%8%33%
PINSPinterest Inc.$4.2B76%-4.1%-5%16%
NIQNIQ Global Intelligence plc$4.2B-2.5%-2%1%
Group median70%-1.4%3%12%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American depositary shares (each ADS represents two of our Class”; KANZHUN LIMITED reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what KANZHUN LIMITED has delivered.

KANZHUN LIMITED’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, KANZHUN LIMITED earns about $447M on its 36.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 53.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+33%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+108%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $654M on 463M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $2.0B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "KANZHUN LIMITED (BZ), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BZ, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BWMX its page in the Manual BZUN →

Industry order: ← BSY the Software chapter CACI →