Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← UPST Manual URBN → ← TRVG IT Services & Consulting VRSK →

UPWK, Upwork Inc.

We define talent as those who deliver services through the Upwork Marketplace, Lifted, or other Upwork workforce solutions.

We define clients as customers who seek and engage with talent through these platforms and other workforce solutions.

We measure economic activity across our portfolio of platforms and other workforce solutions using Gross Services Volume, which we refer to as GSV.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
UPWK · Upwork Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$788M
+2.4% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $791M 5-yr avg $673M
Gross margin 78% 5-yr avg 76%
Operating margin 15.6% 5-yr avg −0.5%
ROIC 10% 5-yr avg 1%
Owner-earnings margin 29% 5-yr avg 12%
Free cash flow margin 29% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 16% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −6.0%) on a 72% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Stock-based pay runs about 6.8% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −7%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 3% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$164M$203M$253M$301M$374M$503M$618M$689M$769M$788M$791MRevenueRevenue
62%68%68%71%72%73%74%75%77%78%78%Gross marginGross mgn
22%18%19%22%19%22%20%17%17%19%19%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
23%23%22%21%22%24%25%26%27%24%23%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($14M)($3M)($12M)($19M)($22M)($54M)($93M)($11M)$65M$129M$123MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−8.8%−1.5%−4.6%−6.2%−6.0%−10.8%−15.0%−1.6%8.5%16.4%15.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
($16M)($4M)($20M)($17M)($23M)($56M)($90M)$47M$216M$115M$109MNet incomeNet inc.
4%25%25%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$3M($4M)$14M$1M$22M$11M$11M$53M$154M$248M$234MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$2M$2M$2M$3M$4M$4M$8M$9M$15M$26M$30MDepreciationDeprec.
$10M($8M)$21M($4M)$16M$10M$18M($78M)($145M)$42M$27MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$846K$2M$3M$11M$6M$1M$1M$692K$4M$6M$5MCapexCapex
0.5%0.9%1.2%3.6%1.7%0.2%0.2%0.1%0.5%0.7%0.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2M($6M)$12M($2M)$19M$10M$10M$52M$150M$242M$229MOwner earningsOwner earn.
1.4%−2.9%4.6%−0.6%5.0%2.0%1.7%7.5%19.5%30.8%29.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$2M($6M)$11M($10M)$16M$10M$10M$52M$150M$242M$229MFree cash flowFCF
1.4%−2.9%4.2%−3.2%4.3%2.0%1.7%7.5%19.5%30.8%29.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$14M$58M$58MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$100M$136MBuybacksBuybacks
-7%-6%-8%-7%-11%-2%10%14%10%ROICROIC
-8%-6%-8%-22%-36%12%37%18%19%Return on equityROE
−8%−6%−8%−22%−36%12%37%18%19%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$90M$22M$129M$134M$170M$685M$687M$550M$622M$673M$580MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$31M$22M$30M$47M$67M$65M$103M$75M$76M$76MReceivablesReceiv.
$462K$2M$652K$6M$5M$8M$5M$6M$8M$11MAccounts payablePayables
$30M$20M$30M$41M$62M$57M$98M$69M$68M$65MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$144M$256M$281M$361M$930M$931M$883M$911M$951M$883MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$115M$128M$149M$199M$234M$248M$293M$268M$650M$647MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×2.0×1.9×1.8×4.0×3.8×3.0×3.4×1.5×1.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$118M$118M$118M$118M$118M$118M$118M$121M$149M$149MGoodwillGoodwill
$275M$392M$446M$529M$1.1B$1.1B$1.0B$1.2B$1.3B$1.2BTotal assetsAssets
$34M$24M$18M$11M$561M$564M$356M$358M$360M$720MTotal debtDebt
$12M($105M)($116M)($159M)($123M)($122M)($194M)($264M)($313M)$141MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-16.9×-3.3×-5.7×-14.3×-28.8×-24.9×-20.7×33.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($30M)($31M)$244M$259M$299M$260M$249M$381M$575M$630M$570MShareholders’ equityEquity
4.4%3.4%4.1%6.3%6.8%10.7%12.2%10.8%8.9%8.3%8.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
32.1M32.9M52.3M110M119M127M131M137M143M141M136MShares out (diluted)Shares
$5.13$6.15$4.84$2.74$3.15$3.95$4.74$5.02$5.37$5.60$5.83Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.51$-0.13$-0.38$-0.15$-0.19$-0.44$-0.69$0.34$1.51$0.82$0.80EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.07$-0.18$0.22$-0.02$0.16$0.08$0.08$0.38$1.05$1.72$1.69Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.07$-0.18$0.21$-0.09$0.14$0.08$0.08$0.38$1.05$1.72$1.69Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.03$0.06$0.06$0.10$0.05$0.01$0.01$0.01$0.02$0.04$0.04Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.94$-0.95$4.66$2.36$2.52$2.04$1.91$2.78$4.02$4.48$4.20Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.59 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×2.1 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.0%/yr+12.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+42.4%/yr+61.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.1%/yr−5.0%/yr
Book value / share+12.2%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Enterprise-2.2%
    “Enterprise revenue decreased to $104.9 million, or 2% for the year ended December 31, 2025, as compared to $107.2 million in 2024, largely due to the fact that we paused our efforts to acquire new Enterprise clients as we prioritize the transition to the Lifted platform.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
141Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
14%low FY2022
Gross margin
78%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-1.3×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$242Mowner earningsvs.$115Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $115M of profit into $242M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$115M
Owner earnings$242M · 31% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$115M$216M$47M($90M)($56M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$26M+$15M+$9M+$8M+$4M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$65M+$68M+$74M+$76M+$54M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$42M−$145M−$78M+$18M+$10M
Cash from operations$248M$154M$53M$11M$11M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$6M−$4M−$692K−$1M−$1M
Owner earnings$242M$150M$52M$10M$10M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue31%20%8%2%2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $65M), owner earnings is nearer $177M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $129M ÷ interest expense $4M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $294M + ST investments $378M − debt $360M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $313M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 35 + DIO 0 − DPO 16 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -11%–14%; 14% latest = NOPAT $97M ÷ invested capital $696M
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High, recently turned positive
    latest $242M = operating cash $248M − maintenance capex $6M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 2%)
    Industry peers: median 15%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 31% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $65M of SBC) leaves $177M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $248M ÷ net income $115M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $136M ÷ Owner Earnings $242M
    What this means

    Of $242M Owner Earnings, $136M (56%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $136M buybacks. Net of $65M stock comp, the real buyback was about $71M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.23×
    Harvesting
    Capex $6M ÷ depreciation $26M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $788M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.46×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $360M vs $301M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.02/share (latest year $0.93), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 3 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −5% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −5% early to 8% lately, median −6% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 13%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Worst year 2022 · −15.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“As with many innovations, AI presents new and evolving risks and challenges that could undermine or slow its adoption or cause us to experience brand or reputational harm, competitive harm, legal liability, new or enhanced governmental or regulatory scrutiny, and to incur additional costs to resolve such issues, each o…”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$883M
  • Cash & short-term investments$580M
  • Receivables$76M
  • Other current assets$228M
Current liabilities$647M
  • Debt due within a year$360M
  • Accounts payable$11M
  • Other current liabilities$276M
Current ratio1.36×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.36×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.90×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$236Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$360M due · $580M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.0× → 1.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$386Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$211MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$740M$19M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$8Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $513M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$35M · 7%
  • Buybacks$236M · 46%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$242M · 47%
  • Returned to owners$236M

    48% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $236M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $490M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $236M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count323.0%

    The diluted count rose from 32M to 136M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Ms. Brown$34.9M$31.1M$10M
2022Ms. Brown$8.5M−$27.3M$10M
2023Ms. Brown$9.5M$10.0M$52M
2024Ms. Brown$9.9M$7.7M$150M
2025Ms. Brown$17.1M$41.2M$242M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4.9%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio287:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$65M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 8% of revenue, equal to 51% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Upwork Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?323.0%

    Diluted shares grew 323.0% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $236M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
EVTCEvertec Inc.$932M100%26.5%15%33%
CARGCarGurus Inc. Class A Common Stock$907M11.1%32%12%
NRDSNerdWallet Inc.$837M92%0.8%1%10%
RAMPLiveRamp Holdings Inc.$813M69%-24.1%-13%1%
GDRXGoodRx Holdings Inc.$797M5.1%2%20%
UPWKUpwork Inc.$788M73%-5.3%-7%3%
LZLegalZoom.com Inc.$756M66%3.3%15%
CARSCars.com Inc. Common Stock$723M90%8.1%5%21%
Group median81%4.2%2%14%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Upwork Inc. has delivered.

Upwork Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Upwork Inc. earns about $26M on its 3.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 30.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+110%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2020+72%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $229M on 124M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $141M. The if-converted diluted count is 136M, 10% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Upwork Inc. (UPWK), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/UPWK, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← UPST its page in the Manual URBN →

Industry order: ← TRVG the IT Services & Consulting chapter VRSK →