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DAVE, Dave Inc.
Dave Inc. market Opportunity According to the Financial Health Network in 2025, approximately 185 million Americans, representing 69% of the U.S. population, are classified as financially "coping" or "vulnerable," up from 66% in 2021.
Through our mobile-first platform, we deliver innovative financial products designed to help underserved consumers manage their money more effectively.
Since inception, over 19 million Members have signed up for the Dave app, with over 14 million having used at least one of our products.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Net current asset value. Current assets alone exceed every liability combined, and the surplus is most of the balance sheet: the shape Graham called a net-net.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 32% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −4.2%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on debt terms & refinancing, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −12%, above 15% in 2 of 5 years). By owner earnings: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $153M | $205M | $259M | $347M | $554M | $605M | RevenueRevenue |
| ($6M) | ($120M) | ($37M) | $68M | $175M | ($6M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −4.2% | −58.5% | −14.1% | 19.7% | 31.6% | −1.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($20M) | ($129M) | ($49M) | $58M | $196M | $225M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| ($541K) | ($45M) | $34M | $125M | $290M | $327M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $3M | $7M | $6M | $8M | $7M | $7M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $14M | $77M | $77M | $60M | $87M | $92M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $371K | $728K | $688K | $262K | $317K | $299K | CapexCapex |
| 0.2% | 0.4% | 0.3% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($912K) | ($46M) | $33M | $125M | $290M | $327M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −0.6% | −22.3% | 12.8% | 36.0% | 52.3% | 54.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($912K) | ($46M) | $33M | $125M | $290M | $327M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −0.6% | −22.3% | 12.8% | 36.0% | 52.3% | 54.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $536K | $0 | $0 | $44M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -12% | -60% | -24% | 31% | 64% | -2% | ROICROIC |
| -52% | -121% | -56% | 32% | 56% | 110% | Return on equityROE |
| −52% | −121% | −56% | 32% | 56% | 110% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| $32M | $23M | $43M | $50M | $81M | $133M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $13M | $11M | $5M | $7M | $8M | $7M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $100M | $309M | $277M | $282M | $437M | $480M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $69M | $36M | $26M | $35M | $114M | $124M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.5× | 8.5× | 10.8× | 8.1× | 3.8× | 3.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $147M | $321M | $294M | $299M | $487M | $531M | Total assetsAssets |
| $35M | $75M | $75M | $75M | $0 | $193M | Total debtDebt |
| $3M | $52M | $32M | $25M | ($81M) | $59M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -2.5× | -13.0× | -3.1× | 8.6× | 24.9× | -0.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $39M | $107M | $87M | $183M | $353M | $204M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||
| 4.3M | 11.6M | 11.9M | 13.8M | 14.5M | 14.4M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $35.86 | $17.68 | $21.71 | $25.11 | $38.27 | $41.99 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-4.69 | $-11.12 | $-4.07 | $4.19 | $13.53 | $15.62 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.21 | $-3.94 | $2.77 | $9.03 | $20.01 | $22.67 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.21 | $-3.94 | $2.77 | $9.03 | $20.01 | $22.67 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.09 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $9.08 | $9.20 | $7.29 | $13.25 | $24.36 | $14.15 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.72 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +1.6%/yr | +1.6%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −29.2%/yr | −29.2%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | +28.0%/yr | +28.0%/yr (4-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2021–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $196M of profit into $290M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $196M | $58M | ($49M) | ($129M) | ($20M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$7M | +$8M | +$6M | +$7M | +$3M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | — | — | — | — | +$2M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$87M | +$60M | +$77M | +$77M | +$14M |
| Cash from operations | $290M | $125M | $34M | ($45M) | ($541K) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$317K | −$262K | −$688K | −$728K | −$371K |
| Owner earnings | $290M | $125M | $33M | ($46M) | ($912K) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 52% | 36% | 13% | -22% | -1% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -0.9×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($6M) ÷ interest expense $7M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $81M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $81M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle5-yr median, range -60%–64%; -2% latest = NOPAT ($6M) ÷ invested capital $272MIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran -2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle5-yr median margin, range -22%–52%; latest $290M = operating cash $290M − maintenance capex $317KIndustry peers: median 29%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 52% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 5 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $2M of SBC) leaves $288M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $290M ÷ net income $196M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $44M ÷ Owner Earnings $290M
What this means
Of $290M Owner Earnings, $44M (15%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $44M buybacks. Net of $2M stock comp, the real buyback was about $42M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.04×HarvestingCapex $317K ÷ depreciation $7M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $554M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 3.83×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $323M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (5-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.09/share (latest year $14.58), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $26.25/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2021–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 2 of 5
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 5 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −31% → 26% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −31% early to 26% lately, median −4% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —
What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
- Worst year 2022 · −58.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“By leveraging technology and AI, we have dramatically reduced our cost to serve, enabling us to provide banking and credit products at lower costs with a stronger value proposition.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$133M
- Other current assets$346M
- Accounts payable$7M
- Other current liabilities$118M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2021–2025
Over the record, the business generated $403M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$2M · 1%
- Buybacks$44M · 11%
- Retained (debt / cash)$357M · 88%
- Returned to owners$44M
11% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $44M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $158M and cash and short-term investments rose $101M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $44M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count237.5%
The diluted count rose from 4M to 14M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained1275%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($12M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $154M, so each retained $1 added about 12.75 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | $2.3M | $1.9M | $33M |
| 2024 | $11.7M | $50.9M | $125M |
| 2025 | $10.2M | $102.2M | $290M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership13.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$2M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Dave Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2021–2025.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?237.5%
Diluted shares grew 237.5% over 2021–2025, even as the company spent $44M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PGYPagaya Technologies Ltd. | $1.3B | 41% | -1.3% | 4% | 3% |
| PWPPerella Weinberg Partners | $751M | — | -7.6% | — | 15% |
| RMRegional Management Corp. | $646M | — | 21.6% | 6% | 43% |
| WRLDWorld Acceptance Corporation | $585M | — | 16.9% | 8% | 44% |
| DAVEDave Inc. | $554M | — | -4.2% | -12% | 13% |
| FIGRFigure Technology Solutions Inc. | $507M | — | 2.7% | 4% | — |
| WDWalker & Dunlop | $320M | — | 143.4% | 14% | 149% |
| GEMIGemini Space Station Inc. | $180M | — | -192.5% | -95% | -123% |
| Group median | — | — | 0.7% | 4% | 15% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Dave Inc. has delivered.
Dave Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Dave Inc. earns about $71M on its 12.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 52.3% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $327M on 13M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $59M. The if-converted diluted count is 14M, 7% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← DASH its page in the Manual DBD →
Industry order: ← CRCL the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter DBRG →