Share count
234Mpeak FY2025
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KD, Kyndryl Holdings Inc.
Kyndryl is a leading provider of mission-critical enterprise technology services, offering advisory, implementation and managed service capabilities to thousands of customers in more than 60 countries.
As the world's largest IT infrastructure services provider, the Company designs, builds, manages and modernizes the complex information systems that the world depends on every day.
We offer services across a number of areas of expertise, such as cloud services, core enterprise services, applications, data and artificial intelligence ("AI") services, digital workplace services, security and resiliency services and network and edge services as we continue to support our customers through technological change.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2026
$15.1B
+0.2% YoY · −5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $15.1B 5-yr avg $16.4B
Revenue $3.9B +3.1% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income $57M yr-ago $215M
Net margin 1.5% yr-ago 5.7%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Principal Markets (36%) and United States (25%), with 2 more segments behind.
- Situation
- Revenue in runoff. Revenue has shrunk about 4% a year across the record while operations still generate cash.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −2.5% through the cycle on a 15% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −9 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −7%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest Principal Markets at 36%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2026
- Principal Markets36%$5.4B
- United States25%$3.8B
- Strategic Markets24%$3.6B
- Japan15%$2.3B
By geographyOther countries, excluding United States and Japan60%United States25%Japan15%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $20.3B | $19.4B | $18.7B | $17.0B | $16.1B | $15.1B | $15.1B | $15.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| 13% | 11% | 11% | 15% | 18% | 21% | 22% | 22% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 15% | 15% | 15% | 17% | 17% | 17% | 18% | 18% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($503M) | ($1.7B) | ($1.8B) | ($756M) | ($46M) | $536M | $502M | $502M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −2.5% | −8.8% | −9.9% | −4.4% | −0.3% | 3.6% | 3.3% | 3.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($943M) | ($2.0B) | ($2.3B) | ($1.4B) | ($340M) | $252M | $198M | $198M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | — | — | 42% | 52% | 52% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $1.1B | $628M | ($119M) | $781M | $454M | $942M | $948M | $948M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $900M | $834M | $660M | $762M | $762M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $557M | $1.1B | $814M | $1.1B | ($135M) | ($70M) | ($76M) | ($76M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $1.2B | $1.0B | $752M | $865M | $651M | $605M | $608M | $608M | CapexCapex |
| 5.9% | 5.4% | 4.0% | 5.1% | 4.1% | 4.0% | 4.0% | 4.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($56M) | ($408M) | ($871M) | ($84M) | ($197M) | $337M | $340M | $340M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −0.3% | −2.1% | −4.7% | −0.5% | −1.2% | 2.2% | 2.3% | 2.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($56M) | ($408M) | ($871M) | ($84M) | ($197M) | $337M | $340M | $340M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −0.3% | −2.1% | −4.7% | −0.5% | −1.2% | 2.2% | 2.3% | 2.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| -7% | -27% | -38% | -22% | -1% | 12% | 6% | 6% | ROICROIC |
| -16% | -41% | -83% | -101% | -33% | 21% | 17% | 17% | Return on equityROE |
| −16% | −41% | −83% | −101% | −33% | 21% | 17% | 17% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $50M | $24M | $2.2B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $2.6B | $2.6B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $1.4B | $2.3B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.3B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $919M | $1.1B | $1.8B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.3B | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $525M | $1.1B | ($251M) | $191M | ($6M) | ($46M) | ($46M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $2.8B | $5.8B | $5.0B | $4.7B | $4.6B | $5.5B | $5.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $3.9B | $4.5B | $4.9B | $4.6B | $4.3B | $6.3B | $6.3B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.7× | 1.3× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 1.1× | 0.9× | 0.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1.2B | $1.2B | $732M | $812M | $805M | $790M | $786M | $786M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $11.2B | $13.2B | $11.5B | $10.6B | $10.5B | $12.6B | $12.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $209M | $3.3B | $3.2B | $3.3B | $3.2B | $5.7B | $5.7B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $185M | $1.0B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $3.1B | $3.1B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -6.6× | -26.9× | -28.7× | -8.0× | -0.4× | 5.4× | 5.6× | 5.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $6.0B | $4.9B | $2.8B | $1.4B | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.7% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 0.4% | 0.4% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 224M | 224M | 224M | 227M | 229M | 239M | 234M | 234M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $90.49 | $86.35 | $83.25 | $75.10 | $70.03 | $62.97 | $64.55 | $64.55 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-4.21 | $-8.96 | $-10.28 | $-6.06 | $-1.48 | $1.05 | $0.85 | $0.85 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.25 | $-1.82 | $-3.89 | $-0.37 | $-0.86 | $1.41 | $1.45 | $1.45 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.25 | $-1.82 | $-3.89 | $-0.37 | $-0.86 | $1.41 | $1.45 | $1.45 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $5.31 | $4.62 | $3.36 | $3.82 | $2.84 | $2.53 | $2.60 | $2.60 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $26.75 | $21.74 | $12.34 | $6.02 | $4.43 | $5.10 | $5.03 | $5.03 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 7-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −4.7%/yr | −5.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −9.7%/yr | −5.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | −21.2%/yr | −16.4%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Net income-21.4%
“Net income of $198 million decreased by $53 million versus the prior year reflecting a $138 million after-tax gain from the sale of our Securities Industry Services (“SIS”) platform in Canada (classified as a transaction-related benefit) in the prior year, partially offset by progress on our key initiatives to drive operating efficiencies.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2019–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
6%low FY2021
Gross margin
22%low FY2021
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$340Mowner earningsvs.$198Mnet incomelow FY2021
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2019FY2026
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned $198M of profit into $340M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $198M | $252M | ($340M) | ($1.4B) | ($2.3B) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$762M | +$660M | +$834M | +$900M | +$1.3B |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$64M | +$100M | +$95M | +$113M | +$71M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$76M | −$70M | −$135M | +$1.1B | +$814M |
| Cash from operations | $948M | $942M | $454M | $781M | ($119M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$608M | −$605M | −$651M | −$865M | −$752M |
| Owner earnings | $340M | $337M | ($197M) | ($84M) | ($871M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 2% | 2% | -1% | 0% | -5% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $64M), owner earnings is nearer $276M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“In addition, as previously disclosed, the Company identified material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $502M ÷ interest expense $89M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.1B · 6.1× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $2.6B − debt $5.7B
What this means
Netting $2.6B of cash and short-term investments against $5.7B of debt leaves $3.1B owed, about 6.1× a year's operating profit (11.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 31 + DIO 0 − DPO 42 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -38%–12%; 6% latest = NOPAT $251M ÷ invested capital $4.3BIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Positive this year, negative across the cyclelatest $340M = operating cash $948M − maintenance capex $608M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median -0%)Industry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a -0% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $64M of SBC) leaves $276M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $948M ÷ net income $198M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $304M ÷ Owner Earnings $340M
What this means
Of $340M Owner Earnings, $304M (89%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $304M buybacks. Net of $64M stock comp, the real buyback was about $240M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.80×HarvestingCapex $608M ÷ depreciation $762M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $15.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.88×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $5.7B vs ($779M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.17/share (latest year $0.90), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.34/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 2 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −7% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −7% early to 2% lately, median −2% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2021 · −9.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.6%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$5.5B
- Cash & short-term investments$2.6B
- Receivables$1.3B
- Other current assets$1.6B
Current liabilities$6.3B
- Debt due within a year$1.8B
- Accounts payable$1.3B
- Other current liabilities$3.2B
Current ratio0.88×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.88×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.42×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($779M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$1.8B due · $2.6B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 0.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$224Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($5.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$6.6B$867M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$1.3Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2031, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Due in the next 12 months$710Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$710Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$710Min 2027the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$2.9Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it
Against what the business has and earns
Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$2.6B
One year of owner earnings (FY2026)$340M
Together, against $710M due next year4.2×
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $3.0B against the $710M due in the twelve months after the Mar 31, 2026 schedule: 4.2 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Mar 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
How the cash was used, 2019–2026
Over the record, the business generated $4.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$5.7B · 120%
- Buybacks$397M · 8%
- Returned to owners$397M
$0 as dividends and $397M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$1.3B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.3B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $397M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count4.3%
The diluted count rose from 224M to 234M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$951M8% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity67%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 7 years buying other businesses, against $5.7B of capital spent building
$469M written down across 1 year (2021): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Martin Schroeter | $26.4M | $23.1M | ($871M) |
| 2022 | Martin Schroeter | $774k | −$7.0M | — |
| 2023 | Martin Schroeter | $13.7M | $19.2M | ($84M) |
| 2024 | Martin Schroeter | $15.7M | $31.6M | ($197M) |
| 2025 | Martin Schroeter | $15.8M | $45.8M | $337M |
| 2026 | Martin Schroeter | $21.8M | −$16.1M | $340M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio501:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$64M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 13% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Kyndryl Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2026.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?4.3%
Diluted shares grew 4.3% over 2019–2026, even as the company spent $397M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$1.5B · 10% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“In fiscal year 2026, our five largest customers accounted for approximately 10 percent of our revenue.”verify →
- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LDOSLeidos Holdings Inc. | $17.1B | 14% | 7.5% | 10% | 7% |
| FLUTFlutter Entertainment plc | $16.4B | 48% | -0.4% | -0% | 8% |
| KDKyndryl Holdings Inc. | $15.1B | 15% | -2.5% | -7% | -0% |
| NOWServiceNow Inc. | $13.3B | 77% | 4.4% | 6% | 30% |
| DXCDXC Technology Company Common Stock | $12.6B | — | 8.0% | 12% | 8% |
| CACICACI International Inc. | $8.6B | 7% | 8.0% | 9% | 6% |
| SAICScience Applications International Corporation | $7.3B | 11% | 6.1% | 11% | 6% |
| PSNParsons Corporation | $6.4B | 22% | 5.0% | 6% | 7% |
| Group median | — | 15% | 5.5% | 8% | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kyndryl Holdings Inc. has delivered.
$
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2025+1%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2025+1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $340M on 220M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-05-22; net debt $3.1B. The if-converted diluted count is 234M, 6% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Kyndryl Holdings Inc. (KD), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KD, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← KBR its page in the Manual KDK →
Industry order: ← KC the Software chapter KDK →