Share count
87Mpeak FY2025
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GDYN, Grid Dynamics Holdings Inc.
Grid Dynamics Holdings Inc. is an Enterprise Artificial Intelligence transformation partner for the Fortune 1000.
We combine deep AI expertise with proven enterprise-scale delivery to help clients identify where to invest in AI, deliver systems that work at scale, and capture real business value from AI deployments.
The building blocks of AI have always been our foundation — distributed systems, real-time data, machine learning algorithms, and natural language processing.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$412M
+17.5% YoY · 30% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $416M 5-yr avg $319M
Revenue $104M +3.7% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −3.5% yr-ago −2.0%
Net income ($1M) yr-ago $3M
Net margin −1.4% yr-ago 2.9%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Retail (29%) and Technology, Media and Telecom (26%), with 4 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Net current asset value. Current assets alone exceed every liability combined, and the surplus is most of the balance sheet: the shape Graham called a net-net.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 15% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −0.6%) on a 37% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Stock-based pay runs about 10% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 2 of 8 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 6 lines, the largest Retail at 29%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Retail29%$121M
- Technology, Media and Telecom26%$107M
- Finance24%$100M
- CPG/Manufacturing10%$43M
- Other7%$30M
- Health Care2%$10M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2018–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| $92M | $118M | $111M | $211M | $310M | $313M | $351M | $412M | $416M | RevenueRevenue |
| 43% | 41% | 37% | 42% | 39% | 36% | 36% | 35% | 34% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 19% | 18% | 34% | 31% | 34% | 26% | 23% | 22% | 22% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 3% | 4% | 8% | 4% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 6% | 6% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $14M | $16M | ($15M) | $50K | ($21M) | ($6M) | ($2M) | ($2M) | ($4M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 15.1% | 13.2% | −13.9% | 0.0% | −6.8% | −1.8% | −0.6% | −0.5% | −0.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $9M | $11M | ($13M) | ($8M) | ($29M) | ($2M) | $4M | $10M | $5M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 29% | 30% | — | — | — | — | — | 38% | 59% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| $11M | $13M | $6M | $18M | $32M | $41M | $30M | $41M | $40M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $1M | $2M | $3M | $5M | $7M | $9M | $14M | $20M | $20M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($2M) | ($3M) | ($4M) | ($12M) | ($7M) | ($2M) | ($22M) | ($19M) | ($14M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $3M | $3M | $2M | $5M | $6M | $8M | $12M | $15M | $16M | CapexCapex |
| 3.4% | 2.4% | 2.0% | 2.2% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 3.4% | 3.7% | 3.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $9M | $10M | $4M | $13M | $26M | $33M | $18M | $25M | $24M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 10.1% | 8.2% | 3.3% | 6.3% | 8.2% | 10.6% | 5.3% | 6.1% | 5.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $8M | $10M | $4M | $13M | $26M | $33M | $18M | $25M | $24M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 8.2% | 8.2% | 3.3% | 6.3% | 8.2% | 10.6% | 5.3% | 6.1% | 5.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | $0 | $16M | $31M | $9M | $18M | $43M | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | $2M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | $0 | $124M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $2M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 30% | 92% | -31% | 0% | -16% | -2% | -1% | -1% | -1% | ROICROIC |
| 28% | 20% | -8% | -3% | -8% | -0% | 1% | 2% | 1% | Return on equityROE |
| — | 16% | −8% | −3% | — | — | — | — | 1% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| $1M | $42M | $113M | $144M | $257M | $257M | $335M | $342M | $327M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $14M | $17M | $39M | $48M | $54M | $69M | $79M | $87M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $216K | $768K | $757K | $2M | $4M | $4M | $4M | $4M | $4M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $13M | $16M | $37M | $44M | $50M | $65M | $76M | $83M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1M | $66M | $135M | $193M | $323M | $324M | $423M | $440M | $432M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $445K | $8M | $13M | $25M | $39M | $42M | $56M | $52M | $55M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.7× | 8.0× | 10.1× | 7.6× | 8.3× | 7.7× | 7.6× | 8.4× | 7.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $0 | $15M | $36M | $46M | $54M | $83M | $84M | $84M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $222M | $72M | $167M | $257M | $411M | $435M | $592M | $613M | $605M | Total assetsAssets |
| $33M | $54M | $152M | $227M | $363M | $383M | $518M | $542M | $530M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.9% | 2.1% | 18.0% | 15.6% | 19.6% | 11.4% | 9.7% | 7.4% | 6.8% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||
| 20.2M | 21.1M | 44.7M | 58.7M | 69.2M | 75.2M | 80.0M | 86.9M | 84.7M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $4.54 | $5.60 | $2.49 | $3.60 | $4.49 | $4.16 | $4.38 | $4.74 | $4.91 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.46 | $0.51 | $-0.28 | $-0.13 | $-0.42 | $-0.02 | $0.05 | $0.11 | $0.06 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.46 | $0.46 | $0.08 | $0.23 | $0.37 | $0.44 | $0.23 | $0.29 | $0.28 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.37 | $0.46 | $0.08 | $0.23 | $0.37 | $0.44 | $0.23 | $0.29 | $0.28 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | $0.09 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.15 | $0.13 | $0.05 | $0.08 | $0.09 | $0.10 | $0.15 | $0.18 | $0.19 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $1.65 | $2.56 | $3.39 | $3.87 | $5.25 | $5.09 | $6.47 | $6.24 | $6.26 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.12 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 7-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +0.6%/yr | +13.8%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −6.3%/yr | +28.7%/yr |
| EPS | −18.3%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | +2.1%/yr | +28.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +20.9%/yr | +13.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2018–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−1%low FY2020
Gross margin
35%low FY2025
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$25Mowner earningsvs.$10Mnet incomelow FY2020
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2018FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $10M of profit into $25M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $10M | $4M | ($2M) | ($29M) | ($8M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$20M | +$14M | +$9M | +$7M | +$5M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$30M | +$34M | +$36M | +$61M | +$33M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$19M | −$22M | −$2M | −$7M | −$12M |
| Cash from operations | $41M | $30M | $41M | $32M | $18M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$15M | −$12M | −$8M | −$6M | −$5M |
| Owner earnings | $25M | $18M | $33M | $26M | $13M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 6% | 5% | 11% | 8% | 6% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $30M), owner earnings is nearer ($5M).
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $342M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $342M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 70 + DIO 0 − DPO 5 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median -17%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Solid through the cycle8-yr median margin, range 3%–11%; latest $25M = operating cash $41M − maintenance capex $15MIndustry peers: median -7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $30M of SBC) leaves ($5M).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $41M ÷ net income $10M
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $2M ÷ Owner Earnings $25M
What this means
Of $25M Owner Earnings, $2M (8%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $2M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($30M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.78×HarvestingCapex $15M ÷ depreciation $20M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $412M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 8.43×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (8-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 1 of 8 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +61%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.05/share (latest year $0.12), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.48/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2018–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 8
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin 5% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 5% early to −1% lately, median −1% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Owner earnings growth +13%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 13% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −13.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“This includes the integration of AI technologies designed to enhance our scalability, operational efficiency and long-term competitiveness.”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$432M
- Cash & short-term investments$327M
- Receivables$87M
- Other current assets$17M
Current liabilities$55M
- Accounts payable$4M
- Other current liabilities$51M
Current ratio7.88×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio7.88×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio5.97×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$377Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters7.1× → 7.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$407Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$357MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$22M$17M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$2Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2018–2025
Over the record, the business generated $191M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$54M · 28%
- Dividends$2M · 1%
- Buybacks$126M · 66%
- Retained (debt / cash)$9M · 5%
- Returned to owners$128M
92% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $2M as dividends and $126M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $326M.
- Average price paid for buybacks$9.99
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $2M, about $9.99 each.
- Net change in share count318.9%
The diluted count rose from 20M to 85M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$126M21% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity16%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$117Mover 8 years buying other businesses, against $54M of capital spent building
$139K written down across 1 year (2019): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Leonard Livschitz | $16.9M | $30.7M | $4M |
| 2021 | Leonard Livschitz | $6.8M | $61.8M | $13M |
| 2022 | Leonard Livschitz | $24.7M | −$1.5M | $26M |
| 2023 | Leonard Livschitz | $5.8M | $10.6M | $33M |
| 2024 | Leonard Livschitz | $26.3M | $50.6M | $18M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership6.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio483:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$30M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Grid Dynamics Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?318.9%
Diluted shares grew 318.9% over 2018–2025, even as the company spent $126M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$64M · 15% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“During each of the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, we had one customer that accounted for 15.4% and 16.0% of our revenues, respectively.”verify →
- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XPERXperi Inc. Common Stock | $448M | — | -29.1% | -19% | -7% |
| ALKTAlkami Technology Inc. | $444M | 54% | -28.2% | -15% | -19% |
| VIAVia Transportation Inc. | $434M | 40% | -24.8% | -24% | -21% |
| AVPTAvePoint Inc. | $419M | 72% | -10.2% | — | 12% |
| PRCHPorch Group Inc. | $419M | 66% | -58.4% | -26% | -10% |
| CERTCertara Inc. | $419M | 61% | 4.7% | -0% | 21% |
| GDYNGrid Dynamics Holdings Inc. | $412M | 38% | -0.5% | -1% | 7% |
| DDD3D Systems Corporation | $387M | 42% | -15.2% | -11% | -6% |
| Group median | — | 54% | -20.0% | -15% | -6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Grid Dynamics Holdings Inc. has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Grid Dynamics Holdings Inc. earns about $30M on its 7.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+14%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+13%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $24M on 84M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net cash $323M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Grid Dynamics Holdings Inc. (GDYN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GDYN, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← GDRX its page in the Manual GE →
Industry order: ← GDS the Software chapter GEGGL →