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CNNE, Cannae Holdings Inc.

Financial Conglomerates consumer brand UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

Revenue is Restaurant Group (92%) and Other revenues (8%).

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CNNE · Cannae Holdings Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$424M

−6.4% YoY · −6% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $417M 5-yr avg $570M

Gross margin 16% 5-yr avg 16%

Operating margin −28.9% 5-yr avg −22.4%

ROIC −11% 5-yr avg −5%

Owner-earnings margin −14% 5-yr avg −21%

Free cash flow margin −14% 5-yr avg −21%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: A restaurant business, earning on traffic through its doors and the returns on each new unit.
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −21% through the cycle on a 15% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −10 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on same-store sales and unit economics. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −5%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Restaurant Group is 92% of revenue, with Other revenues the other meaningful segment at 8%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Restaurant Group92%$391M
Other revenues8%$33M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$586M	$742M	$662M	$570M	$453M	$424M	$417M	RevenueRevenue
16%	14%	14%	—	—	—	14%	17%	18%	15%	16%	Gross marginGross mgn
($2M)	($78M)	($146M)	($118M)	($189M)	($134M)	($145M)	($119M)	($104M)	($120M)	($120M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−0.2%	−6.7%	−12.7%	−11.0%	−32.2%	−18.0%	−21.8%	−20.9%	−22.9%	−28.2%	−28.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($12M)	$109M	$28M	$77M	$1.8B	($287M)	($428M)	($313M)	($305M)	($513M)	($444M)	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	35%	24%	21%	—	—	—	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$60M	($91M)	($23M)	($84M)	($114M)	($176M)	($205M)	($88M)	($90M)	($18M)	($48M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$63M	$58M	$61M	$55M	$31M	$26M	$23M	$19M	$13M	$12M	$11M	DepreciationDeprec.
$9M	($258M)	($134M)	($221M)	($1.9B)	$82M	$199M	$203M	$182M	$465M	$367M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$50M	$39M	$16M	$28M	$22M	$14M	$14M	$10M	$7M	$10M	$10M	CapexCapex
4.2%	3.4%	1.4%	2.6%	3.8%	1.8%	2.2%	1.8%	1.5%	2.5%	2.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$11M	($130M)	($39M)	($113M)	($136M)	($190M)	($219M)	($98M)	($97M)	($29M)	($59M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
0.9%	−11.2%	−3.4%	−10.5%	−23.3%	−25.6%	−33.1%	−17.2%	−21.5%	−6.7%	−14.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$11M	($130M)	($39M)	($113M)	($136M)	($190M)	($219M)	($98M)	($97M)	($29M)	($59M)	Free cash flowFCF
0.9%	−11.2%	−3.4%	−10.5%	−23.3%	−25.6%	−33.1%	−17.2%	−21.5%	−6.7%	−14.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$76M	$223M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$22M	$31M	$30M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	$0	$0	$5M	$14M	$160M	$230M	$113M	$231M	$320M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-0%	-8%	-11%	-8%	-5%	-3%	-4%	-4%	-4%	-10%	-11%	ROICROIC
-1%	10%	2%	5%	47%	-9%	-16%	-13%	-17%	-50%	-46%	Return on equityROE
—	—	—	—	—	—	−16%	−13%	−18%	−53%	−49%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$142M	$246M	$347M	$534M	$725M	$86M	$283M	$122M	$138M	$182M	$136M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$25M	$36M	$30M	$16M	$18M	$18M	$7M	$8M	$8M	$8M	$6M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$24M	$30M	$22M	$16M	—	—	—	—	—	—	$6M	InventoryInvent.
$25M	$20M	$23M	$20M	$26M	$23M	$26M	$27M	$17M	$17M	$87M	Accounts payablePayables
$24M	$45M	$30M	$13M	($8M)	($5M)	($19M)	($19M)	($9M)	($9M)	($74M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$273M	$350M	$452M	$631M	$844M	$122M	$311M	$177M	$197M	$268M	$209M	Current assetsCur. assets
$160M	$250M	$160M	$199M	$202M	$180M	$123M	$108M	$147M	$130M	$122M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×	1.4×	2.8×	3.2×	4.2×	0.7×	2.5×	1.6×	1.3×	2.1×	1.7×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$103M	$103M	$77M	$66M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$2.1B	$4.6B	$3.9B	$3.1B	$2.7B	$2.2B	$1.3B	$1.2B	Total assetsAssets
$105M	$135M	$48M	$127M	$64M	$16M	$97M	$105M	$181M	$71M	$70M	Total debtDebt
($37M)	($111M)	($299M)	($407M)	($661M)	($69M)	($185M)	($17M)	$43M	($111M)	($65M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-0.4×	-11.1×	-31.0×	-6.6×	-20.9×	-13.6×	-11.8×	-6.6×	-8.9×	-10.1×	-11.6×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$894M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.5B	$3.8B	$3.3B	$2.7B	$2.3B	$1.8B	$1.0B	$959M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%	0.0%	1.9%	0.4%	0.7%	0.3%	0.2%	0.6%	4.2%	4.4%	4.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	$27M	$10M	$8M	—	—	—	—	—	—	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
70.6M	70.6M	71.3M	72.4M	85.9M	90.1M	81.6M	73.4M	64.4M	56.5M	45.9M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$16.69	$16.38	$16.09	$14.78	$6.82	$8.24	$8.11	$7.77	$7.03	$7.50	$9.08	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.18	$1.54	$0.39	$1.07	$20.79	$-3.19	$-5.25	$-4.27	$-4.73	$-9.08	$-9.68	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.15	$-1.84	$-0.54	$-1.55	$-1.59	$-2.11	$-2.69	$-1.33	$-1.51	$-0.50	$-1.28	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.15	$-1.84	$-0.54	$-1.55	$-1.59	$-2.11	$-2.69	$-1.33	$-1.51	$-0.50	$-1.28	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	—	—	—	—	$0.00	$0.00	$0.35	$0.54	$0.65	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.70	$0.55	$0.22	$0.39	$0.26	$0.15	$0.18	$0.14	$0.11	$0.18	$0.22	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$12.66	$15.01	$15.77	$20.56	$44.00	$37.02	$33.32	$31.67	$28.52	$18.12	$20.89	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−8.5%/yr	+1.9%/yr
Capital spending / share	−13.8%/yr	−6.6%/yr
Book value / share	+4.1%/yr	−16.3%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue-6.4%
“Total revenue decreased $28.9 million in 2025 compared to 2024, primarily driven by a decrease in revenue in the Restaurant Group segment.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

57Mpeak FY2021

ROIC

−10%low FY2018

Gross margin

15%low FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($29M)owner earningsvs.($513M)net incomelow FY2022

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $513M loss into ($29M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($513M)	($305M)	($313M)	($428M)	($287M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$12M	+$13M	+$19M	+$23M	+$26M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$19M	+$19M	+$4M	+$2M	+$2M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$465M	+$182M	+$203M	+$199M	+$82M
Cash from operations	($18M)	($90M)	($88M)	($205M)	($176M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$10M	−$7M	−$10M	−$14M	−$14M
Owner earnings	($29M)	($97M)	($98M)	($219M)	($190M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-7%	-21%	-17%	-33%	-26%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $19M), owner earnings is nearer ($47M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -10.1×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($120M) ÷ interest expense $12M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$111M

Net cash

Cash $182M − debt $71M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $111M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 6d

Tight

DSO 7 + DIO 17 − DPO 17 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -5%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -11%–-0%; -10% latest = NOPAT ($94M) ÷ invested capital $913M

Industry peers: median 3%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -17%

Consumes cash through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -33%–1%; latest ($29M) = operating cash ($18M) − maintenance capex $10M

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -7% of revenue this year, a -17% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $19M of SBC) leaves ($47M).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($18M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($513M) · cash from operations ($18M)

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 0.87×

Maintaining

Capex $10M ÷ depreciation $12M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $424M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.07×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $71M vs $139M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 2 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −1012%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-8.58/share (latest year $-11.68), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $23.30/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 4 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −7% → −24% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −7% early to −24% lately, median −21% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −4%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2020 · −32.2% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −2.4%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Large and well-capitalized competitors may be able to respond to the need for technological changes (including the implementation of AI and Machine Learning ("ML")) and innovate faster, or price their services more aggressively.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$209M

Cash & short-term investments$136M
Receivables$6M
Inventory$6M
Other current assets$60M

Current liabilities$122M

Debt due within a year$6M
Accounts payable$87M
Other current liabilities$30M

Current ratio1.71×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.65×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.11×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$86Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$6M due · $136M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Cash runway2.3 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−6.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.7×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$893Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($109M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$204M$134M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$15Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$7M

'27$700K

'28$600K

'29$2M

'30$48M

later$13M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$7Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$8Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$48Min 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$71Mevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$136M

Together, against $7M due next year19.7×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 comes to $136M against the $7M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 20 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$67M5% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity5%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$299Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $210M of capital spent building

$45M written down across 3 years (2018, 2019, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 15% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2020	Mr. Massey	$1	$27k	($136M)
2021	Mr. Ducommun	$2.0M	$2.0M	($190M)
2022	Mr. Ducommun	$763k	$763k	($219M)
2023	Mr. Ducommun	$390k	$390k	($98M)
2023	Mr. Massey	$1	$1	($98M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$19M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Cannae Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−15.1% vs −4.6%
The business ran at a loss early in the record (an owner-earnings margin of −4.6%) and the loss has widened to −15.1% across the last three years, with the latest year at −6.7%. Ask the filing where the widening sits — price, cost, or spending growing faster than revenue — and what would narrow it.
Look hereDid reported profit become cash?-5.87×
Across the record the business reported $141M of net income but generated ($829M) of operating cash, a -5.87-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $233M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Financial Conglomerates

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
SHAKShake Shack	$1.4B	—	2.4%	5%	7%
WINGWingstop	$697M	80%	25.6%	48%	19%
SGSweetgreen Inc.	$679M	—	-30.2%	-43%	-16%
LOCOEl Pollo Loco Holdings Inc.	$490M	—	8.5%	8%	6%
CNNECannae Holdings Inc.	$424M	15%	-19.4%	-5%	-14%
BHBiglari Holdings Inc.	$395M	57%	5.8%	3%	16%
KRUSKura Sushi USA Inc.	$283M	—	-1.1%	-2%	5%
BRCBBlack Rock Coffee Bar Inc.	$200M	—	1.5%	1%	-3%
Group median	—	57%	2.0%	2%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Cannae Holdings Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered−9%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−14%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh CNNE against another business →

The owners of CNNE: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Cannae Holdings Inc. (CNNE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CNNE, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CNMD its page in the Manual CNO →

Industry order: the Financial Conglomerates chapter CODI →