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SHAK, Shake Shack

Restaurants consumer brand Cyclical

Shake Shack Inc. is the sole managing member of SSE Holdings and, as sole managing member, it operates and controls all of the business and affairs of SSE Holdings.

With our fine-dining roots and a commitment to crafting uplifting experiences, Shake Shack has become a cult brand.

Since the original Shack opened in 2004 in Madison Square Park, the Company has expanded to 659 Shacks system-wide, of which 373 were Company-operated Shacks and 286 were licensed Shacks, including Shacks across London, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Singapore, Mexico City, Istanbul, Dubai, Tokyo, Seoul and more.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

SHAK · Shake Shack

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.4B

+15.4% YoY · 23% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.5B 5-yr avg $1.1B

Operating margin 3.8% 5-yr avg −0.0%

ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 1%

Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 4%

Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg −2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 0.5% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −8.4% to 10% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Capital spending runs about 14% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on same-store sales and unit economics. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMApr 2026
											Income statement
$268M	$359M	$459M	$595M	$523M	$740M	$900M	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.5B	RevenueRevenue
11%	11%	11%	11%	12%	12%	13%	12%	12%	12%	13%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$28M	$34M	$32M	$26M	($44M)	($16M)	($27M)	$6M	$3M	$63M	$57M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
10.4%	9.4%	6.9%	4.3%	−8.4%	−2.1%	−3.0%	0.5%	0.2%	4.3%	3.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$12M	($320K)	$15M	$20M	($42M)	($5M)	($21M)	$20M	$10M	$46M	$41M	Net incomeNet inc.
34%	—	37%	15%	—	—	—	—	25%	33%	35%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$54M	$71M	$85M	$90M	$37M	$58M	$77M	$132M	$171M	$222M	$200M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$15M	$22M	$29M	$40M	$49M	$59M	$73M	$91M	$102M	$107M	$109M	DepreciationDeprec.
$22M	$44M	$35M	$22M	$25M	($5M)	$12M	$6M	$43M	$51M	$29M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$54M	$62M	$88M	$107M	$69M	$101M	$143M	$146M	$135M	$166M	$184M	CapexCapex
20.3%	17.1%	19.1%	17.9%	13.2%	13.7%	15.8%	13.4%	10.8%	11.5%	12.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$40M	$49M	$56M	$49M	($11M)	($587K)	$4M	$41M	$69M	$116M	$90M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
14.8%	13.7%	12.3%	8.3%	−2.2%	−0.1%	0.4%	3.8%	5.5%	8.0%	6.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($148K)	$9M	($2M)	($17M)	($32M)	($43M)	($66M)	($14M)	$36M	$57M	$16M	Free cash flowFCF
−0.1%	2.6%	−0.5%	−2.8%	−6.1%	−5.8%	−7.3%	−1.3%	2.8%	3.9%	1.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
13%	11%	10%	8%	-13%	-4%	-6%	1%	1%	10%	8%	ROICROIC
8%	-0%	7%	7%	-10%	-1%	-5%	5%	2%	9%	8%	Return on equityROE
8%	−0%	7%	7%	−10%	−1%	−5%	5%	2%	9%	8%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$74M	$85M	$87M	$74M	$184M	$382M	$359M	$293M	$321M	$360M	$314M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$6M	$6M	$11M	$10M	$9M	$14M	$12M	$17M	$20M	$33M	$29M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$806K	$1M	$2M	$2M	$3M	$4M	$4M	$5M	$6M	$7M	$7M	InventoryInvent.
$7M	$8M	$12M	$14M	$23M	$20M	$13M	$22M	$24M	$25M	$27M	Accounts payablePayables
($109K)	($1M)	($195K)	($2M)	($11M)	($2M)	$2M	($22K)	$2M	$15M	$9M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$84M	$93M	$101M	$88M	$203M	$410M	$387M	$334M	$368M	$430M	$394M	Current assetsCur. assets
$32M	$34M	$60M	$99M	$110M	$121M	$126M	$164M	$187M	$245M	$233M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.6×	2.7×	1.7×	0.9×	1.9×	3.4×	3.1×	2.0×	2.0×	1.8×	1.7×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$538M	$471M	$611M	$968M	$1.1B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.9B	$1.9B	Total assetsAssets
$0	—	—	—	$0	$244M	$244M	$246M	$247M	$248M	$248M	Total debtDebt
($74M)	—	—	—	($184M)	($139M)	($115M)	($48M)	($74M)	($112M)	($66M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
74.3×	20.6×	13.1×	59.2×	-53.8×	-10.1×	-17.7×	3.4×	1.5×	29.0×	26.6×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$152M	$169M	$226M	$299M	$407M	$410M	$415M	$443M	$470M	$525M	$526M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.0%	1.6%	1.3%	1.3%	1.1%	1.2%	1.5%	1.4%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
23.4M	25.9M	29.2M	32.3M	37.1M	39.1M	39.2M	43.9M	44.2M	41.8M	40.3M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$11.45	$13.87	$15.74	$18.43	$14.08	$18.93	$22.95	$24.77	$28.34	$34.54	$37.01	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.53	$-0.01	$0.52	$0.61	$-1.14	$-0.12	$-0.54	$0.46	$0.23	$1.09	$1.02	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.70	$1.90	$1.93	$1.53	$-0.31	$-0.02	$0.10	$0.93	$1.55	$2.77	$2.24	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.01	$0.36	$-0.07	$-0.52	$-0.85	$-1.10	$-1.68	$-0.32	$0.81	$1.35	$0.40	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.32	$2.38	$3.00	$3.30	$1.86	$2.60	$3.63	$3.33	$3.07	$3.96	$4.56	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$6.49	$6.55	$7.75	$9.27	$10.97	$10.48	$10.57	$10.10	$10.63	$12.55	$13.05	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+13.1%/yr	+19.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+5.6%/yr	—
EPS	+8.4%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	+6.1%/yr	+16.3%/yr
Book value / share	+7.6%/yr	+2.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

42Mpeak FY2024

ROIC

10%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$116Mowner earningsvs.$46Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $116M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $107M it takes just to hold its position. It put $59M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $57M.

Reported net income$46M

Owner earnings$116M · 8% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$46M	$10M	$20M	($21M)	($5M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$107M	+$102M	+$91M	+$73M	+$59M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$20M	+$16M	+$15M	+$13M	+$9M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$51M	+$43M	+$6M	+$12M	−$5M
Cash from operations	$222M	$171M	$132M	$77M	$58M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$107M	−$102M	−$91M	−$73M	−$59M
Owner earnings	$116M	$69M	$41M	$4M	($587K)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$59M	−$33M	−$55M	−$70M	−$43M
Free cash flow	$57M	$36M	($14M)	($66M)	($43M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	8%	5%	4%	0%	0%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $107M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $59M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $20M), owner earnings is nearer $96M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 29.0×

Comfortable

Operating income $63M ÷ interest expense $2M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$112M

Net cash

Cash $360M − debt $248M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $112M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 1%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -13%–13%; 10% latest = NOPAT $42M ÷ invested capital $413M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 5%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -2%–15%; latest $116M = operating cash $222M − maintenance capex $107M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. It chose to put $59M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $57M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $20M of SBC) leaves $96M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 4.86×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $222M ÷ net income $46M

In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 1.56×

Expanding

Capex $166M ÷ depreciation $107M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.4B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.76×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Near

Debt ≤ working capital · $248M vs $185M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +179%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.63/share (latest year $1.13), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.04/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 9% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 9% early to 2% lately, median 1% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Owner earnings growth +8%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 8% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −8.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +6.6%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 1, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$394M

Cash & short-term investments$314M
Receivables$29M
Inventory$7M
Other current assets$44M

Current liabilities$233M

Accounts payable$27M
Other current liabilities$206M

Current ratio1.69×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.66×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.35×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$161Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+14.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 1.7×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$526Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($969M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$922M$674M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $884M (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$21Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$89M

'27$112M

'28$106M

'29$96M

'30$84M

later$350M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$89Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$838Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$636Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$248M

Lease obligations (present value)$636M

Total fixed claims on the business$884M

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $884M, of which the leases are 72%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $999M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$1.1B · 107%

Source of funding−$72M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $72M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $0 to $248M.
Net change in share count71.8%
The diluted count rose from 23M to 40M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained48%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($55M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $27M, so each retained $1 added about 0.48 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Robert Lynch	$5.5M	$4.5M	($587K)
2022	Robert Lynch	$3.3M	$1.4M	$4M
2023	Robert Lynch	$3.6M	$5.9M	$41M
2024	Robert Lynch	$764k	−$1.3M	$69M
2024	Robert Lynch	$13.1M	$17.1M	$69M
2025	Robert Lynch	$7.2M	−$370k	$116M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership4.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$20M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 31% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Shake Shack is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?5.8% vs 13.6%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 13.6% early in the record and 5.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?71.8%
Diluted shares grew 71.8% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$0 → $248M
Debt rose from $0 to $248M while owner earnings went from about $48M to $75M — under 0.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 3.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Restaurants

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
WENWendy's	$2.2B	64%	15.7%	8%	12%
PZZAPapa John's International Inc.	$2.1B	—	6.0%	37%	4%
BROSDutch Bros Inc.	$1.6B	27%	4.8%	7%	11%
JACKJack in the Box	$1.5B	56%	19.1%	19%	8%
SHAKShake Shack	$1.4B	—	2.4%	5%	7%
BJRIBJ's Restaurants Inc.	$1.4B	74%	2.2%	6%	3%
FWRGFirst Watch Restaurant Group Inc.	$1.2B	—	2.3%	2%	4%
CAVACAVA Group	$1.2B	—	0.6%	10%	7%
Group median	—	—	3.6%	8%	7%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Shake Shack has delivered.

Shake Shack’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Shake Shack earns about $98M on its 6.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($98M) Net of stock comp (−$20M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($93M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+172%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+29%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $16M on 40M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $66M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($184M) runs well above depreciation ($109M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $93M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh SHAK against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Shake Shack (SHAK), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SHAK, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SGU its page in the Manual SHAZ →

Industry order: ← SG the Restaurants chapter THCH →