Owner Scorecard


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CCRN, Cross Country Healthcare, Inc.

Staffing & Employment Services diversified UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

Revenue is Nurse and Allied Staffing (82%) and Physician Staffing (18%).

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CCRN · Cross Country Healthcare, Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.1B
−21.6% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.0B 5-yr avg $1.8B
Operating margin −8.7% 5-yr avg 2.9%
ROIC −19% 5-yr avg 9%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 5%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A diversified business; where the profit really comes from, and whether it is earned or bought, is what the segment detail settles.
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −1.1% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −3%, above 15% in 3 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 3% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Nurse And Allied Staffing is 82% of revenue, with Physician Staffing the other meaningful segment at 18%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Nurse And Allied Staffing82%$863M
  • Physician Staffing18%$192M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$834M$865M$816M$822M$836M$1.7B$2.8B$2.0B$1.3B$1.1B$1.0BRevenueRevenue
22%22%22%22%21%13%12%15%17%19%19%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$6M$12M($13M)($16M)($9M)$139M$270M$113M($17M)($84M)($88M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
0.7%1.4%−1.6%−1.9%−1.1%8.3%9.6%5.6%−1.3%−8.0%−8.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$8M$38M($17M)($58M)($13M)$132M$188M$73M($15M)($95M)($99M)Net incomeNet inc.
1%26%29%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$30M$46M$21M$6M$27M($86M)$134M$248M$120M$48M$47MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$9M$10M$12M$14M$13M$10M$13M$18M$18M$17M$16MDepreciationDeprec.
$10M($6M)$23M$46M$22M($234M)($74M)$151M$110M$119M$123MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$7M$5M$5M$3M$5M$7M$9M$14M$9M$8M$8MCapexCapex
0.8%0.6%0.6%0.4%0.6%0.4%0.3%0.7%0.6%0.8%0.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$24M$40M$16M$3M$23M($93M)$125M$235M$111M$40M$40MOwner earningsOwner earn.
2.8%4.7%2.0%0.3%2.7%−5.5%4.5%11.6%8.3%3.8%4.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$24M$40M$16M$3M$23M($93M)$125M$235M$111M$40M$40MFree cash flowFCF
2.8%4.7%2.0%0.3%2.7%−5.5%4.5%11.6%8.3%3.8%4.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2M$86M$2M$0$0$28M$35M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$5M$0$0$0$35M$58M$37M$7MBuybacksBuybacks
3%-4%-5%-3%29%33%18%-4%-31%-19%ROICROIC
5%16%-8%-35%-8%45%42%16%-3%-29%-32%Return on equityROE
5%16%−8%−35%−8%45%42%16%−3%−29%−32%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$21M$26M$16M$1M$2M$1M$4M$17M$82M$109M$108MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$174M$174M$166M$170M$170M$494M$642M$372M$223M$168M$177MReceivablesReceiv.
$3M$13M$3M$6M$2M$2MAccounts payablePayables
$174M$174M$166M$170M$170M$491M$629M$369M$217M$165M$175MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$206M$209M$195M$183M$183M$508M$677M$417M$335M$294M$298MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$97M$95M$85M$85M$93M$200M$279M$156M$120M$78M$91MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.1×2.2×2.3×2.1×2.0×2.5×2.4×2.7×2.8×3.8×3.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$80M$118M$101M$101M$91M$119M$163M$135M$135M$64M$64MGoodwillGoodwill
$388M$468M$427M$382M$357M$733M$950M$681M$589M$449M$451MTotal assetsAssets
$92M$100M$83M$71M$58M$186M$151M$0$151MTotal debtDebt
$71M$74M$67M$70M$57M$185M$147M($17M)$42MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.0×2.8×-2.3×-3.0×-3.2×20.3×18.8×13.9×-7.7×-38.1×-39.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$151M$237M$218M$163M$154M$294M$451M$468M$419M$323M$313MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.5%0.4%0.4%0.6%0.4%0.3%0.3%0.4%0.7%0.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$10M$370K$71M$71MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
36.2M36.2M35.7M35.8M36.1M37.4M37.5M35.5M33.4M32.4M31.5MShares out (diluted)Shares
$23.00$23.92$22.90$22.96$23.18$44.84$74.69$56.93$40.26$32.53$31.84Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.22$1.04$-0.48$-1.61$-0.36$3.53$5.02$2.05$-0.44$-2.93$-3.13EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.65$1.12$0.46$0.07$0.63$-2.48$3.34$6.61$3.34$1.24$1.26Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.65$1.12$0.46$0.07$0.63$-2.48$3.34$6.61$3.34$1.24$1.26Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.18$0.14$0.13$0.08$0.13$0.19$0.23$0.39$0.26$0.25$0.25Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.17$6.56$6.10$4.54$4.28$7.87$12.03$13.18$12.55$9.96$9.94Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.9%/yr+7.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.4%/yr+14.6%/yr
Capital spending / share+3.8%/yr+14.5%/yr
Book value / share+10.2%/yr+18.4%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Physician Staffing-3.6%
    “Physician Staffing Revenue decreased $7.1 million, or 3.6%, to $191.5 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, as compared to $198.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, primarily due to volume declines in certain specialties partially offset by a slight increase in revenue per day filled.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
32Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
−31%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-0.1×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$40Mowner earningsvs.($95M)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $95M loss into $40M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($95M)($15M)$73M$188M$132M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$17M+$18M+$18M+$13M+$10M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$7M+$6M+$7M+$7M+$7M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$119M+$110M+$151M−$74M−$234M
Cash from operations$48M$120M$248M$134M($86M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$8M−$9M−$14M−$9M−$7M
Owner earnings$40M$111M$235M$125M($93M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%8%12%4%-6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $7M), owner earnings is nearer $33M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($84M) ÷ interest expense $2M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $109M + ST investments $2M − debt $151M
    What this means

    Netting $110M of cash and short-term investments against $151M of debt leaves $40M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. It also holds $3K in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $40M of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -31%–33%; -18% latest = NOPAT ($67M) ÷ invested capital $365M
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -18% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest $40M = operating cash $48M − maintenance capex $8M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 3%)
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $7M of SBC) leaves $33M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($95M) · cash from operations $48M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $7M ÷ Owner Earnings $40M
    What this means

    Of $40M Owner Earnings, $7M (17%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $7M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($7M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.49×
    Harvesting
    Capex $8M ÷ depreciation $17M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.78×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $151M vs $216M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −229%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.38/share (latest year $-2.93), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $9.98/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 0% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 0% early, −1% lately, median −1%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +10%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 10% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −8.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −1.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Not named

Despite the structural exposure, the latest 10-K does not name AI as a competitive risk, which is itself worth a question.

The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$298M
  • Cash & short-term investments$108M
  • Receivables$177M
  • Other current assets$13M
Current liabilities$91M
  • Accounts payable$2M
  • Other current liabilities$89M
Current ratio3.29×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio3.29×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.20×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$208Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−17.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.1× → 3.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$223Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$160MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$153M$2M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $595M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$71M · 12%
  • Buybacks$142M · 24%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$382M · 64%
  • Returned to owners$142M

    27% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $142M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $142M over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.

  • Net change in share count−13.2%

    The diluted count fell from 36M to 31M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained102%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($99M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $102M, so each retained $1 added about 1.02 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$91M20% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity20%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$153Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $71M of capital spent building

$82M written down across 3 years (2020, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 53% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$4.4M$17.9M($93M)
2022$484k−$1.7M$125M
2022$3.3M$4.1M$125M
2023$3.5M$1.5M$235M
2024$3.5M$1.5M$111M
2025$2.3M$2.3M$40M
2025$888k$986k$40M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership6.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$7M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Cross Country Healthcare, Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $265M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Staffing & Employment Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
KELYAKelly Services Inc.$4.3B19%0.7%2%1%
ASGNEverforth, Inc.$4.0B29%8.1%9%7%
AMNAMN Healthcare Services$2.7B33%9.2%13%8%
KFRCKforce Inc.$1.3B29%5.6%29%5%
BBSIBarrett Business Services Inc.$1.2B21%4.8%34%5%
PAYPaymentus Holdings Inc.$1.2B30%5.1%13%7%
MAXMediaAlpha Inc.$1.1B16%2.7%-12%6%
CCRNCross Country Healthcare, Inc.$1.1B-0.2%-3%3%
Group median5.0%11%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Cross Country Healthcare, Inc. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+47%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+10%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $40M on 32M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $42M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Cross Country Healthcare, Inc. (CCRN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CCRN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CCOI its page in the Manual CCS →

Industry order: ← BBSI the Staffing & Employment Services chapter EFOR →