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GDRX, GoodRx Holdings Inc.

IT Services & Consulting asset-light Distress / turnaroundCyclicalSerial acquirer

GoodRx is a key integration partner for pharma manufacturers offering discounted cash prices on TrumpRx at launch.

To achieve this, we are building the leading, consumer-focused digital healthcare platform in the United States.

GoodRx was founded to solve the challenges that consumers face in understanding, accessing, and affording healthcare by removing the friction and inefficiencies in the system.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

GDRX · GoodRx Holdings Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$797M

+0.6% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $788M 5-yr avg $770M

Operating margin 9.9% 5-yr avg 3.5%

ROIC 4% 5-yr avg 2%

Owner-earnings margin 21% 5-yr avg 21%

Free cash flow margin 21% 5-yr avg 21%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Prescription transactions revenue (68%) and Pharma Direct Revenue (19%), with 2 more lines behind.
Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 35% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 8 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 1.8% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −50% to 36% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Stock-based pay runs about 12% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 20% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Prescription transactions revenue is 68% of revenue, with Pharma Direct Revenue the other meaningful line at 19%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Prescription transactions revenue68%$544M
Pharma Direct Revenue19%$151M
Subscription revenue11%$84M
Other revenue2%$18M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
									Income statement
$250M	$388M	$551M	$745M	$767M	$750M	$792M	$797M	$788M	RevenueRevenue
3%	4%	84%	21%	19%	17%	15%	14%	14%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
18%	8%	11%	17%	19%	18%	16%	15%	15%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$77M	$140M	($276M)	$13M	$2M	($27M)	$66M	$87M	$78M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
31.0%	36.0%	−50.1%	1.8%	0.2%	−3.6%	8.3%	11.0%	9.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$44M	$66M	($294M)	($25M)	($33M)	($9M)	$16M	$30M	$21M	Net incomeNet inc.
16%	20%	—	—	—	—	48%	46%	55%	Effective tax rateTax rate
									Cash flow & returns
$45M	$83M	$131M	$179M	$147M	$138M	$184M	$168M	$170M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$10M	$14M	$18M	$35M	$54M	$108M	$70M	$85M	$86M	DepreciationDeprec.
($10M)	($82K)	$9M	$9M	$5M	($65M)	($1M)	($24M)	($10M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$804K	$1M	$21M	$5M	$4M	$1M	$1M	$4M	$5M	CapexCapex
0.3%	0.4%	3.7%	0.6%	0.5%	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%	0.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$44M	$82M	$111M	$174M	$143M	$137M	$183M	$164M	$166M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
17.8%	21.1%	20.1%	23.4%	18.6%	18.3%	23.1%	20.6%	21.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$44M	$82M	$111M	$174M	$143M	$137M	$183M	$164M	$166M	Free cash flowFCF
17.8%	21.1%	20.1%	23.4%	18.6%	18.3%	23.1%	20.6%	21.0%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$31M	$56M	$140M	$157M	$0	$0	$43M	$13M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	$0	$0	$102M	$104M	$159M	$216M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	-53%	2%	—	-3%	4%	6%	4%	ROICROIC
—	—	-41%	-3%	-4%	-1%	2%	5%	3%	Return on equityROE
									Balance sheet
$35M	$26M	$969M	$941M	$757M	$672M	$448M	$262M	$236M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$48M	$69M	$118M	$117M	$144M	$146M	$236M	$233M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$8M	$10M	$18M	$18M	$36M	$14M	$19M	$15M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$40M	$58M	$101M	$99M	$107M	$132M	$216M	$218M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$87M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$920M	$873M	$659M	$643M	$1.3B	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$33M	$60M	$81M	$76M	$123M	$124M	$246M	$859M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	2.6×	18.2×	13.4×	12.1×	7.1×	5.3×	2.6×	1.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$220M	$236M	$261M	$330M	$412M	$411M	$411M	$430M	$430M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$387M	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$2.0B	Total assetsAssets
—	$671M	$667M	$663M	$659M	$656M	$492M	$488M	$487M	Total debtDebt
—	$645M	($302M)	($278M)	($98M)	($16M)	$43M	$226M	$252M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	—	—	0.1×	-0.5×	1.2×	2.1×	1.9×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($1.2B)	($1.1B)	$711M	$832M	$815M	$762M	$725M	$616M	$622M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%	1.0%	72.1%	21.5%	15.7%	14.0%	12.5%	9.6%	9.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
									Per share
118M	231M	275M	410M	413M	410M	392M	357M	341M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$2.11	$1.68	$2.00	$1.82	$1.86	$1.83	$2.02	$2.23	$2.31	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.37	$0.29	$-1.07	$-0.06	$-0.08	$-0.02	$0.04	$0.09	$0.06	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.38	$0.35	$0.40	$0.42	$0.35	$0.33	$0.47	$0.46	$0.49	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.38	$0.35	$0.40	$0.42	$0.35	$0.33	$0.47	$0.46	$0.49	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.01	$0.01	$0.07	$0.01	$0.01	$0.00	$0.00	$0.01	$0.01	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-9.82	$-4.70	$2.59	$2.03	$1.97	$1.86	$1.85	$1.73	$1.82	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.95 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.49 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	7-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+0.8%/yr	+2.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+3.0%/yr	+2.7%/yr
EPS	−18.9%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	+5.5%/yr	−33.3%/yr
Book value / share	—	−7.8%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Pharma Direct Revenue+41.2%
“Pharma direct revenue increased $44.1 million, or 41%, year-over year, driven by organic growth as we continued to expand our market penetration with pharma manufacturers and other customers.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
Subscription revenue-3.2%
“Subscription revenue decreased $2.8 million, or 3%, year-over year, primarily driven by a decrease in the number of subscription plans with 674 thousand subscription plans as of December 31, 2025 compared to 684 thousand as of December 31, 2024.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2018–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

357Mpeak FY2022

ROIC

6%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

1.4×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$164Mowner earningsvs.$30Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $30M of profit into $164M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$30M

Owner earnings$164M · 21% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$30M	$16M	($9M)	($33M)	($25M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$85M	+$70M	+$108M	+$54M	+$35M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$77M	+$99M	+$105M	+$120M	+$160M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$24M	−$1M	−$65M	+$5M	+$9M
Cash from operations	$168M	$184M	$138M	$147M	$179M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$4M	−$1M	−$1M	−$4M	−$5M
Owner earnings	$164M	$183M	$137M	$143M	$174M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	21%	23%	18%	19%	23%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $77M), owner earnings is nearer $88M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 2.1×

Adequate

Operating income $87M ÷ interest expense $43M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $226M · 2.6× operating profit

Meaningful net debt

Cash $262M − debt $488M

What this means
Netting $262M of cash and short-term investments against $488M of debt leaves $226M owed, about 2.6× a year's operating profit (5.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 2%

Below average through the cycle

5-yr median, range -53%–6%; 6% latest = NOPAT $47M ÷ invested capital $843M

Industry peers: median 3%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 20%

High through the cycle

8-yr median margin, range 18%–23%; latest $164M = operating cash $168M − maintenance capex $4M

Industry peers: median 12%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 21% of revenue this year, a 20% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $77M of SBC) leaves $88M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 5.52×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $168M ÷ net income $30M

In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 951%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $1.6B ÷ Owner Earnings $164M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $164M of Owner Earnings, $1.6B (951%) went back to shareholders, $1.3B dividends, $216M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $77M stock comp, the real buyback was about $140M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.04×

Harvesting

Capex $4M ÷ depreciation $85M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $797M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.61×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Near

Debt ≤ working capital · $488M vs $397M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (8-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 8 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.04/share (latest year $0.09), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.81/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 4 of 8

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 6% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 6% early, 5% lately, median 2%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 15%

What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
Owner earnings growth +16%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 16% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −50.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“New developments in other areas, such as cloud computing, artificial intelligence ("AI"), and machine learning, have made it easier for competition to enter our markets due to lower up-front technology costs.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.3B

Cash & short-term investments$236M
Receivables$233M
Other current assets$798M

Current liabilities$859M

Debt due within a year$5M
Accounts payable$15M
Other current liabilities$840M

Current ratio1.47×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.47×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.27×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$407Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$5M due · $236M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−4.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters7.3× → 1.5×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$130Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($133M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$541M$54M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$9Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$37M · 3%
Dividends$1.3B · 125%
Buybacks$581M · 54%

Returned to owners$1.9B
186% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.3B as dividends and $581M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$889M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $889M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $581M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count188.5%
The diluted count rose from 118M to 341M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$11.38/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$494M35% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity70%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$428Mover 8 years buying other businesses, against $37M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership18.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$77M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 10% of revenue, equal to 88% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
EVTCEvertec Inc.	$932M	100%	26.5%	15%	33%
CARGCarGurus Inc. Class A Common Stock	$907M	—	11.1%	32%	12%
NRDSNerdWallet Inc.	$837M	92%	0.8%	1%	10%
RAMPLiveRamp Holdings Inc.	$813M	69%	-24.1%	-13%	1%
GDRXGoodRx Holdings Inc.	$797M	—	5.1%	2%	20%
UPWKUpwork Inc.	$788M	73%	-5.3%	-7%	3%
LZLegalZoom.com Inc.	$756M	66%	3.3%	—	15%
CARSCars.com Inc. Common Stock	$723M	90%	8.1%	5%	21%
Group median	—	—	4.2%	2%	14%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what GoodRx Holdings Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, GoodRx Holdings Inc. earns about $162M on its 20.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 20.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($162M) Net of stock comp (−$74M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($167M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+2%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+16%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $166M on 341M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $252M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($5M) runs well above depreciation ($86M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $167M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh GDRX against another business →

The owners of GDRX: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "GoodRx Holdings Inc. (GDRX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GDRX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GDOT its page in the Manual GDYN →

Industry order: ← GDEV the IT Services & Consulting chapter GLOB →