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EVTC, Evertec Inc.
EVERTEC is a leading full-service transaction-processing business and financial technology provider in Latin America, Puerto Rico and the Caribbean, providing a broad range of merchant acquiring, payment services and business solutions.
EVERTEC Inc.'s subsidiaries include Holdings, EVERTEC Group; EVERTEC Dominicana, SAS; Evertec Chile Holdings SpA; Evertec Chile SpA; Evertec Chile Global SpA; Evertec Chile Servicios Profesionales SpA; Paytrue S.A.; Caleidon; S.A.; Evertec Brasil Solutions Inform tica S.A.
We serve a diversified customer base of leading financial institutions, merchants, corporations, and government agencies with "mission-critical" technology solutions that enable them to issue, process and accept transactions securely.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Latin America Payments and Solutions (36%) and Business Solutions (26%), with 2 more segments behind.
- Situation
- Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 64% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 6 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 25% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 15%, above 15% in 5 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 33% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest Latin America Payments and Solutions at 36%.
- Latin America Payments and Solutions36%$343M
- Business Solutions26%$250M
- Merchant Acquiring Net20%$190M
- Payment Services - Puerto Rico & Caribbean16%$149M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $390M | $407M | $454M | $487M | $511M | $590M | $618M | $695M | $845M | $932M | $951M | RevenueRevenue |
| 99% | 99% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 100% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 12% | 14% | 15% | 13% | 14% | 12% | 15% | 18% | 17% | 17% | 17% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $107M | $86M | $125M | $145M | $141M | $197M | $157M | $136M | $166M | $186M | $182M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 27.5% | 21.1% | 27.6% | 29.6% | 27.7% | 33.3% | 25.5% | 19.6% | 19.6% | 20.0% | 19.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $75M | $55M | $86M | $103M | $104M | $161M | $239M | $80M | $113M | $142M | $133M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 10% | 8% | 13% | 11% | 15% | 11% | 11% | 6% | 4% | 6% | 7% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $168M | $146M | $173M | $180M | $199M | $228M | $220M | $211M | $260M | $227M | $221M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $14M | $15M | $15M | $17M | $17M | $17M | $19M | $22M | $22M | $22M | $23M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $72M | $66M | $59M | $46M | $63M | $35M | ($58M) | $84M | $95M | $34M | $35M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $18M | $11M | $14M | $23M | $17M | $25M | $27M | $21M | $25M | $23M | $23M | CapexCapex |
| 4.7% | 2.8% | 3.1% | 4.7% | 3.3% | 4.3% | 4.4% | 3.1% | 3.0% | 2.5% | 2.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $154M | $134M | $159M | $163M | $182M | $211M | $201M | $190M | $235M | $204M | $197M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 39.5% | 33.0% | 35.0% | 33.5% | 35.6% | 35.8% | 32.6% | 27.3% | 27.8% | 21.9% | 20.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $150M | $134M | $159M | $157M | $182M | $203M | $193M | $190M | $235M | $204M | $197M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 38.4% | 33.0% | 35.0% | 32.2% | 35.6% | 34.5% | 31.2% | 27.3% | 27.8% | 21.9% | 20.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $16M | $43M | $0 | $6M | $0 | $0 | $44M | $418M | $34M | $144M | $144M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $30M | $22M | $7M | $14M | $14M | $14M | $14M | $13M | $13M | $13M | $13M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $40M | $8M | $10M | $32M | $7M | $24M | $97M | $36M | $82M | $69M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 14% | 11% | 16% | 19% | 19% | 26% | 20% | 10% | 14% | 12% | 11% | ROICROIC |
| 72% | 38% | 41% | 39% | 31% | 35% | 51% | 13% | 24% | 23% | 20% | Return on equityROE |
| 43% | 23% | 37% | 33% | 27% | 31% | 48% | 11% | 21% | 21% | 18% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $52M | $50M | $70M | $111M | $203M | $258M | $185M | $296M | $274M | $306M | $291M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $78M | $83M | $100M | $107M | $96M | $113M | $111M | $127M | $138M | $164M | $176M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $41M | $41M | $47M | $39M | $43M | $28M | $30M | $67M | $59M | $64M | $63M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $37M | $42M | $53M | $68M | $52M | $85M | $82M | $60M | $79M | $101M | $113M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $158M | $169M | $216M | $276M | $359M | $436M | $389M | $561M | $529M | $591M | $602M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $129M | $147M | $137M | $144M | $153M | $153M | $208M | $298M | $280M | $285M | $306M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.6× | 1.9× | 2.3× | 2.9× | 1.9× | 1.9× | 1.9× | 2.1× | 2.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $371M | $399M | $395M | $399M | $398M | $393M | $423M | $792M | $727M | $892M | $918M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $886M | $903M | $927M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $2.1B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| $619M | $604M | $538M | $525M | $495M | $465M | $410M | $998M | $965M | $1.1B | $1.1B | Total debtDebt |
| $568M | $553M | $468M | $414M | $293M | $207M | $225M | $702M | $692M | $793M | $814M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 4.4× | 2.9× | 4.2× | 5.0× | 5.6× | 8.6× | 6.4× | 4.2× | 2.2× | 2.7× | 2.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $105M | $144M | $211M | $267M | $338M | $466M | $472M | $594M | $473M | $622M | $668M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.6% | 2.4% | 2.8% | 2.8% | 2.8% | 2.5% | 3.2% | 3.7% | 3.6% | 3.2% | 3.1% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 74.5M | 72.9M | 74.4M | 73.5M | 73.1M | 72.9M | 69.3M | 65.8M | 65.1M | 64.4M | 62.6M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $5.23 | $5.59 | $6.10 | $6.63 | $6.99 | $8.09 | $8.92 | $10.56 | $12.99 | $14.46 | $15.20 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.01 | $0.76 | $1.16 | $1.41 | $1.43 | $2.21 | $3.45 | $1.21 | $1.73 | $2.20 | $2.12 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $2.07 | $1.85 | $2.13 | $2.22 | $2.49 | $2.90 | $2.91 | $2.88 | $3.61 | $3.16 | $3.15 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $2.01 | $1.85 | $2.13 | $2.14 | $2.49 | $2.79 | $2.78 | $2.88 | $3.61 | $3.16 | $3.15 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.40 | $0.30 | $0.10 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.20 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.25 | $0.15 | $0.19 | $0.31 | $0.23 | $0.34 | $0.39 | $0.33 | $0.39 | $0.36 | $0.37 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $1.41 | $1.98 | $2.84 | $3.64 | $4.62 | $6.40 | $6.80 | $9.03 | $7.26 | $9.65 | $10.68 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +12.0%/yr | +15.7%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +4.8%/yr | +4.9%/yr |
| EPS | +9.1%/yr | +9.0%/yr |
| Dividends / share | −7.5%/yr | +0.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +4.3%/yr | +9.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +23.9%/yr | +15.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $142M of profit into $204M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $142M | $113M | $80M | $239M | $161M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$22M | +$22M | +$22M | +$19M | +$17M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$30M | +$30M | +$26M | +$20M | +$15M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$34M | +$95M | +$84M | −$58M | +$35M |
| Cash from operations | $227M | $260M | $211M | $220M | $228M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$23M | −$25M | −$21M | −$19M | −$17M |
| Owner earnings | $204M | $235M | $190M | $201M | $211M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | — | −$9M | −$8M |
| Free cash flow | $204M | $235M | $190M | $193M | $203M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 22% | 28% | 27% | 33% | 36% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $30M), owner earnings is nearer $174M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $186M ÷ interest expense $68M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $793M · 4.3× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $306M − debt $1.1B
What this means
Netting $306M of cash and short-term investments against $1.1B of debt leaves $793M owed, about 4.3× a year's operating profit (5.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- How long is cash tied up? -7877dNegative, funded by othersDSO 64 + DIO 0 − DPO 7941 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 10%–26%; 12% latest = NOPAT $174M ÷ invested capital $1.4BIndustry peers: median 1%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 22%–39%; latest $204M = operating cash $227M − maintenance capex $23MIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 22% of revenue this year, a 33% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $30M of SBC) leaves $174M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $227M ÷ net income $142M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $82M ÷ Owner Earnings $204M
What this means
Of $204M Owner Earnings, $82M (40%) went back to shareholders, $13M dividends, $69M buybacks. Net of $30M stock comp, the real buyback was about $40M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.05×MaintainingCapex $23M ÷ depreciation $22M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $932M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.07×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs $306M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +54%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.81/share (latest year $2.30), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $10.09/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 25% → 20% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 25% early to 20% lately, median 25% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 10%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +5%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · 19.6% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −1.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“If we fail to keep pace with rapidly evolving AI technological developments, especially in the financial technology sector, our competitive position and business results may suffer.”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$291M
- Receivables$176M
- Other current assets$135M
- Debt due within a year$27M
- Accounts payable$63M
- Other current liabilities$216M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $2.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$206M · 10%
- Dividends$154M · 8%
- Buybacks$405M · 20%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.2B · 62%
- Returned to owners$560M
31% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $154M as dividends and $405M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $485M and cash and short-term investments rose $239M.
- Average price paid for buybacks$29.17
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 14M shares were bought for $405M, about $29.17 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $15.34 (2017) to $40.65 (2021); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $34.50 ($97M).
- Net change in share count−16.0%
The diluted count fell from 74M to 63M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.20/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 7% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained10%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($599M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $60M, so each retained $1 added about 0.10 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Schuessler | $7.5M | $17.2M | $211M |
| 2022 | Mr. Schuessler | $8.3M | −$1.2M | $201M |
| 2023 | Mr. Schuessler | $14.4M | $22.8M | $190M |
| 2024 | Mr. Schuessler | $9.0M | $4.9M | $235M |
| 2025 | Mr. Schuessler | $9.2M | $3.7M | $204M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$30M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 16% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Evertec Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?25.6% vs 35.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 35.8% early in the record and 25.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$619M → $1.1B
Debt rose from $619M to $1.1B while owner earnings went from about $149M to $209M — about 4.2 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$276M · 29% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“Popular continues to be the Company's largest customer and during the year ended December 31, 2025 approximately 29% of our revenues were generated from this relationship.”verify →
- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, IT Services & Consulting
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FIVNFive9 | $1.1B | 57% | -3.4% | -5% | 9% |
| SSTKShutterstock Inc. | $990M | 59% | 7.7% | 24% | 13% |
| EVTCEvertec Inc. | $932M | 100% | 26.5% | 15% | 33% |
| CARGCarGurus Inc. Class A Common Stock | $907M | — | 11.1% | 32% | 12% |
| NRDSNerdWallet Inc. | $837M | 92% | 0.8% | 1% | 10% |
| RAMPLiveRamp Holdings Inc. | $813M | 69% | -24.1% | -13% | 1% |
| GDRXGoodRx Holdings Inc. | $797M | — | 5.1% | 2% | 20% |
| UPWKUpwork Inc. | $788M | 73% | -5.3% | -7% | 3% |
| Group median | — | 71% | 2.9% | 1% | 11% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Evertec Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Evertec Inc. earns about $310M on its 33.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 21.9% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $197M on 62M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $814M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← EVRG its page in the Manual EW →
Industry order: ← EPAM the IT Services & Consulting chapter FA →