Owner Scorecard


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CAE, CAE Inc.

Aerospace & Defense capital-intensive Cyclical

Revenue is Civil Aviation (58%) and Defense and Security (42%).

Latest annual: FY2025 40-F · figures as filed, in CAD · US listing is the ordinary share
CAE · CAE Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
C$4.7B
+9.9% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue C$4.7B 5-yr avg C$3.9B
Gross margin 28% 5-yr avg 27%
Operating margin 15.5% 5-yr avg 6.6%
ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 4%
Owner-earnings margin 11% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin 11% 5-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 28% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −4.3% and 16% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 16% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 2 segments, the largest Civil Aviation at 58%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Civil Aviation58%C$2.7B
  • Defense and Security42%C$2.0B
By geographyUnited States48%Asia16%Europe14%Canada10%United Kingdom6%Oceania and Africa3%Rest of Americas3%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2025
Income statement
C$2.7BC$2.8BC$3.3BC$3.6BC$3.0BC$3.4BC$4.0BC$4.3BC$4.7BC$4.7BRevenueRevenue
30%31%28%30%26%28%27%27%28%28%Gross marginGross mgn
C$365MC$463MC$481MC$537MC$48MC$284MC$466M(C$185M)C$729MC$729MOperating incomeOp. inc.
13.5%16.4%14.5%14.8%1.6%8.4%11.6%−4.3%15.5%15.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
C$252MC$346MC$330MC$311M(C$47M)C$142MC$223M(C$304M)C$405MC$405MNet incomeNet inc.
12%8%15%19%2%22%20%20%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
C$464MC$403MC$530MC$545MC$367MC$418MC$408MC$567MC$897MC$897MOperating cash flowOp. cash
C$123MC$121MC$217MC$305MC$320MC$311MC$342MC$375MC$415MC$415MDepreciationDeprec.
C$90M(C$64M)(C$17M)(C$72M)C$94M(C$34M)(C$157M)C$496MC$77MC$77MWorking capital & otherWC & other
C$223MC$174MC$252MC$283MC$108MC$272MC$269MC$330MC$356MC$356MCapexCapex
8.2%6.2%7.6%7.8%3.6%8.1%6.7%7.7%7.6%7.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
C$342MC$283MC$279MC$262MC$259MC$146MC$140MC$237MC$540MC$540MOwner earningsOwner earn.
12.6%10.0%8.4%7.2%8.7%4.3%3.5%5.5%11.5%11.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
C$241MC$229MC$279MC$262MC$259MC$146MC$140MC$237MC$540MC$540MFree cash flowFCF
8.9%8.1%8.4%7.2%8.7%4.3%3.5%5.5%11.5%11.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
C$81MC$90MC$100MC$111MC$0C$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
12%15%10%9%4%5%-2%8%8%ROICROIC
13%16%14%13%-2%4%5%-7%8%8%Return on equityROE
9%11%10%8%−2%8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
C$505MC$612MC$446MC$947MC$926MC$346MC$218MC$160MC$294MC$294MCash & investmentsCash+inv
C$450MC$452MC$496MC$566MC$519MC$557MC$616MC$625MC$612MC$612MReceivablesReceiv.
C$549MC$516MC$537MC$616MC$648MC$520MC$583MC$574MC$595MC$595MInventoryInvent.
C$686MC$667MC$884MC$934MC$946MC$975MC$1.0BC$1.0BC$1.2BC$1.2BAccounts payablePayables
C$313MC$301MC$149MC$248MC$221MC$102MC$162MC$163MC$16MC$16MOperating working capitalOper. WC
C$2.0BC$2.1BC$2.1BC$2.8BC$3.4BC$2.1BC$2.2BC$2.0BC$2.1BC$2.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
C$1.4BC$1.5BC$1.9BC$2.1BC$2.6BC$2.1BC$2.2BC$2.4BC$2.7BC$2.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×1.4×1.1×1.4×1.3×1.0×1.0×0.9×0.8×0.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
C$1.2BC$2.5BC$2.7BC$2.0BC$2.4BC$2.4BGoodwillGoodwill
C$5.4BC$5.8BC$7.2BC$8.5BC$8.7BC$9.6BC$10.4BC$9.8BC$11.2BC$11.2BTotal assetsAssets
C$1.2BC$1.2BC$2.1BC$3.1BC$2.1BC$2.8BC$3.0BC$2.8BC$3.1BC$3.1BTotal debtDebt
C$699MC$597MC$1.6BC$2.2BC$1.2BC$2.5BC$2.8BC$2.6BC$2.8BC$2.8BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
4.3×5.1×4.9×3.4×0.3×2.0×2.5×-0.8×3.1×3.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
C$2.0BC$2.2BC$2.3BC$2.5BC$3.1BC$4.0BC$4.5BC$4.2BC$4.9BC$4.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
269M268M267M266M272M311M318M318M319M319MShares out (diluted)Shares
C$10.07C$10.53C$12.39C$13.62C$10.96C$10.84C$12.63C$13.46C$14.75C$14.75Revenue / shareRev/sh
C$0.94C$1.29C$1.24C$1.17C$-0.17C$0.46C$0.70C$-0.96C$1.27C$1.27EPS (diluted)EPS
C$1.27C$1.05C$1.05C$0.98C$0.95C$0.47C$0.44C$0.75C$1.69C$1.69Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
C$0.90C$0.86C$1.05C$0.98C$0.95C$0.47C$0.44C$0.75C$1.69C$1.69Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
C$0.30C$0.34C$0.37C$0.42C$0.00C$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
C$0.83C$0.65C$0.94C$1.07C$0.40C$0.88C$0.85C$1.04C$1.12C$1.12Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
C$7.27C$8.31C$8.75C$9.36C$11.55C$12.89C$14.19C$13.28C$15.33C$15.33Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.9%/yr+1.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+3.7%/yr+11.5%/yr
EPS+3.9%/yr+1.6%/yr
Capital spending / share+3.8%/yr+0.9%/yr
Book value / share+9.8%/yr+10.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
319Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
8%low FY2024
Gross margin
28%low FY2021
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
5.1×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

C$540Mowner earningsvs.C$405Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned C$405M of profit into C$540M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net incomeC$405M
Owner earningsC$540M · 11% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net incomeC$405M(C$304M)C$223MC$142M(C$47M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+C$415M+C$375M+C$342M+C$311M+C$320M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+C$77M+C$496M−C$157M−C$34M+C$94M
Cash from operationsC$897MC$567MC$408MC$418MC$367M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−C$356M−C$330M−C$269M−C$272M−C$108M
Owner earningsC$540MC$237MC$140MC$146MC$259M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue11%6%3%4%9%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 40-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income C$729M ÷ interest expense C$237M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? C$2.8B · 3.8× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash C$294M − debt C$3.1B
    What this means

    Netting C$294M of cash and short-term investments against C$3.1B of debt leaves C$2.8B owed, about 3.8× a year's operating profit (4.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 47 + DIO 64 − DPO 128 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -2%–15%; 8% latest = NOPAT C$586M ÷ invested capital C$7.7B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range 3%–13%; latest C$540M = operating cash C$897M − maintenance capex C$356M
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 9 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops C$897M ÷ net income C$405M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks C$21M ÷ Owner Earnings C$540M
    What this means

    Of C$540M Owner Earnings, C$21M (4%) went back to shareholders, C$0 dividends, C$21M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.86×
    Maintaining
    Capex C$356M ÷ depreciation C$415M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size
    Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · C$4.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.80×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · C$3.1B vs (C$543M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 4 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −65%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are C$0.34/share (latest year C$1.27), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is C$15.27/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 9
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 15% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    The recent-years average (8%) sits below the early years (15%), but the latest year (15%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 13% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −3%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +3%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 3% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · −4.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +2.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    Results have held roughly flat while the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary — watch whether the words are doing work the numbers are not.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“In addition, some trends are currently accelerating, such as the integration of artificial intelligence ( AI ) to improve the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of existing aerospace and aviation technology solutions, as well as potential regulatory changes increasing simulato…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assetsC$2.1B
  • Cash & short-term investmentsC$294M
  • ReceivablesC$612M
  • InventoryC$595M
  • Other current assetsC$643M
Current liabilitiesC$2.7B
  • Accounts payableC$1.2B
  • Other current liabilitiesC$1.5B
Current ratio0.80×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.58×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.11×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital(C$543M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Deeper floors
Tangible book valueC$2.5Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(C$4.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesC$3.3BC$260M of it operating leases
Deferred revenueC$1.0Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'27C$184M
'28C$476M
'29C$653M
'30C$123M
'31C$236M
laterC$800M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2031, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 monthsC$184Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two yearsC$660Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single yearC$653Min 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principalC$2.5Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2025C$294M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)C$540M
Together, against C$184M due next year4.5×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2025 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to C$834M against the C$184M due in the twelve months after the Mar 31, 2026 schedule: 4.5 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Mar 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated C$4.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • ReinvestedC$2.3B · 49%
  • DividendsC$381M · 8%
  • BuybacksC$21M · 0%
  • Retained (debt / cash)C$1.9B · 42%
  • Returned to ownersC$403M

    16% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, C$381M as dividends and C$21M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose C$1.9B and cash and short-term investments fell C$211M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran C$21M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count18.7%

    The diluted count rose from 269M to 319M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend recordC$0.00/sh

    Paid in 4 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained0%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (C$1.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew C$5M, so each retained C$1 added about 0.00 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

GoodwillC$2.4B22% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity50%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiringC$0over 9 years buying other businesses, against C$2.3B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why CAE Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?18.7%

    Diluted shares grew 18.7% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent C$21M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?C$1.2B → C$3.1B

    Debt rose from C$1.2B to C$3.1B while owner earnings went from about C$301M to C$306M — about 4.0 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 10 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Aerospace & Defense

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CIENCiena Corporation$4.8B43%7.5%9%9%
CAECAE Inc.C$4.7B28%13.5%8%8%
GNRCGenerac$4.2B36%14.5%14%11%
ENSEnerSys$3.8B31%12.1%10%11%
ENREnergizer Holdings$3.0B39%11.4%9%10%
ATKRAtkore$2.9B28%13.6%20%12%
SPBSpectrum Brands Holdings$2.8B34%3.8%3%6%
FLNCFluence Energy Inc.$2.3B4%-5.0%-32%-6%
Group median32%11.8%9%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. CAE Inc.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself; figures in this tool are translated at CAD 1 = $0.712 (2026-07-17, reference rate); the dollar quote then reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CAD.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what CAE Inc. has delivered.

CAE Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

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Through the cycle, CAE Inc. earns about $283M on its 8.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+18%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $385M on 320M shares outstanding, per the 40-F cover, as of 2025-03-31; net debt $2.0B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "CAE Inc. (CAE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CAE, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CAAS its page in the Manual CAMT →

Industry order: ← BWXT the Aerospace & Defense chapter CW →