Owner Scorecard


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PWP, Perella Weinberg Partners

We are a leading global independent advisory firm that provides strategic and financial advice to clients across the most active industry sectors and international markets.

Perella Weinberg Partners provides services to multiple industry sectors, geographic markets and advisory offerings.

Our growth strategy centers on increasing the depth and breadth of our advisory business in both current and potential future markets.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
PWP · Perella Weinberg Partners
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$751M
−14.5% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $688M 5-yr avg $742M
Operating margin 3.4% 5-yr avg −3.9%
Owner-earnings margin 14% 5-yr avg 14%
Free cash flow margin 14% 5-yr avg 13%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −7.6% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Stock-based pay runs about 22% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

25% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States75%$563M
  • United Kingdom13%$101M
  • Other international countries12%$87M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$533M$519M$802M$632M$649M$878M$751M$688MRevenueRevenue
0%0%2%3%3%3%2%2%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($155M)($15M)$67M($48M)($115M)($79M)$48M$23MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−29.1%−2.8%8.3%−7.6%−17.7%−8.9%6.4%3.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
($1K)($5M)($9M)$18M($17M)($65M)$35M$20MNet incomeNet inc.
37%9%14%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($106M)$86M$235M($18M)$146M$223M$35M$102MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$16M$16M$14M$11M$15M$20M$21M$22MDepreciationDeprec.
($315M)$51M$133M($203M)($36M)$79M($132M)($55M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$7M$6M$1M$27M$58M$16M$4M$5MCapexCapex
1.4%1.1%0.2%4.2%8.9%1.9%0.6%0.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($114M)$80M$233M($28M)$131M$207M$30M$96MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−21.3%15.5%29.1%−4.5%20.2%23.6%4.1%14.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($114M)$80M$233M($44M)$88M$207M$30M$96MFree cash flowFCF
−21.3%15.5%29.1%−7.0%13.6%23.6%4.1%14.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$19M$19MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$6M$13M$13M$20M$23M$23MDividends paidDiv. paid
-6%-7%-7%13%-11%Return on equityROE
−6%−7%−12%4%−20%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$11K$329M$503M$312M$338M$407M$256M$78MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$41M$47M$68M$48M$73M$63M$33MReceivablesReceiv.
$41M$47M$68M$48M$73M$63M$33MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$11K$1M$2MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$43K$793K$1MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.3×1.8×1.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$34M$34M$34M$34M$34M$73M$73MGoodwillGoodwill
$66K$543M$718M$717M$761M$877M$798M$596MTotal assetsAssets
$147M$0$0Total debtDebt
($182M)($503M)($78M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-10.1×-0.9×8.8×-172.9×-417.0×84.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$23K$74M$126M$137M$153M($421M)($127M)($155M)Shareholders’ equityEquity
36.2%4.8%12.1%24.8%28.4%21.5%14.7%16.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
92.7M89.8M86.8M53.2M101M101MShares out (diluted)Shares
$8.64$7.04$7.47$16.51$7.45$6.80Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.10$0.20$-0.20$-1.22$0.35$0.19EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.52$-0.32$1.51$3.89$0.30$0.95Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.52$-0.49$1.02$3.89$0.30$0.95Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.06$0.14$0.15$0.38$0.23$0.23Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.02$0.30$0.66$0.31$0.04$0.05Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.36$1.53$1.76$-7.92$-1.26$-1.53Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1/1.63 into 2024 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.9 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
6-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−3.7%/yr (4-yr)−3.7%/yr (4-yr)
Owner earnings / share−41.1%/yr (4-yr)−41.1%/yr (4-yr)
Dividends / share+37.0%/yr (4-yr)+37.0%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share+28.3%/yr (4-yr)+28.3%/yr (4-yr)

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
101Mpeak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$30Mowner earningsvs.$35Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2020FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $35M of profit but $30M of owner earnings: $5M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$35M
Owner earnings$30M · 4% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$35M($65M)($17M)$18M($9M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$21M+$20M+$15M+$11M+$14M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$110M+$189M+$184M+$156M+$97M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$132M+$79M−$36M−$203M+$133M
Cash from operations$35M$223M$146M($18M)$235M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$4M−$16M−$15M−$11M−$1M
Owner earnings$30M$207M$131M($28M)$233M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$43M−$16M
Free cash flow$30M$207M$88M($44M)$233M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%24%20%-5%29%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $110M), owner earnings is nearer ($80M).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $48M ÷ interest expense $276K
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $256M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $256M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Not meaningful here
    Invested capital ($383M) = debt $0 + equity ($127M) − cash
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.

  • High through the cycle
    7-yr median margin, range -21%–29%; latest $30M = operating cash $35M − maintenance capex $4M
    Industry peers: median 15%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 15% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $110M of SBC) leaves ($80M).

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops $35M ÷ net income $35M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $23M ÷ Owner Earnings $30M
    What this means

    Of $30M Owner Earnings, $23M (75%) went back to shareholders, $23M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.21×
    Harvesting
    Capex $4M ÷ depreciation $21M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $751M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.81×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $642K WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (7-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.22/share (latest year $0.50), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-1.81/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 2 of 7
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −8% → −7% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about −8% early, −7% lately, median −8%.

  • Worst year 2019 · −29.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +1.4%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2021

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2M
  • Cash & short-term investments$78M
  • Receivables$33M
Current liabilities$1M
  • Other current liabilities$1M
Current ratio1.26×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.26×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio58.88×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$347Kthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−29.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($238M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($366M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Deferred revenue$10Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $601M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$119M · 20%
  • Dividends$75M · 13%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$407M · 68%
  • Returned to owners$75M

    14% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $75M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Net change in share count9.1%

    The diluted count rose from 93M to 101M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.23/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 37% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Peter A. Weinberg$6.8M−$9.5M($28M)
2023Andrew Bednar$12.4M$24.9M$131M
2024Andrew Bednar$27.4M$85.7M$207M
2025Andrew Bednar$5.1M−$16.0M$30M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$110M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 15% of revenue, equal to 230% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Perella Weinberg Partners is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?9.1%

    Diluted shares grew 9.1% over 2019–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
PGYPagaya Technologies Ltd.$1.3B41%-1.3%4%3%
ONITOnity Group Inc.$1.1B41.0%2%15%
PWPPerella Weinberg Partners$751M-7.6%15%
RMRegional Management Corp.$646M21.6%6%43%
WRLDWorld Acceptance Corporation$585M16.9%8%44%
DAVEDave Inc.$554M-4.2%-12%13%
WDWalker & Dunlop$320M143.4%14%149%
GEMIGemini Space Station Inc.$180M-192.5%-95%-123%
Group median7.8%15%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Perella Weinberg Partners has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Perella Weinberg Partners earns about $116M on its 15.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+4%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023−41%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $96M on 70M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $78M. The if-converted diluted count is 101M, 44% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($5M) runs well above depreciation ($22M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $97M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Perella Weinberg Partners (PWP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PWP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PVLA its page in the Manual PWR →

Industry order: ← PLUT the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter QFIN →