Share count
33Mpeak FY2025
← All companies ← VHI Manual VIAV → ← VERX Software VRNS →
VIA, Via Transportation Inc.
Transportation vertical operates on a different and fragmented technology platform many of which rely on legacy software solutions with antiquated and unscalable architectures.
Via transforms antiquated and siloed public transportation systems into smart, data-driven, and AI-powered efficient digital networks.
We are addressing a striking gap in the $545 billion global public transportation market.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$434M
+28.6% YoY
Vital signs · TTM, with 3-yr average
Revenue $463M 3-yr avg $340M
Revenue $127M +29.2% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −18.5% yr-ago −17.5%
Net income ($20M) yr-ago ($16M)
Net margin −15.8% yr-ago −16.5%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −25% through the cycle on a 40% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Stock-based pay runs about 6.3% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →29% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
Revenue by geography, FY2025
- United States71%$310M
- Germany19%$84M
- All other countries9%$41M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2023–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||
| $249M | $338M | $434M | $463M | RevenueRevenue |
| 40% | 39% | 40% | 39% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 26% | 21% | 20% | 21% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 39% | 26% | 21% | 21% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($114M) | ($84M) | ($77M) | ($83M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −46.0% | −24.8% | −17.6% | −17.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($117M) | ($90M) | ($96M) | ($100M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||
| ($93M) | ($70M) | ($31M) | ($46M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $3M | $4M | $4M | $4M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $8M | ($4M) | $31M | $9M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $3M | $1M | $2M | $2M | CapexCapex |
| 1.0% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($95M) | ($71M) | ($33M) | ($48M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −38.2% | −21.0% | −7.5% | −10.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($95M) | ($71M) | ($33M) | ($48M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −38.2% | −21.0% | −7.5% | −10.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $39M | $0 | $40M | $40M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | -24% | -24% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -15% | -16% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −15% | −16% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||
| $74M | $78M | $371M | $348M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $74M | $82M | $95M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $4M | $4M | $7M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $70M | $77M | $88M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $163M | $470M | $461M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $77M | $94M | $91M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.1× | 5.0× | 5.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $162M | $160M | $192M | $191M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $379M | $733M | $723M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $35M | $0 | $0 | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($43M) | ($371M) | ($348M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -175.3× | -19.6× | -10.4× | -16.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($825M) | ($987M) | $628M | $622M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 5.3% | 6.3% | 7.0% | 8.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||
| 12.2M | 12.5M | 32.9M | 81.2M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $20.47 | $26.95 | $13.18 | $5.71 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-9.60 | $-7.21 | $-2.92 | $-1.23 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-7.83 | $-5.67 | $-0.99 | $-0.59 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-7.83 | $-5.67 | $-0.99 | $-0.59 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.21 | $0.09 | $0.05 | $0.02 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-67.84 | $-78.81 | $19.05 | $7.66 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.63 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×2.46 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The record, charted
FY2023–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Gross margin
40%low FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($33M)owner earningsvs.($96M)net incomelow FY2023
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $96M loss into ($33M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($96M) | ($90M) | ($117M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$4M | +$4M | +$3M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$30M | +$21M | +$13M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$31M | −$4M | +$8M |
| Cash from operations | ($31M) | ($70M) | ($93M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$2M | −$1M | −$3M |
| Owner earnings | ($33M) | ($71M) | ($95M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -7% | -21% | -38% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $30M), owner earnings is nearer ($63M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -10.4×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($77M) ÷ interest expense $7M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $371M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $371M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 69 + DIO 0 − DPO 6 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT ($61M) ÷ invested capital $257M (debt + equity − cash)Industry peers: median -17%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle3-yr median margin, range -38%–-7%; latest ($33M) = operating cash ($31M) − maintenance capex $2MIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -7% of revenue this year, a -21% median across 3 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $30M of SBC) leaves ($63M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($31M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($96M) · cash from operations ($31M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.43×HarvestingCapex $2M ÷ depreciation $4M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $434M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 4.98×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $375M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.25/share (latest year $-1.19), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.73/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“To grow our business and remain competitive, we must continue to enhance our software with features that reflect the constantly evolving nature of automation and AI technology and our customers' evolving needs.”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$461M
- Cash & short-term investments$348M
- Receivables$95M
- Other current assets$18M
Current liabilities$91M
- Accounts payable$7M
- Other current liabilities$83M
Current ratio5.09×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio5.09×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio3.84×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$371Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway7.2 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+29.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 5.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$397Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$360MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$19M$19M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$25Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 3-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$228M31% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity31%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$78Mover 3 years buying other businesses, against $5M of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 3-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership36.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$30M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SPTSprout Social Inc | $458M | 76% | -20.6% | -52% | 2% |
| XPERXperi Inc. Common Stock | $448M | — | -29.1% | -19% | -7% |
| ALKTAlkami Technology Inc. | $444M | 54% | -28.2% | -15% | -19% |
| VIAVia Transportation Inc. | $434M | 40% | -24.8% | -24% | -21% |
| AVPTAvePoint Inc. | $419M | 72% | -10.2% | — | 12% |
| PRCHPorch Group Inc. | $419M | 66% | -58.4% | -26% | -10% |
| CERTCertara Inc. | $419M | 61% | 4.7% | -0% | 21% |
| GDYNGrid Dynamics Holdings Inc. | $412M | 38% | -0.5% | -1% | 7% |
| Group median | — | 61% | -22.7% | -19% | -2% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFVia Transportation Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−10%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Via Transportation Inc. (VIA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/VIA, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← VHI its page in the Manual VIAV →
Industry order: ← VERX the Software chapter VRNS →