Owner Scorecard


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CTRN, Citi Trends Inc.

Specialty Retail retail Cyclical

Citi Trends Inc. is a highly differentiated off-price value retailer known for trendy fashions, great brands and amazing prices.

We are the leading off-price retailer specifically focused on Black customers, delivering the styles, brands, and trends at amazing prices that resonate with our primary and secondary customers.

Our product offering is Women's, Men's and Children's apparel, family footwear, accessories and products for the home, with a three-tiered mix of product.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
CTRN · Citi Trends Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$820M
+8.9% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $849M 5-yr avg $822M
Operating margin 1.3% 5-yr avg 2.0%
ROIC 12% 5-yr avg 23%
Owner-earnings margin 3% 5-yr avg −1%
Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg −1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 2.7% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −5.2% to 9.5% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Inventory runs near 16% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMay 2026
Income statement
$695M$755M$770M$782M$783M$992M$795M$748M$753M$820M$849MRevenueRevenue
33%33%32%33%33%31%35%38%40%38%37%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$19M$23M$25M$19M$32M$80M$75M($19M)($39M)$4M$11MOperating incomeOp. inc.
2.7%3.0%3.3%2.4%4.1%8.0%9.5%−2.6%−5.2%0.5%1.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$13M$15M$21M$17M$24M$62M$59M($12M)($43M)$5M$12MNet incomeNet inc.
31%38%19%17%24%21%23%5%2%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$40M$42M$30M$43M$111M$74M$6M($10M)($4M)$21M$53MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$17M$19M$19M$19M$19M$20M$21M$19M$19M$18M$19MDepreciationDeprec.
$6M$7M($12M)$5M$65M($13M)($77M)($21M)$17M($8M)$16MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$24M$21M$13M$24M$17M$30M$22M$15M$10M$20M$24MCapexCapex
3.4%2.8%1.7%3.1%2.2%3.0%2.8%2.0%1.3%2.5%2.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$16M$21M$17M$18M$94M$45M($17M)($24M)($14M)$624K$29MOwner earningsOwner earn.
2.3%2.8%2.2%2.4%12.0%4.5%−2.1%−3.3%−1.9%0.1%3.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$16M$21M$17M$18M$94M$45M($17M)($24M)($14M)$624K$29MFree cash flowFCF
2.3%2.8%2.2%2.4%12.0%4.5%−2.1%−3.3%−1.9%0.1%3.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$4M$4M$4M$4M$832K$832KDividends paidDiv. paid
$25M$40M$28M$33M$115M$10M$4M$6MBuybacksBuybacks
7%9%12%10%60%94%93%-20%-60%7%12%ROICROIC
6%7%11%10%15%54%35%-8%-38%4%10%Return on equityROE
4%5%9%7%14%9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$87M$80M$68M$47M$123M$50M$103M$80M$61M$66M$117MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$135M$138M$140M$138M$104M$124M$106M$130M$123M$114M$115MInventoryInvent.
$75M$76M$73M$80M$85M$99M$81M$100M$102M$101M$113MAccounts payablePayables
$59M$62M$66M$59M$19M$25M$25M$30M$20M$13M$2MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$237M$233M$226M$201M$244M$193M$223M$225M$197M$193M$213MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$100M$109M$102M$151M$183M$187M$161M$170M$174M$173M$186MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.4×2.1×2.2×1.3×1.3×1.0×1.4×1.3×1.1×1.1×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$333M$327M$298M$459M$495M$474M$544M$519M$463M$471M$496MTotal assetsAssets
119.1×151.8×163.2×117.4×41.2×259.9×246.1×-63.6×-123.8×11.3×30.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$224M$209M$187M$171M$164M$116M$166M$158M$113M$116M$125MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.2%0.3%0.3%0.4%0.5%0.5%0.5%0.4%0.7%0.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
14.7M14.1M13.1M11.7M10.3M9.0M8.2M8.2M8.3M8.3M8.5MShares out (diluted)Shares
$47.41$53.50$58.88$66.84$75.86$110.02$96.76$90.97$90.57$98.79$100.08Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.91$1.03$1.64$1.41$2.32$6.91$7.17$-1.46$-5.19$0.63$1.43EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.08$1.51$1.31$1.58$9.09$4.95$-2.01$-2.97$-1.68$0.08$3.39Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.08$1.51$1.31$1.58$9.09$4.95$-2.01$-2.97$-1.68$0.08$3.39Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.24$0.30$0.32$0.32$0.08$0.10Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.63$1.49$1.01$2.07$1.64$3.30$2.71$1.81$1.22$2.45$2.84Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$15.25$14.84$14.34$14.62$15.85$12.89$20.26$19.18$13.61$14.01$14.77Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+8.5%/yr+5.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share−25.6%/yr−61.7%/yr
EPS−4.0%/yr−23.0%/yr
Dividends / share−23.8%/yr (4-yr)−23.8%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share+4.6%/yr+8.3%/yr
Book value / share−0.9%/yr−2.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
8Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
7%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$624Kowner earningsvs.$5Mnet incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business reported $5M of profit but $624K of owner earnings: $5M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$5M
Owner earnings$624K · 0% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$5M($43M)($12M)$59M$62M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$18M+$19M+$19M+$21M+$20M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$5M+$3M+$4M+$4M+$5M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$8M+$17M−$21M−$77M−$13M
Cash from operations$21M($4M)($10M)$6M$74M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$20M−$10M−$15M−$22M−$30M
Owner earnings$624K($14M)($24M)($17M)$45M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue0%-2%-3%-2%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $5M), owner earnings is nearer ($5M).

Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $4M ÷ interest expense $342K
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $66M + ST investments $28M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $94M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -3%–12%; latest $624K = operating cash $21M − maintenance capex $20M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 0% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $5M of SBC) leaves ($5M).

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $21M ÷ net income $5M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $7M ÷ Owner Earnings $624K
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $624K of Owner Earnings, $7M (1145%) went back to shareholders, $832K dividends, $6M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $5M stock comp, the real buyback was about $926K. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.10×
    Maintaining
    Capex $20M ÷ depreciation $18M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $820M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.11×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −201%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.00/share (latest year $0.63), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.96/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin 3% → −2% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 3% early to −2% lately, median 3% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Worst year 2025 · −5.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −6.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We use AI in our business, and challenges with effectively managing its use could result in reputation harm, competitive harm, and legal liability, and adversely affect our business, financial condition, or results of operations.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 2, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$213M
  • Cash & short-term investments$117M
  • Inventory$115M
Current liabilities$186M
  • Accounts payable$113M
  • Other current liabilities$73M
Current ratio1.15×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.53×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.63×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$27Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+14.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$124Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($158M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$268M$226M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $354M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$197M · 56%
  • Dividends$17M · 5%
  • Buybacks$262M · 74%
  • Returned to owners$279M

    178% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $17M as dividends and $262M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$122M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $122M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$45.12

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 4M shares were bought for $187M, about $45.12 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $20.26 (2020) to $84.21 (2022), and 2022, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($115M).

  • Net change in share count−42.1%

    The diluted count fell from 15M to 8M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.08/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 24% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Mr. Seipel$3.0M$2.9M$45M
2023Mr. Seipel$1.7M−$332k($17M)
2024Mr. Seipel$1.8M$1.2M($24M)
2025Mr. Seipel$6.1M$10.3M($14M)
2025Mr. Seipel$1.5M$266k($14M)
2026Mr. Seipel$1.9M$9.5M$624K
2026Mr. Seipel$1.9M$9.5M$624K

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership9.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$5M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 140% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Citi Trends Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−1.7% vs 2.4%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 2.4% early in the record and −1.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $7M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
HBIHanesbrands$3.5B38%9.3%16%8%
GCOGenesco Inc.$2.4B48%3.6%6%4%
BOOTBoot Barn Holdings$2.3B35%10.8%17%4%
LELands' End Inc.$1.3B42%2.9%6%1%
BKEBuckle$1.3B49%19.2%113%17%
SCVLShoe Carnival$1.1B33%5.6%14%5%
ZUMZZumiez$929M34%5.0%9%5%
CTRNCiti Trends Inc.$820M49%2.9%9%2%
Group median40%5.3%12%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Citi Trends Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Citi Trends Inc. earns about $18M on its 2.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $29M on 8M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-29; net cash $75M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($24M) runs well above depreciation ($19M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $32M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Citi Trends Inc. (CTRN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CTRN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CTRI its page in the Manual CTS →

Industry order: ← BOOT the Specialty Retail chapter DBI →