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CERT, Certara Inc.

Software asset-light UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclicalSerial acquirer

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Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CERT · Certara Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$419M

+8.7% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $420M 5-yr avg $356M

Gross margin 66% 5-yr avg 61%

Operating margin 2.2% 5-yr avg 1.5%

ROIC 1% 5-yr avg 0%

Owner-earnings margin 21% 5-yr avg 23%

Free cash flow margin 21% 5-yr avg 23%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 78% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 7 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 61% and operating margin about 4.7% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −12% to 10% — on a steadier 61% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −0%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 21% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Americas is 70% of revenue, so this is largely a single-region business.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

Americas70%$292M
EMEA22%$93M
Asia Pacific8%$35M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$209M	$244M	$286M	$336M	$354M	$385M	$419M	$420M	RevenueRevenue
62%	59%	61%	61%	60%	—	—	66%	Gross marginGross mgn
23%	36%	28%	21%	27%	24%	20%	23%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
6%	8%	7%	8%	10%	10%	10%	10%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$20M	($24M)	$14M	$33M	($41M)	($2M)	$21M	$9M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
9.4%	−10.0%	4.7%	9.7%	−11.5%	−0.4%	5.0%	2.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($9M)	($49M)	($13M)	$15M	($55M)	($12M)	($2M)	($15M)	Net incomeNet inc.
								Cash flow & returns
$38M	$45M	$60M	$93M	$83M	$80M	$96M	$91M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$3M	$2M	$2M	$2M	$56M	$68M	$75M	$76M	DepreciationDeprec.
$44M	$92M	$72M	$76M	$82M	$24M	$23M	$30M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$2M	$863K	$1M	$1M	$2M	$2M	$2M	$2M	CapexCapex
1.0%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.5%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$36M	$44M	$59M	$91M	$81M	$79M	$95M	$89M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
17.2%	18.0%	20.7%	27.1%	22.9%	20.5%	22.6%	21.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$36M	$44M	$59M	$91M	$81M	$79M	$95M	$89M	Free cash flowFCF
17.2%	18.0%	20.7%	27.1%	22.9%	20.5%	22.6%	21.2%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$675K	$261M	$15M	$64M	$91M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$703K	$1M	—	—	$0	$0	$43M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	-2%	—	2%	-3%	-0%	1%	1%	ROICROIC
-2%	-6%	-1%	1%	-5%	-1%	-0%	-1%	Return on equityROE
−2%	−6%	−1%	1%	−5%	−1%	−0%	−1%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$29M	$271M	$186M	$237M	$235M	$179M	$189M	$149M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$46M	$60M	$72M	$75M	$91M	$95M	$83M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$6M	$7M	$8M	$5M	$4M	$3M	$4M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$40M	$53M	$65M	$70M	$87M	$91M	$80M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$347M	$275M	$342M	$340M	$311M	$315M	$271M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$75M	$92M	$103M	$130M	$146M	$153M	$144M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	4.6×	3.0×	3.3×	2.6×	2.1×	2.1×	1.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$515M	$519M	$703M	$718M	$716M	$757M	$773M	$771M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.5B	Total assetsAssets
—	$299M	$295M	$293M	$291M	$295M	$293M	$292M	Total debtDebt
—	$27M	$109M	$56M	$56M	$116M	$104M	$143M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
0.7×	-1.0×	0.8×	1.8×	-1.8×	-0.1×	1.1×	0.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$492M	$822M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.0B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
								Per share
132M	133M	150M	159M	159M	160M	160M	158M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.57	$1.83	$1.91	$2.11	$2.23	$2.40	$2.61	$2.66	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.07	$-0.37	$-0.09	$0.09	$-0.35	$-0.08	$-0.01	$-0.10	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.27	$0.33	$0.40	$0.57	$0.51	$0.49	$0.59	$0.56	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.27	$0.33	$0.40	$0.57	$0.51	$0.49	$0.59	$0.56	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.02	$0.01	$0.01	$0.01	$0.01	$0.01	$0.01	$0.01	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.72	$6.17	$6.95	$6.78	$6.59	$6.60	$6.63	$6.45	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+8.8%/yr	+7.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+13.8%/yr	+12.3%/yr
Capital spending / share	−6.0%/yr	+11.1%/yr
Book value / share	+10.1%/yr	+1.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

160Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

1%low FY2023

Gross margin

60%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

1.1×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$95Mowner earningsvs.($2M)net incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $2M loss into $95M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($2M)	($12M)	($55M)	$15M	($13M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$75M	+$68M	+$56M	+$2M	+$2M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$23M	+$24M	+$82M	+$76M	+$72M
Cash from operations	$96M	$80M	$83M	$93M	$60M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$2M	−$2M	−$2M	−$1M	−$1M
Owner earnings	$95M	$79M	$81M	$91M	$59M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	23%	20%	23%	27%	21%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 1.1×

Thin

Operating income $21M ÷ interest expense $20M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $104M · 4.9× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $189M − debt $293M

What this means
Netting $189M of cash and short-term investments against $293M of debt leaves $104M owed, about 4.9× a year's operating profit (13.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 74d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 82 + DIO 0 − DPO 9 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -0%

Below average through the cycle

5-yr median, range -3%–2%; 1% latest = NOPAT $11M ÷ invested capital $1.2B

Industry peers: median -21%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 21%

High through the cycle

7-yr median margin, range 17%–27%; latest $95M = operating cash $96M − maintenance capex $2M

Industry peers: median -7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 23% of revenue this year, a 21% median across 7 years.
Are earnings backed by cash? $96M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($2M) · cash from operations $96M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 45%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $43M ÷ Owner Earnings $95M

What this means
Of $95M Owner Earnings, $43M (45%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $43M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.02×

Harvesting

Capex $2M ÷ depreciation $75M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $419M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.05×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $293M vs $162M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.15/share (latest year $-0.01), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.83/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 1% → −2% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
The recent-years average (−2%) sits below the early years (1%), but the latest year (5%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 5% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +14%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 14% a year over the record.
Worst year 2023 · −11.5% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +3.2%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“In particular, we, along with companies in our sector, have been particularly susceptible to stock price volatility stemming from the integration of AI and machine learning technologies into our business model and market perceptions regarding the impact that developments in AI and machine learning technologies may have…”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$271M

Cash & short-term investments$149M
Receivables$83M
Other current assets$38M

Current liabilities$144M

Debt due within a year$3M
Accounts payable$4M
Other current liabilities$137M

Current ratio1.88×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.88×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.04×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$126Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$3M due · $149M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.6× → 1.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($187M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($213M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$304M$11M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$80Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $495M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$11M · 2%
Buybacks$44M · 9%
Retained (debt / cash)$440M · 89%

Returned to owners$44M
9% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $44M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $120M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $44M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count19.1%
The diluted count rose from 132M to 158M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.2B78% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity73%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$433Mover 7 years buying other businesses, against $11M of capital spent building

$47M written down across 1 year (2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	William F. Feehery	$6.2M	$2.3M	$59M
2022	William F. Feehery	$6.2M	−$4.6M	$91M
2023	William F. Feehery	$7.8M	$4.4M	$81M
2024	William F. Feehery	$7.2M	$2.0M	$79M
2025	William F. Feehery	$6.5M	$1.8M	$95M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Certara Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?19.1%
Diluted shares grew 19.1% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $44M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$101M · 24% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Our ten largest customers accounted for 24% and 27% of revenues for the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, respectively.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
SPTSprout Social Inc	$458M	76%	-20.6%	-52%	2%
XPERXperi Inc. Common Stock	$448M	—	-29.1%	-19%	-7%
ALKTAlkami Technology Inc.	$444M	54%	-28.2%	-15%	-19%
VIAVia Transportation Inc.	$434M	40%	-24.8%	-24%	-21%
AVPTAvePoint Inc.	$419M	72%	-10.2%	—	12%
PRCHPorch Group Inc.	$419M	66%	-58.4%	-26%	-10%
CERTCertara Inc.	$419M	61%	4.7%	-0%	21%
GDYNGrid Dynamics Holdings Inc.	$412M	38%	-0.5%	-1%	7%
Group median	—	61%	-22.7%	-19%	-2%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Certara Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Certara Inc. earns about $87M on its 20.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 22.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($87M) Net of stock comp

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+4%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+14%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $89M on 156M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $143M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CERT against another business →

The owners of CERT: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Certara Inc. (CERT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CERT, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CERS its page in the Manual CEVA →

Industry order: ← CDNS the Software chapter CEVA →