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CNCK, Coincheck Group N.V.
Coincheck runs a cryptocurrency exchange in Japan, where retail customers buy and sell digital tokens through its Marketplace platform. It earns its keep chiefly on the trading itself — the spread and fees collected each time a customer transacts — so what it takes in tracks how much its users trade. Customer cash is held in trust accounts kept apart from the company's own funds, as Japanese rules require.
Next Finance, headquartered in Tokyo, Japan, is a blockchain infrastructure company focused primarily on staking services technology.
KDDI, a Japanese corporation listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and headquartered in Tokyo, Japan, is a major Japanese telecommunications company that provides telecommunications services, finance and, energy, IoT services for connected cars, and data center connectivity.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- This is a toll booth on a volatile flow: the house earns a cut of trading volume, and that volume answers to crypto prices and the public's appetite to speculate — neither of which the company sets. The test a value investor watches is whether such an exchange is a franchise or a commodity — whether it can hold its take rate when rival venues compete on price, and whether anything beyond the lowest fee and the hottest token keeps a customer who can leave for another app; loyalty here is the thing to prove, not assume. Japanese licensing and the trust-account regime are the wall a value investor must size against new entrants, but they are also a standing cost and a source of rule changes that can cut either way, and the reach across customers and listed coins is the reinvestment lever — a race others run too. The bad case is plain: a thin-margin toll booth earns little when the flow runs dry, so watch the record below for what the spread actually clears across a full cycle of volume.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2023–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||
| ¥176.9B | ¥224.0B | ¥383.3B | ¥475.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| 4% | 4% | 4% | 3% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| (¥839M) | ¥2.9B | (¥13.3B) | ¥1.5B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −0.5% | 1.3% | −3.5% | 0.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (¥559M) | ¥2.0B | (¥14.3B) | ¥25M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||
| (¥3.8B) | ¥3.9B | (¥1.9B) | (¥282M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥483M | ¥679M | ¥727M | ¥727M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (¥3.7B) | ¥1.3B | ¥11.7B | (¥1.0B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥93M | ¥308M | ¥176M | ¥84M | CapexCapex |
| 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| (¥3.9B) | ¥3.6B | (¥2.1B) | (¥366M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −2.2% | 1.6% | −0.5% | −0.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| (¥3.9B) | ¥3.6B | (¥2.1B) | (¥366M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −2.2% | 1.6% | −0.5% | −0.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥5.0B | ¥0 | ¥0 | ¥0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| -5% | 16% | -133% | 0% | Return on equityROE |
| −53% | 16% | −133% | 0% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||
| ¥8.4B | ¥10.9B | ¥8.6B | ¥11.2B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥439M | ¥719M | ¥1.1B | ¥1.3B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥439M | ¥719M | ¥1.1B | ¥1.3B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥69.3B | ¥115.4B | ¥107.1B | ¥118.7B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥61.2B | ¥105.5B | ¥99.9B | ¥111.4B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥72.0B | ¥119.2B | ¥112.3B | ¥128.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| -119.9× | 168.1× | -341.5× | 10.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥10.5B | ¥12.4B | ¥10.8B | ¥14.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||
| 123M | 123M | 125M | 131M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥1443.25 | ¥1827.66 | ¥3071.47 | ¥3632.07 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥-4.56 | ¥16.05 | ¥-114.98 | ¥0.19 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥-31.78 | ¥29.32 | ¥-16.75 | ¥-2.80 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥-31.78 | ¥29.32 | ¥-16.75 | ¥-2.80 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥40.79 | ¥0.00 | ¥0.00 | ¥0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥0.76 | ¥2.51 | ¥1.41 | ¥0.64 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥85.47 | ¥101.51 | ¥86.29 | ¥108.94 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The record, charted
FY2023–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a ¥14.3B loss into (¥2.1B) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | (¥14.3B) | ¥2.0B | (¥559M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥727M | +¥679M | +¥483M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +¥11.7B | +¥1.3B | −¥3.7B |
| Cash from operations | (¥1.9B) | ¥3.9B | (¥3.8B) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −¥176M | −¥308M | −¥93M |
| Owner earnings | (¥2.1B) | ¥3.6B | (¥3.9B) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -1% | 2% | -2% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 10.3×ComfortableOperating income ¥1.5B ÷ interest expense ¥143M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Debt under-captured — leverage unknown, not low
What this means
This company pays far more interest than its tagged debt implies (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so its net cash or net debt cannot be read honestly: the gap is unknown, not zero, and 'net cash' here would be exactly the fiction the figure is meant to prevent. Judge it on the record and owner earnings instead.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Debt under-capturedIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
This company's interest bill implies far more debt than its filings tag at the consolidated level (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so invested capital, and the return on it, cannot be read honestly. Judge this one on Owner Earnings and the record instead.
- Consumes cash through the cycle3-yr median margin, range -2%–2%; latest (¥366M) = operating cash (¥282M) − maintenance capex ¥84MIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -0% of revenue this year, a -1% median across 3 years.
- Are earnings backed by cash? -11.28×Thinly cash-backedCash from ops (¥282M) ÷ net income ¥25M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.12×HarvestingCapex ¥84M ÷ depreciation ¥727M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 1 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · ¥475.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.07×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt —Debt ≤ working capital · —
What this means
The filings tag only a fraction of the debt this company's interest bill implies (much of it sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so this test can't be run honestly.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are ¥-26.47/share (latest year ¥0.15), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is ¥87.44/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments¥11.2B
- Receivables¥1.3B
- Other current assets¥106.3B
- Other current liabilities¥111.4B
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CNCKCoincheck Group N.V. | ¥475.1B | 4% | -0.5% | — | -1% |
| COINCoinbase Global Inc. | $7.2B | — | 20.0% | 11% | 2% |
| UWMCUWM Holdings Corporation | $3.2B | — | 13.9% | 4% | -86% |
| CACCCredit Acceptance Corporation | $2.3B | — | 45.7% | 10% | 54% |
| PGYPagaya Technologies Ltd. | $1.3B | 41% | -1.3% | 4% | 3% |
| PRAAPRA Group Inc. | $1.2B | — | 570.9% | 6% | 124% |
| PWPPerella Weinberg Partners | $751M | — | -7.6% | — | 15% |
| DAVEDave Inc. | $554M | — | -4.2% | -12% | 13% |
| Group median | — | — | 6.7% | — | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Coincheck Group N.V.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself; figures in this tool are translated at JPY 1 = $0.0062 (2026-07-17, reference rate); the dollar quote then reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in JPY.
Coincheck Group N.V. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← CMRE its page in the Manual CNI →
Industry order: ← CME the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter CNS →