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CARG, CarGurus Inc. Class A Common Stock

E-Commerce & Marketplaces asset-light Cyclical

CarGurus is a multinational automotive platform helping consumers and dealers confidently buy and sell vehicles.

CarGurus' selection, trusted automotive insights, and data-driven products and solutions support each shopper's journey — from online research and shopping to in-dealership decisions — to empower them at every step.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CARG · CarGurus Inc. Class A Common Stock

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$907M

+13.7% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $938M 5-yr avg $1.0B

Operating margin 24.9% 5-yr avg 17.2%

ROIC 104% 5-yr avg 43%

Owner-earnings margin 31% 5-yr avg 20%

Free cash flow margin 31% 5-yr avg 19%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 91% and operating margin about 6.6% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 4.3% and 27% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −172 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on debt terms & refinancing, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 32%, above 15% in 8 of 9 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$198M	$317M	$454M	$589M	$551M	$951M	$1.7B	$698M	$798M	$907M	$938M	RevenueRevenue
6%	7%	9%	9%	11%	10%	4%	14%	13%	11%	11%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
6%	7%	11%	12%	16%	11%	7%	20%	17%	15%	15%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$9M	$15M	$23M	$34M	$98M	$148M	$108M	$120M	$157M	$244M	$234M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
4.3%	4.8%	5.1%	5.8%	17.7%	15.6%	6.6%	17.2%	19.7%	27.0%	24.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$6M	$13M	$65M	$42M	$78M	$109M	$84M	$37M	$21M	$156M	$149M	Net incomeNet inc.
27%	17%	—	-9%	22%	26%	28%	56%	—	26%	26%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$20M	$26M	$52M	$70M	$157M	$98M	$256M	$125M	$255M	$295M	$297M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$2M	$4M	$5M	$8M	$10M	$40M	$45M	$48M	$25M	$28M	$29M	DepreciationDeprec.
$11M	$4M	($39M)	($14M)	$24M	($105M)	$72M	($25M)	$147M	$61M	$68M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$6M	$5M	$6M	$11M	$3M	$8M	$6M	$25M	$75M	$6M	$5M	CapexCapex
3.0%	1.6%	1.3%	1.9%	0.5%	0.8%	0.4%	3.5%	9.4%	0.7%	0.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$18M	$22M	$46M	$62M	$154M	$91M	$250M	$100M	$230M	$289M	$293M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
9.1%	6.9%	10.1%	10.6%	27.9%	9.5%	15.1%	14.3%	28.8%	31.9%	31.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$14M	$21M	$46M	$59M	$154M	$91M	$250M	$100M	$180M	$289M	$293M	Free cash flowFCF
7.1%	6.5%	10.1%	10.0%	27.9%	9.5%	15.1%	14.3%	22.6%	31.9%	31.2%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	$19M	$21M	$64M	—	—	—	—	$64M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	—	—	$14M	$209M	$146M	$352M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	32%	15%	17%	42%	38%	30%	18%	33%	98%	104%	ROICROIC
—	10%	34%	16%	21%	21%	11%	6%	4%	42%	63%	Return on equityROE
—	10%	34%	16%	21%	21%	11%	6%	4%	42%	63%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$74M	$138M	$35M	$60M	$190M	$232M	$470M	$312M	$304M	$191M	$72M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$7M	$13M	$13M	$22M	$18M	$189M	$47M	$40M	$38M	$42M	$45M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	—	—	—	—	$20M	$5M	$331K	$338K	—	$0	InventoryInvent.
$16M	$24M	$34M	$37M	$22M	$66M	$33M	$48M	$22M	$29M	$31M	Accounts payablePayables
($10M)	($11M)	($21M)	($15M)	($3M)	$143M	$20M	($8M)	$17M	$13M	$14M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$86M	$157M	$195M	$219M	$332M	$563M	$557M	$391M	$391M	$283M	$162M	Current assetsCur. assets
$29M	$43M	$64M	$74M	$67M	$171M	$99M	$115M	$93M	$101M	$98M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.9×	3.7×	3.1×	3.0×	5.0×	3.3×	5.6×	3.4×	4.2×	2.8×	1.7×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	—	$15M	$29M	$158M	$157M	$158M	$27M	$28M	$28M	GoodwillGoodwill
$100M	$177M	$268M	$394M	$502M	$932M	$927M	$919M	$825M	$662M	$520M	Total assetsAssets
—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	Total debtDebt
($74M)	($138M)	($35M)	($60M)	($190M)	($232M)	($470M)	($312M)	($304M)	($191M)	($72M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
329.7×	526.7×	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8064.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($68M)	$127M	$194M	$257M	$374M	$517M	$735M	$617M	$542M	$374M	$237M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%	1.6%	4.6%	5.8%	8.2%	5.6%	3.3%	9.1%	7.8%	5.6%	5.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
44.1M	60.6M	113M	113M	114M	117M	128M	114M	106M	100M	95.1M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$4.49	$5.23	$4.01	$5.19	$4.84	$8.12	$12.91	$6.12	$7.51	$9.03	$9.87	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.15	$0.22	$0.57	$0.37	$0.68	$0.93	$0.66	$0.32	$0.20	$1.55	$1.57	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.41	$0.36	$0.40	$0.55	$1.35	$0.77	$1.95	$0.88	$2.17	$2.88	$3.08	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.32	$0.34	$0.40	$0.52	$1.35	$0.77	$1.95	$0.88	$1.70	$2.88	$3.08	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.13	$0.09	$0.05	$0.10	$0.03	$0.07	$0.05	$0.22	$0.71	$0.06	$0.05	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-1.54	$2.09	$1.71	$2.26	$3.28	$4.41	$5.73	$5.40	$5.10	$3.73	$2.49	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.87 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+8.1%/yr	+13.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+24.3%/yr	+16.3%/yr
EPS	+29.9%/yr	+17.9%/yr
Capital spending / share	−7.8%/yr	+19.6%/yr
Book value / share	—	+2.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

100Mpeak FY2022

ROIC

98%low FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$289Mowner earningsvs.$156Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $156M of profit into $289M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$156M

Owner earnings$289M · 32% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$156M	$21M	$37M	$84M	$109M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$28M	+$25M	+$48M	+$45M	+$40M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$50M	+$62M	+$64M	+$55M	+$54M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$61M	+$147M	−$25M	+$72M	−$105M
Cash from operations	$295M	$255M	$125M	$256M	$98M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$6M	−$25M	−$25M	−$6M	−$8M
Owner earnings	$289M	$230M	$100M	$250M	$91M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	−$50M	—	—	—
Free cash flow	$289M	$180M	$100M	$250M	$91M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	32%	29%	14%	15%	10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $50M), owner earnings is nearer $238M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 8429.1×

Comfortable

Operating income $244M ÷ interest expense $29K

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$191M

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $191M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $191M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -144d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 17 + DIO 2 − DPO 162 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 32%

Very high (≥25%) through the cycle

9-yr median, range 15%–98%; 98% latest = NOPAT $180M ÷ invested capital $184M

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 98% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 11%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 7%–32%; latest $289M = operating cash $295M − maintenance capex $6M

Industry peers: median 13%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 32% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $50M of SBC) leaves $238M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.89×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $295M ÷ net income $156M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 122%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $352M ÷ Owner Earnings $289M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $289M of Owner Earnings, $352M (122%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $352M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $50M stock comp, the real buyback was about $301M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.23×

Harvesting

Capex $6M ÷ depreciation $28M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $907M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.81×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $182M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +152%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.76/share (latest year $1.66), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.98/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 5 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 5% → 21% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 5% early to 21% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +33%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 33% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · 4.3% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

Despite the structural exposure, the filing positions AI as something it uses, not a threat to its product.

“Following the wind-down, we will continu e to deliver AI-powered inventory intelligence through our insights platform and enable consumer vehicle sourcing at scale through Sell My Car, and will focus on technology and analytics that will enable smarter sourcing and pricing decisi…”

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$162M

Cash & short-term investments$72M
Receivables$45M
Other current assets$45M

Current liabilities$98M

Accounts payable$31M
Other current liabilities$67M

Current ratio1.65×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.65×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.74×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$64Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+14.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.6× → 1.7×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$206Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($121M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$188M$188M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$25Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$151M · 11%
Buybacks$721M · 53%
Retained (debt / cash)$482M · 36%

Returned to owners$721M
57% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $721M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$19.65
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 19M shares were bought for $369M, about $19.65 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $10.68 (2022) to $22.99 (2024); its heaviest year, 2023, paid $18.83 ($209M).
Net change in share count115.4%
The diluted count rose from 44M to 95M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$32M5% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity8%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$104Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $151M of capital spent building

$115M written down across 1 year (2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	—	$19.2M	$16.8M	$91M
2022	—	$1.5M	−$5.9M	$250M
2022	—	$1.5M	−$5.9M	$250M
2023	—	$3.8M	$6.9M	$100M
2023	—	$3.8M	$6.9M	$100M
2024	—	$7.8M	$11.9M	$230M
2024	—	$7.8M	$11.9M	$230M
2025	Mr. Trevisan	$7.9M	$9.2M	$289M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

Insider ownership2.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$50M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 6% of revenue, equal to 21% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why CarGurus Inc. Class A Common Stock is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?115.4%
Diluted shares grew 115.4% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $721M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?3% → 5% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $7M to $45M while revenue grew 374%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (3% of revenue then, 5% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, E-Commerce & Marketplaces

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
SSTKShutterstock Inc.	$990M	59%	7.7%	24%	13%
EVTCEvertec Inc.	$932M	100%	26.5%	15%	33%
CARGCarGurus Inc. Class A Common Stock	$907M	—	11.1%	32%	12%
NRDSNerdWallet Inc.	$837M	92%	0.8%	1%	10%
RAMPLiveRamp Holdings Inc.	$813M	69%	-24.1%	-13%	1%
GDRXGoodRx Holdings Inc.	$797M	—	5.1%	2%	20%
UPWKUpwork Inc.	$788M	73%	-5.3%	-7%	3%
CARSCars.com Inc. Common Stock	$723M	90%	8.1%	5%	21%
Group median	—	—	6.4%	4%	13%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what CarGurus Inc. Class A Common Stock has delivered.

CarGurus Inc. Class A Common Stock’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, CarGurus Inc. Class A Common Stock earns about $113M on its 12.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 31.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($113M) Net of stock comp (−$51M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+11%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+34%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $293M on 94M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $72M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CARG against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "CarGurus Inc. Class A Common Stock (CARG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CARG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CARE its page in the Manual CARR →

Industry order: ← BZUN the E-Commerce & Marketplaces chapter CHWY →