← All companies ← RAL Manual RARE → ← QBTS IT Services & Consulting RDDT →

RAMP, LiveRamp Holdings Inc.

IT Services & Consulting asset-light Serial acquirer

LiveRamp Holdings Inc. is a leading data collaboration technology company, empowering marketers and media owners to deliver and measure marketing performance everywhere it matters.

As consumers embrace AI-powered experiences, the LiveRamp data collaboration network expands the breadth and accuracy of the data on which marketing AI capabilities operate.

Our platform is engineered for AI agent accessibility, facilitating autonomous data collaboration between the specialized AI agents utilized by our customers and partners and our networked platform.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K

RAMP · LiveRamp Holdings Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026

$813M

+9.0% YoY · 13% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $813M 5-yr avg $669M

Gross margin 71% 5-yr avg 72%

Operating margin 10.3% 5-yr avg −4.2%

ROIC 11% 5-yr avg −3%

Owner-earnings margin 20% 5-yr avg 15%

Free cash flow margin 20% 5-yr avg 15%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Subscription (76%) and Marketplace and Other (24%).
Situation: Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 40% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 6 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 10% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −27%) on a 67% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −60 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −13%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Subscription is 76% of revenue, with Marketplace and Other the other meaningful line at 24%.

Revenue by product line, FY2026

Subscription76%$614M
Marketplace and Other24%$199M

By geographyUnited States94%All Foreign Countries6%Europe5%Asia Pacific1%Other0%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$175M	$220M	$286M	$381M	$443M	$529M	$597M	$660M	$746M	$813M	$813M	RevenueRevenue
43%	56%	58%	60%	67%	72%	71%	73%	71%	71%	71%	Gross marginGross mgn
53%	39%	35%	29%	24%	20%	21%	17%	17%	16%	16%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
28%	28%	30%	28%	30%	30%	32%	23%	24%	18%	18%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($131M)	($134M)	($198M)	($181M)	($121M)	($66M)	($126M)	$11M	$5M	$83M	$83M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−75.2%	−60.7%	−69.4%	−47.5%	−27.2%	−12.4%	−21.1%	1.7%	0.7%	10.3%	10.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$4M	$23M	$1.0B	($125M)	($90M)	($34M)	($119M)	$12M	($814K)	$146M	$146M	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
($26M)	($14M)	($2M)	($29M)	($21M)	$78M	$34M	$106M	$154M	$168M	$168M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$32M	$38M	$34M	$36M	$28M	$24M	$21M	$12M	$17M	$13M	$13M	DepreciationDeprec.
($101M)	($128M)	($1.2B)	($29M)	($70M)	$405K	$7M	$11M	$30M	($75M)	($75M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$23M	$9M	$7M	$12M	$2M	$4M	$5M	$4M	$1M	$1M	$1M	CapexCapex
13.2%	4.3%	2.6%	3.1%	0.5%	0.9%	0.8%	0.6%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($49M)	($23M)	($9M)	($40M)	($23M)	$74M	$30M	$101M	$153M	$166M	$166M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−28.0%	−10.7%	−3.3%	−10.6%	−5.1%	13.9%	5.0%	15.4%	20.5%	20.5%	20.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($49M)	($23M)	($9M)	($40M)	($23M)	$74M	$30M	$101M	$153M	$166M	$166M	Free cash flowFCF
−28.0%	−10.7%	−3.3%	−10.6%	−5.1%	13.9%	5.0%	15.4%	20.5%	20.5%	20.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$137M	$4M	$0	$105M	$76M	$19M	$0	$170M	$2M	$595K	$595K	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$31M	$89M	$74M	$182M	$42M	$59M	$150M	$61M	$101M	$195M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-14%	-13%	-74%	-39%	-19%	-11%	-22%	1%	1%	14%	11%	ROICROIC
1%	3%	77%	-11%	-8%	-3%	-13%	1%	-0%	15%	15%	Return on equityROE
											Balance sheet
$170M	$140M	$1.1B	$718M	$573M	$608M	$497M	$369M	$421M	$387M	$387M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$143M	$52M	$79M	$93M	$114M	$148M	$157M	$190M	$186M	$213M	$213M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$40M	$19M	$31M	$42M	$40M	$83M	$87M	$81M	$112M	$130M	$130M	Accounts payablePayables
$103M	$33M	$47M	$51M	$74M	$65M	$71M	$109M	$74M	$83M	$83M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$369M	$361M	$1.2B	$896M	$826M	$816M	$715M	$602M	$656M	$653M	$653M	Current assetsCur. assets
$230M	$179M	$95M	$161M	$165M	$185M	$175M	$217M	$248M	$265M	$265M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×	2.0×	12.5×	5.6×	5.0×	4.4×	4.1×	2.8×	2.7×	2.5×	2.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$200M	$204M	$205M	$298M	$357M	$364M	$363M	$502M	$502M	$502M	$502M	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	Total assetsAssets
$189M	$228M	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$169M	Total debtDebt
$19M	$88M	($1.1B)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	($218M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-17.8×	-13.2×	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7.9×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$739M	$749M	$1.3B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$926M	$949M	$949M	$972M	$972M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
22.5%	24.0%	36.0%	23.5%	25.2%	16.5%	21.1%	10.8%	14.5%	10.2%	10.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
77.6M	78.9M	75.0M	67.8M	66.3M	68.2M	66.4M	67.9M	66.1M	65.0M	65.0M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$2.25	$2.79	$3.81	$5.62	$6.68	$7.75	$8.99	$9.71	$11.28	$12.50	$12.50	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.05	$0.30	$13.71	$-1.84	$-1.36	$-0.50	$-1.79	$0.17	$-0.01	$2.24	$2.24	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.63	$-0.30	$-0.12	$-0.59	$-0.34	$1.08	$0.45	$1.49	$2.31	$2.56	$2.56	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.63	$-0.30	$-0.12	$-0.59	$-0.34	$1.08	$0.45	$1.49	$2.31	$2.56	$2.56	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.30	$0.12	$0.10	$0.17	$0.03	$0.07	$0.07	$0.06	$0.02	$0.02	$0.02	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$9.52	$9.50	$17.74	$16.05	$16.30	$15.58	$13.96	$13.97	$14.35	$14.94	$14.94	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+21.0%/yr	+13.3%/yr
EPS	+51.6%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	−25.5%/yr	−8.5%/yr
Book value / share	+5.1%/yr	−1.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

65Mpeak FY2018

ROIC

14%low FY2019

Gross margin

71%low FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$166Mowner earningsvs.$146Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2022FY2026

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned $146M of profit into $166M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$146M

Owner earnings$166M · 20% of revenue

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	$146M	($814K)	$12M	($119M)	($34M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$13M	+$17M	+$12M	+$21M	+$24M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$83M	+$108M	+$71M	+$126M	+$87M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$75M	+$30M	+$11M	+$7M	+$405K
Cash from operations	$168M	$154M	$106M	$34M	$78M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$1M	−$1M	−$4M	−$5M	−$4M
Owner earnings	$166M	$153M	$101M	$30M	$74M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	20%	21%	15%	5%	14%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $83M), owner earnings is nearer $83M.

Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 8.2×

Comfortable

Operating income $83M ÷ interest expense $10M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$133M

Net cash

Cash $380M + ST investments $8M − debt $255M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $133M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -103d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 96 + DIO 0 − DPO 199 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -14%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -74%–14%; 10% latest = NOPAT $83M ÷ invested capital $847M

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 20%

High, recently turned positive

latest $166M = operating cash $168M − maintenance capex $1M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -3%)

Industry peers: median 15%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 20% of revenue this year, a -3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $83M of SBC) leaves $83M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.15×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $168M ÷ net income $146M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 123%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $204M ÷ Owner Earnings $166M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $166M of Owner Earnings, $204M (123%) went back to shareholders, $9M dividends, $195M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $83M stock comp, the real buyback was about $112M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.10×

Harvesting

Capex $1M ÷ depreciation $13M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $813M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.47×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $255M vs $388M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −85%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.87/share (latest year $2.43), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.18/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −68% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −68% early to 4% lately, median −27% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2017 · −75.2% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −1.9%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Without the timely introduction of new products, services and enhancements that comply with changing laws and standards, including through the use of new and emerging technologies (e.g., AI and machine learning), we could be at a competitive disadvantage and our offerings will become technologically or commercially obs…”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$653M

Cash & short-term investments$387M
Receivables$213M
Other current assets$53M

Current liabilities$265M

Accounts payable$130M
Other current liabilities$135M

Current ratio2.47×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.47×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.46×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$388Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters3.1× → 2.5×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$461Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$511MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$198M$30M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$40Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $449M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$70M · 16%
Buybacks$983M · 219%

Returned to owners$983M
259% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $983M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$604M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $604M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $983M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−16.2%
The diluted count fell from 78M to 65M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$511M40% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity52%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$515Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $70M of capital spent building

$4M written down across 2 years (2018, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Howe	$6.9M	$12.0M	($23M)
2022	Mr. Howe	$8.5M	$3.0M	$74M
2023	Mr. Howe	$6.3M	$433k	$30M
2024	Mr. Howe	$10.1M	$16.5M	$101M
2025	Mr. Howe	$9.6M	$2.8M	$153M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership3.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio55:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$83M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 10% of revenue, equal to 99% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why LiveRamp Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.53×
Across the record the business reported $846M of net income but generated $449M of operating cash, a 0.53-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$244M · 30% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Our ten largest customers represented approximately 30% of our revenues during the twelve months ended March 31, 2026.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
EVTCEvertec Inc.	$932M	100%	26.5%	15%	33%
CARGCarGurus Inc. Class A Common Stock	$907M	—	11.1%	32%	12%
NRDSNerdWallet Inc.	$837M	92%	0.8%	1%	10%
RAMPLiveRamp Holdings Inc.	$813M	69%	-24.1%	-13%	1%
GDRXGoodRx Holdings Inc.	$797M	—	5.1%	2%	20%
UPWKUpwork Inc.	$788M	73%	-5.3%	-7%	3%
LZLegalZoom.com Inc.	$756M	66%	3.3%	—	15%
CARSCars.com Inc. Common Stock	$723M	90%	8.1%	5%	21%
Group median	—	81%	4.2%	2%	14%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what LiveRamp Holdings Inc. has delivered.

LiveRamp Holdings Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, LiveRamp Holdings Inc. earns about $7M on its 0.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 20.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($7M) Net of stock comp (−$83M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+33%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022+23%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $166M on 60M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-05-15; net cash $218M. The if-converted diluted count is 65M, 8% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh RAMP against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "LiveRamp Holdings Inc. (RAMP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RAMP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← RAL its page in the Manual RARE →

Industry order: ← QBTS the IT Services & Consulting chapter RDDT →