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CSIQ, Canadian Solar Inc. Common Shares (ON)
A semiconductor business, riding a brutal capacity cycle on the edge of Moore's Law.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 17% and operating margin about 4.8% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −0.5% and 10% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 17% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $2.9B | $3.4B | $3.7B | $3.2B | $3.5B | $5.3B | $7.5B | $7.6B | $6.0B | $5.6B | $5.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| 15% | 19% | 21% | 22% | 20% | 17% | 17% | 17% | 17% | 18% | 18% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $93M | $269M | $365M | $259M | $220M | $190M | $356M | $453M | ($30M) | $43M | $43M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 3.3% | 7.9% | 9.7% | 8.1% | 6.3% | 3.6% | 4.8% | 6.0% | −0.5% | 0.8% | 0.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $65M | $103M | $242M | $167M | $147M | $110M | $299M | $364M | ($78M) | ($184M) | ($184M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 22% | 28% | 20% | 20% | -1% | 25% | 20% | 14% | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($278M) | $204M | $216M | $600M | ($121M) | ($408M) | $917M | $685M | ($885M) | ($253M) | ($253M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $96M | $99M | $129M | $160M | $209M | $283M | $235M | $307M | $501M | $555M | $555M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($439M) | $2M | ($155M) | $274M | ($477M) | ($801M) | $384M | $14M | ($1.3B) | ($624M) | ($624M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $287M | $277M | $316M | — | — | $429M | $627M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $962M | $1.1B | CapexCapex |
| 10.0% | 8.2% | 8.4% | — | — | 8.1% | 8.4% | 14.7% | 18.6% | 17.2% | 20.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($374M) | $105M | $87M | — | — | ($691M) | $682M | $378M | ($1.4B) | ($808M) | ($808M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −13.1% | 3.1% | 2.3% | — | — | −13.1% | 9.1% | 5.0% | −23.1% | −14.4% | −14.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($565M) | ($73M) | ($100M) | — | — | ($837M) | $290M | ($432M) | ($2.0B) | ($1.2B) | ($1.4B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −19.8% | −2.2% | −2.7% | — | — | −15.9% | 3.9% | −5.7% | −33.3% | −21.7% | −24.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | $12M | $6M | — | — | — | $80M | $70M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 5% | 12% | 22% | 11% | 14% | 7% | 6% | 7% | -0% | — | — | ROICROIC |
| 7% | 10% | 20% | 12% | 9% | 6% | 15% | 14% | -3% | -7% | -7% | Return on equityROE |
| 7% | 10% | 20% | 12% | 9% | 6% | 15% | 14% | −3% | −7% | −7% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $511M | $562M | $444M | $669M | $1.2B | $870M | $1000M | $2.0B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $1.4B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $400M | $358M | $498M | $437M | $409M | $651M | $971M | $905M | $1.1B | $830M | $830M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $295M | $346M | $262M | $554M | $696M | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.1B | InventoryInvent. |
| $440M | $403M | $379M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $379M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $256M | $301M | $381M | $991M | $1.1B | $1.8B | $2.5B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.0B | $1.6B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $3.8B | $4.1B | $3.1B | $3.3B | $4.2B | $4.8B | $5.6B | $6.1B | $5.9B | $6.0B | $6.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $3.7B | $4.1B | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.6B | $4.0B | $5.3B | $5.9B | $5.4B | $5.9B | $5.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.0× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 1.1× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.0× | 1.1× | 1.0× | 1.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $8M | $6M | $1M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $1M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $5.4B | $5.9B | $4.9B | $5.5B | $6.5B | $7.4B | $9.0B | $11.9B | $13.5B | $15.2B | $15.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.2B | $1.1B | $565M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $3.7B | $4.9B | $6.5B | $6.0B | $573M | Total debtDebt |
| $658M | $561M | $120M | $465M | $46M | $333M | $2.7B | $2.9B | $4.8B | $4.6B | ($813M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 1.3× | 2.3× | 3.4× | 3.2× | 3.1× | 3.3× | 4.8× | 4.0× | -0.2× | 0.2× | 0.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $885M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $2.8B | $2.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 58.1M | 61.5M | 62.3M | 60.8M | 62.3M | 68.9M | 71.2M | 72.2M | 66.9M | 67.4M | 67.8M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $49.14 | $55.09 | $60.11 | $52.66 | $55.80 | $76.62 | $104.92 | $105.46 | $89.53 | $83.05 | $82.51 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.12 | $1.67 | $3.89 | $2.74 | $2.36 | $1.60 | $4.19 | $5.04 | $-1.16 | $-2.73 | $-2.71 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-6.44 | $1.70 | $1.40 | — | — | $-10.03 | $9.58 | $5.23 | $-20.72 | $-11.99 | $-11.91 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-9.73 | $-1.19 | $-1.61 | — | — | $-12.15 | $4.07 | $-5.98 | $-29.85 | $-18.04 | $-20.19 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $4.94 | $4.50 | $5.08 | — | — | $6.22 | $8.81 | $15.46 | $16.62 | $14.28 | $16.46 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $15.24 | $16.77 | $19.67 | $22.92 | $25.20 | $26.15 | $27.28 | $35.45 | $42.06 | $41.68 | $41.41 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +6.0%/yr | +8.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +12.5%/yr | +23.1%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | +11.8%/yr | +10.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($808M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $555M it takes just to hold its position. It put $407M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($1.2B).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($184M) | ($78M) | $364M | $299M | $110M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$555M | +$501M | +$307M | +$235M | +$283M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$624M | −$1.3B | +$14M | +$384M | −$801M |
| Cash from operations | ($253M) | ($885M) | $685M | $917M | ($408M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$555M | −$501M | −$307M | −$235M | −$283M |
| Owner earnings | ($808M) | ($1.4B) | $378M | $682M | ($691M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$407M | −$611M | −$809M | −$393M | −$146M |
| Free cash flow | ($1.2B) | ($2.0B) | ($432M) | $290M | ($837M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -14% | -23% | 5% | 9% | -13% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $555M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $407M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income $43M ÷ interest expense $114M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cashCash $1.4B + ST investments $15M − debt $573M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $813M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 54 + DIO 91 − DPO 30 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range -0%–22%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle8-yr median margin, range -23%–9%; latest ($808M) = operating cash ($253M) − maintenance capex $555MIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -14% of revenue this year, a -13% median across 8 years. It chose to put $561M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($1.4B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($253M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($184M) · cash from operations ($253M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.01×ExpandingCapex $1.1B ÷ depreciation $555M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $5.6B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.02×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $573M vs $128M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −75%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.50/share (latest year $-2.71), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $41.41/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 7% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 7% early to 2% lately, median 5% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2024 · −0.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +1.7%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$1.4B
- Receivables$830M
- Inventory$1.1B
- Other current assets$2.6B
- Debt due within a year$179M
- Accounts payable$379M
- Other current liabilities$5.3B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $197M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$5.1B · 2602%
- Buybacks$150M · 76%
- Returned to owners$150M
$0 as dividends and $150M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$5.1B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $5.1B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $150M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count16.8%
The diluted count rose from 58M to 68M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained−71%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($771M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $545M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.71 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Canadian Solar Inc. Common Shares (ON) is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
4 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−10.9% vs −2.6%
The business ran at a loss early in the record (an owner-earnings margin of −2.6%) and the loss has widened to −10.9% across the last three years, with the latest year at −14.4%. Ask the filing where the widening sits — price, cost, or spending growing faster than revenue — and what would narrow it.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?16.8%
Diluted shares grew 16.8% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $150M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.55×
Across the record the business reported $1.2B of net income but generated $677M of operating cash, a 0.55-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?24% → 35% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $696M to $2.0B while revenue grew 96%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (24% of revenue then, 35% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Did debt outgrow the business?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Semiconductors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TXNTexas Instruments Incorporated | $17.7B | 64% | 40.7% | 35% | 35% |
| AMKRAmkor Technology | $6.7B | 17% | 7.5% | 10% | 6% |
| SNSharkNinja Inc. | $6.4B | 48% | 11.7% | 21% | 6% |
| CSIQCanadian Solar Inc. Common Shares (ON) | $5.6B | 18% | 5.4% | 7% | -5% |
| FSLRFirst Solar | $5.2B | 23% | 8.9% | 5% | 4% |
| CIENCiena Corporation | $4.8B | 43% | 7.5% | 9% | 9% |
| AYIAcuity | $4.3B | 42% | 12.7% | 19% | 11% |
| GNRCGenerac | $4.2B | 36% | 14.5% | 14% | 11% |
| Group median | — | 39% | 10.3% | 12% | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Canadian Solar Inc. Common Shares (ON) reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Canadian Solar Inc. Common Shares (ON) is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered8%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← CSAN its page in the Manual CSTE →
Industry order: ← CRUS the Semiconductors chapter DIOD →