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ATI, ATI Inc

Steel capital-intensive Cyclical

ATI produces specialty materials, highly differentiated by our materials science expertise and advanced process technologies.

Aerospace & defense, our largest end markets, represent approximately 68% of total sales, led by products for jet engines and airframes in addition to a wide range of defense applications.

HPMC's capabilities range from cast/wrought and powder alloy development to production of highly engineered finished components, and 3D-printed aerospace products.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

ATI · ATI Inc

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$4.6B

+5.2% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $4.6B 5-yr avg $3.7B

Gross margin 23% 5-yr avg 17%

Operating margin 14.3% 5-yr avg 9.5%

ROIC 17% 5-yr avg 12%

Owner-earnings margin 14% 5-yr avg 1%

Free cash flow margin 12% 5-yr avg −0%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 14% and operating margin about 4.2% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −44% and 14% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 31% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price and the cost position. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

42% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

United States58%$2.6B
Rest of World15%$703M
China7%$324M
United Kingdom6%$277M
France5%$246M
Germany5%$227M
Canada4%$170M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$3.1B	$3.5B	$4.0B	$4.1B	$3.0B	$2.8B	$2.8B	$4.2B	$4.4B	$4.6B	$4.6B	RevenueRevenue
7%	14%	16%	15%	10%	12%	12%	19%	21%	22%	23%	Gross marginGross mgn
8%	7%	7%	6%	7%	8%	8%	8%	8%	8%	8%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($542M)	$135M	$362M	$366M	($1.3B)	$118M	$118M	$466M	$609M	$641M	$658M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−17.3%	3.8%	8.9%	8.9%	−43.7%	4.2%	4.2%	11.2%	14.0%	14.0%	14.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($641M)	($92M)	$222M	$253M	($1.6B)	($38M)	$185M	$411M	$368M	$404M	$426M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	5%	—	—	—	13%	—	22%	20%	19%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
($44M)	$22M	$393M	$230M	$167M	$16M	$16M	$86M	$407M	$614M	$835M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$170M	$161M	$156M	$151M	$143M	$144M	$144M	$146M	$152M	$168M	$172M	DepreciationDeprec.
$427M	($47M)	$14M	($174M)	$1.6B	($111M)	($334M)	($500M)	($146M)	$13M	$209M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$202M	$123M	$139M	$168M	$137M	$153M	$153M	$201M	$239M	$281M	$283M	CapexCapex
6.5%	3.5%	3.4%	4.1%	4.6%	5.5%	5.5%	4.8%	5.5%	6.1%	6.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($246M)	($100M)	$254M	$62M	$30M	($137M)	($137M)	($60M)	$256M	$446M	$663M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−7.8%	−2.8%	6.3%	1.5%	1.0%	−4.9%	−4.9%	−1.4%	5.9%	9.7%	14.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($246M)	($100M)	$254M	$62M	$30M	($137M)	($137M)	($115M)	$168M	$334M	$553M	Free cash flowFCF
−7.8%	−2.8%	6.3%	1.5%	1.0%	−4.9%	−4.9%	−2.8%	3.9%	7.3%	12.0%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$10M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$26M	$0	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$0	$85M	$260M	$470M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-15%	3%	11%	12%	-72%	5%	5%	17%	16%	16%	17%	ROICROIC
-47%	-5%	12%	12%	-302%	-6%	18%	30%	20%	22%	24%	Return on equityROE
−49%	−5%	12%	12%	—	—	—	—	—	—	24%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$230M	$142M	$382M	$491M	$646M	$688M	$584M	$744M	$721M	$417M	$402M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$452M	$545M	$528M	$554M	$346M	$470M	$579M	$625M	$709M	$686M	$664M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$997M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.6B	InventoryInvent.
$294M	$420M	$499M	$521M	$291M	$376M	$553M	$525M	$609M	$568M	$655M	Accounts payablePayables
$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.6B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.2B	$2.3B	$2.1B	$2.3B	$2.5B	$2.7B	$2.9B	$2.7B	$2.8B	Current assetsCur. assets
$709M	$713M	$837M	$849M	$653M	$856M	$964M	$977M	$1.2B	$1.0B	$1.0B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.5×	2.7×	2.7×	2.7×	3.2×	2.7×	2.6×	2.8×	2.4×	2.7×	2.7×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$642M	$531M	$535M	$526M	$241M	$228M	$227M	$227M	$227M	$225M	$225M	GoodwillGoodwill
$5.2B	$5.2B	$5.5B	$5.6B	$4.0B	$4.3B	$4.3B	$5.0B	$5.2B	$5.1B	$5.2B	Total assetsAssets
$1.8B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$2.1B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$1.8B	Total debtDebt
$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$897M	$904M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.4B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5.3×	5.6×	—	6.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.4B	$1.7B	$1.9B	$2.1B	$521M	$686M	$1.0B	$1.4B	$1.9B	$1.8B	$1.8B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
—	—	—	—	0.1%	0.8%	0.8%	0.7%	0.8%	0.6%	0.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
107M	110M	146M	147M	127M	127M	153M	150M	147M	142M	139M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$29.21	$32.02	$27.74	$28.14	$23.57	$22.03	$18.34	$27.82	$29.76	$32.35	$33.15	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-5.97	$-0.83	$1.52	$1.72	$-12.43	$-0.30	$1.21	$2.74	$2.51	$2.85	$3.07	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-2.29	$-0.91	$1.74	$0.42	$0.24	$-1.07	$-0.89	$-0.40	$1.74	$3.15	$4.78	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-2.29	$-0.91	$1.74	$0.42	$0.24	$-1.07	$-0.89	$-0.77	$1.15	$2.35	$3.99	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.24	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0.00	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.88	$1.11	$0.95	$1.15	$1.08	$1.20	$1.00	$1.34	$1.63	$1.98	$2.04	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$12.63	$15.80	$12.92	$14.27	$4.12	$5.39	$6.85	$9.15	$12.62	$12.73	$12.77	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+1.1%/yr	+6.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+67.3%/yr
Capital spending / share	+0.5%/yr	+12.9%/yr
Book value / share	+0.1%/yr	+25.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

142Mpeak FY2022

ROIC

16%low FY2020

Gross margin

22%low FY2016

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

3.0×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$446Mowner earningsvs.$404Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $446M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $168M it takes just to hold its position. It put $113M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $334M.

Reported net income$404M

Owner earnings$446M · 10% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$404M	$368M	$411M	$185M	($38M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$168M	+$152M	+$146M	+$144M	+$144M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$29M	+$34M	+$29M	+$21M	+$21M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$13M	−$146M	−$500M	−$334M	−$111M
Cash from operations	$614M	$407M	$86M	$16M	$16M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$168M	−$152M	−$146M	−$153M	−$153M
Owner earnings	$446M	$256M	($60M)	($137M)	($137M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$113M	−$88M	−$55M	—	—
Free cash flow	$334M	$168M	($115M)	($137M)	($137M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	10%	6%	-1%	-5%	-5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $168M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $113M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $29M), owner earnings is nearer $417M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 5.9×

Comfortable

Operating income $641M ÷ interest expense $108M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.3B · 2.1× operating profit

Meaningful net debt

Cash $417M − debt $1.7B

What this means
Netting $417M of cash and short-term investments against $1.7B of debt leaves $1.3B owed, about 2.1× a year's operating profit (2.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 140d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 55 + DIO 143 − DPO 58 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 5%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -72%–17%; 16% latest = NOPAT $510M ÷ invested capital $3.1B

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 16% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 10%

Positive this year, negative across the cycle

latest $446M = operating cash $614M − maintenance capex $168M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -1%)

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a -1% median across 10 years. It chose to put $113M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $334M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $29M of SBC) leaves $417M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.52×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $614M ÷ net income $404M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 105%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $470M ÷ Owner Earnings $446M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $446M of Owner Earnings, $470M (105%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $470M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $29M stock comp, the real buyback was about $441M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 1.67×

Expanding

Capex $281M ÷ depreciation $168M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.6B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.66×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Near

Debt ≤ working capital · $1.7B vs $1.7B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.89/share (latest year $2.96), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.22/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −2% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −2% early to 13% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2020 · −43.7% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +3.1%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 29, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.8B

Cash & short-term investments$402M
Receivables$664M
Inventory$1.6B
Other current assets$158M

Current liabilities$1.0B

Debt due within a year$33M
Accounts payable$655M
Other current liabilities$361M

Current ratio2.67×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.17×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.38×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.8Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$33M due · $402M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 29, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 2.7×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.5Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($543M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$89M$56M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$292Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$1.8B · 94%
Dividends$26M · 1%
Buybacks$815M · 43%

Returned to owners$841M
228% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $26M as dividends and $815M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$727M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $727M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks$59.50
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 14M shares were bought for $815M, about $59.50 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $42.60 (2023) to $73.44 (2025), and 2025, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($470M).
Net change in share count29.2%
The diluted count rose from 107M to 139M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$225M4% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity12%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$10Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.8B of capital spent building

$401M written down across 2 years (2017, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	Robert S. Wetherbee	$7.6M	$6.7M	($137M)
2023	Robert S. Wetherbee	$7.7M	$35.2M	($60M)
2024	Kimberly A	$5.9M	$18.5M	$256M
2024	Robert S. Wetherbee	$7.2M	$41.1M	$256M
2025	Kimberly A	$13.5M	$41.1M	$446M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio123:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$29M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why ATI Inc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?29.2%
Diluted shares grew 29.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $815M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Steel

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CMCCommercial Metals	$7.8B	16%	5.7%	9%	6%
ATIATI Inc	$4.6B	15%	6.5%	8%	-0%
MLIMueller Industries	$4.2B	16%	13.8%	25%	8%
KALUKaiser Aluminum Corporation	$3.4B	16%	6.3%	8%	5%
WSWorthington Steel Inc.	$3.1B	11%	5.2%	12%	3%
CRSCarpenter Technology	$2.9B	17%	6.0%	5%	5%
SXCSunCoke Energy Inc.	$1.8B	—	7.8%	8%	6%
TWITitan International Inc. (DE)	$1.8B	13%	1.5%	2%	0%
Group median	—	16%	6.1%	8%	5%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what ATI Inc has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($129M) Net of stock comp (−$28M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($667M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+99%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $553M on 136M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-21; net debt $1.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($283M) runs well above depreciation ($172M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $667M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh ATI against another business →

The owners of ATI: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "ATI Inc (ATI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ATI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ATHS its page in the Manual ATKR →

Industry order: ← ASTL the Steel chapter CLF →