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PRCH, Porch Group Inc.
Porch is a leader in the home software-as-a-service space, serving approximately 24 thousand companies across industries essential to the home-buying process—home inspectors, title companies, mortgage providers, and more.
In return, Porch earns commissions and fees for these services.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~37 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Recurring (82%) and Transactional (7%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- The spread on the float and the growth in book value. What decides it: the gap between what the invested reserves earn and what is credited to policyholders, the mortality and fee margins on top, and the scale of the float against equity. Benefits exceed premiums by design, so a P&C combined ratio is the wrong lens; the risks are interest rates and reserve adequacy. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- A life insurer is read on the spread it earns on a large float and the growth in book value, not a combined ratio: benefits exceed premiums by design, since claims fall due decades after the premium and are funded by the investment income on accumulated reserves. The float runs about -5.2× equity, the leverage that magnifies the spread. Whether the spread holds as rates move, and whether the reserves prove adequate, are what the 10-K decides, not an earnings multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Recurring is 82% of revenue, so this is largely a single-line business.
- Recurring82%$394M
- Transactional7%$34M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $78M | $72M | $192M | $276M | $430M | $438M | $482M | $514M | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | $30M | $63M | $369M | $234M | $328M | — | Premiums written (net)Prem. written |
| — | — | $14M | $46M | $227M | $253M | $297M | $323M | Premiums earnedPremiums |
| — | — | $768K | $2M | $8M | $14M | $12M | $13M | Investment incomeInv. inc. |
| ($103M) | ($56M) | ($117M) | ($156M) | ($133M) | ($31M) | $27M | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| ($103M) | ($54M) | ($107M) | ($157M) | ($134M) | ($33M) | ($3M) | ($13M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| ($29M) | ($49M) | ($35M) | ($18M) | $34M | ($32M) | $66M | $96M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ($30M) | ($49M) | ($36M) | ($20M) | $33M | ($32M) | $66M | $96M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | -50% | -49% | -197% | — | — | — | — | Return on equityROE |
| — | $42K | $0 | $2M | $6M | $0 | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($5M) | ($11M) | ($263M) | ($80M) | ($56M) | ($45M) | ($72M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $34M | $260M | $416M | $1M | $91M | ($24M) | ($22M) | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| ($57K) | $200M | $117M | ($96M) | $69M | ($100M) | ($28M) | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| — | — | $5M | $24M | $76M | $48M | $41M | — | Float (net reserves)Float |
| $48M | $268M | $1.0B | $1.0B | $899M | $814M | $797M | $819M | Total assetsAssets |
| $108M | $161M | $822M | $970M | $935M | $857M | $775M | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| ($60M) | $107M | $217M | $79M | ($36M) | ($43M) | ($25M) | ($12M) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 31.2M | 36.4M | 93.9M | 97.4M | 96.1M | 99.6M | 104M | 117M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $-3.31 | $-1.49 | $-1.14 | $-1.61 | $-1.39 | $-0.33 | $-0.03 | $-0.12 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.96 | $-1.35 | $-0.38 | $-0.21 | $0.34 | $-0.32 | $0.64 | $0.82 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-1.92 | $2.95 | $2.31 | $0.82 | $-0.37 | $-0.43 | $-0.24 | $-0.10 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.58 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +11.0%/yr | +18.5%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −18.9%/yr | −10.6%/yr |
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
Net income or equity missing.
- Investment income $12Mearned on investmentsNet investment income $12M
What this means
What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.
The float and book value
- Float (net reserves) $41M-1.7× equityLoss and claim reserves, net of reinsurance: $41M, -1.7× equity
What this means
Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. Measured here from net loss and claim reserves only; it excludes unearned premiums and funds held, so the true float is somewhat larger than shown. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.
- the compounding scoreboardEquity ($25M) ÷ 104M shares
What this means
A life insurer is judged the way Berkshire is, by the growth in book value per share over the years as the spread on the float and the mortality and fee margins compound into equity. This is the level today; the record below shows whether it has grown. Note that reported book value swings with interest rates, which mark the bond portfolio up and down through other comprehensive income.
The reserves
- Reserve development +$6MPast reserves fell shortPrior-year development, FY2025: unfavorable (past years strengthened) · record: 2 favorable, 3 unfavorable of 5
What this means
Each year an insurer restates what its old accident years actually cost. Persistent favorable development means management reserved honestly and released the cushion; persistent unfavorable development means past profits were overstated by under-reserving — the industry's chronic sin, and the single most tell-tale line an owner can read. Signed as the company files it: negative favorable, positive unfavorable.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$208M
- Receivables$11M
- Debt due within a year$8M
- Accounts payable$3M
- Other current liabilities$54M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$99M written down across 2 years (2022, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 32% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Beside that spending sits $96M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2019 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Ehrlichman | $1.3M | $12.6M | ($36M) |
| 2022 | Mr. Ehrlichman | $13.6M | −$5.1M | ($20M) |
| 2023 | Mr. Ehrlichman | $4.3M | $9.0M | $33M |
| 2024 | Mr. Ehrlichman | $12.8M | $22.4M | ($32M) |
| 2025 | Mr. Ehrlichman | $14.5M | $36.8M | $66M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership27.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$29M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 6.0% of revenue, equal to 79.2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Insurance — Property & Casualty
The same industry, side by side on the spread-and-book-value lens. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | ROEmedian over the record | Yield on floatmedian over the record | Return on assetsmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NMIHNMI Holdings Inc. | $706M | 15% | — | 10.0% |
| JRVRJames River Group Holdings Inc. | $688M | 5% | 6.8% | 0.7% |
| BOWBowhead Specialty Holdings Inc. | $552M | 12% | 4.9% | 2.3% |
| IGICInternational General Insurance Holdings Ltd. | $517M | 8% | 5.7% | 4.2% |
| PRCHPorch Group Inc. | $482M | -50%3y | 1.5%3y | -14.9% |
| HIPOHippo Holdings Inc. | $469M | -43% | 4.6% | -16.2% |
| ASICAtegrity Specialty Insurance Company Holdings | $424M | 12%2y | 6.8%2y | 4.6%2y |
| ACICAmerican Coastal Insurance Corporation | $335M | 2% | 4.7% | 0.3% |
| Group median | — | 7% | 4.9% | 1.5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA bank / financial isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).
Manual order: ← PRAA its page in the Manual PRCT →
Industry order: ← PRA the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter RDN →