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LDOS, Leidos Holdings Inc.
Leidos Holdings Inc. is a holding company whose direct 100%-owned subsidiary and principal operating company is Leidos, Inc.
Leidos is an industry and technology leader serving government and commercial customers with smarter, more efficient digital and mission innovations.
Headquartered in Reston, Virginia, with 47,000, global employees, we pursue strategic growth across five pillars: space and maritime; energy infrastructure; digital modernization and cyber; mission software; and managed health services.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by National Security & Digital (44%) and Health & Civil (30%), with 2 more segments behind.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 14% and operating margin about 7.3% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −4.2% to 12% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest National Security & Digital at 44%.
- National Security & Digital44%$7.6B
- Health & Civil30%$5.1B
- Commercial & International14%$2.3B
- Defense Systems13%$2.2B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2015–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2015’15 | 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMApr 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $5.1B | $7.0B | $10.2B | $10.2B | $11.0B | $13.6B | $14.3B | $15.3B | $16.6B | $17.1B | $17.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| 13% | 13% | 14% | 15% | 13% | 14% | 14% | 14% | 16% | 18% | 18% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 6% | 6% | 7% | 7% | 6% | 6% | 7% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 1% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($214M) | $417M | $559M | $749M | $912M | $1.2B | $1.1B | $621M | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.1B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −4.2% | 5.9% | 5.5% | 7.3% | 8.3% | 8.5% | 7.6% | 4.0% | 11.0% | 12.3% | 12.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($323M) | $244M | $366M | $581M | $667M | $753M | $685M | $199M | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.4B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 23% | 7% | 5% | 23% | 22% | 22% | 49% | 24% | 24% | 23% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $396M | $449M | $526M | $768M | $992M | $1.0B | $992M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.8B | $2.0B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $62M | $122M | $336M | $257M | $234M | $325M | $333M | $331M | $290M | $290M | $293M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $615M | $48M | ($219M) | ($114M) | $39M | ($112M) | ($99M) | $580M | ($194M) | ($83M) | $188M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $29M | $29M | $81M | $73M | $121M | $104M | $129M | $207M | $149M | $125M | $134M | CapexCapex |
| 0.6% | 0.4% | 0.8% | 0.7% | 1.1% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 1.3% | 0.9% | 0.7% | 0.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $367M | $420M | $445M | $695M | $871M | $929M | $863M | $980M | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.9B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 7.2% | 6.0% | 4.4% | 6.8% | 7.9% | 6.8% | 6.0% | 6.4% | 7.8% | 9.5% | 10.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $367M | $420M | $445M | $695M | $871M | $929M | $863M | $980M | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.9B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 7.2% | 6.0% | 4.4% | 6.8% | 7.9% | 6.8% | 6.0% | 6.4% | 7.8% | 9.5% | 10.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $0 | $81M | $94M | $622M | $192M | $6M | $0 | $293M | $2.6B | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $0 | $993M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | $0 | $0 | $167M | $25M | $237M | $0 | $225M | $850M | $400M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -10% | 5% | 9% | 12% | 12% | 10% | 10% | 4% | 17% | 19% | 15% | ROICROIC |
| -32% | 8% | 11% | 18% | 20% | 18% | 16% | 5% | 28% | 29% | 28% | Return on equityROE |
| −32% | −24% | 11% | 18% | — | — | — | — | — | — | 28% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $459M | $376M | $390M | $327M | $668M | $727M | $516M | $641M | $849M | $1.1B | $457M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $896M | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.7B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $3.0B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $70M | $67M | $76M | — | $72M | $274M | $287M | $310M | $315M | $342M | $336M | InventoryInvent. |
| $244M | $591M | $557M | $547M | $592M | $692M | $733M | $736M | $611M | $627M | $2.1B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $722M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $1.2B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1.6B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $2.8B | $3.6B | $3.6B | $4.0B | $4.3B | $4.8B | $4.4B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $951M | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $3.2B | $3.9B | $3.0B | $3.6B | $2.8B | $3.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.7× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.4× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 0.9× | 1.3× | 1.2× | 1.7× | 1.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1.2B | $4.6B | $5.0B | $4.9B | $4.9B | $6.7B | $6.7B | $6.1B | $6.1B | $6.3B | $8.1B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $3.3B | $9.1B | $9.0B | $8.8B | $9.4B | $13.3B | $13.1B | $12.7B | $13.0B | $13.5B | $15.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.2B | $3.3B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.0B | $5.1B | $4.9B | $4.7B | $4.7B | $4.6B | $6.0B | Total debtDebt |
| $707M | $2.9B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $2.3B | $4.3B | $4.4B | $4.0B | $3.8B | $3.5B | $5.6B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -2.9× | 4.3× | 3.8× | 5.2× | 6.2× | 6.3× | — | — | — | — | 11.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $998M | $3.1B | $3.4B | $3.3B | $3.4B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.2B | $4.4B | $4.9B | $5.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.8% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.6% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 74.0M | 104M | 154M | 153M | 145M | 143M | 138M | 138M | 136M | 130M | 128M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $68.42 | $67.72 | $66.04 | $66.63 | $75.70 | $95.22 | $103.53 | $111.15 | $121.88 | $131.59 | $134.86 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-4.36 | $2.35 | $2.38 | $3.80 | $4.60 | $5.27 | $4.96 | $1.44 | $9.22 | $11.14 | $11.04 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $4.96 | $4.04 | $2.89 | $4.54 | $6.01 | $6.50 | $6.25 | $7.10 | $9.46 | $12.50 | $14.52 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $4.96 | $4.04 | $2.89 | $4.54 | $6.01 | $6.50 | $6.25 | $7.10 | $9.46 | $12.50 | $14.52 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $9.55 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.39 | $0.28 | $0.53 | $0.48 | $0.83 | $0.73 | $0.93 | $1.50 | $1.10 | $0.96 | $1.05 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $13.49 | $30.14 | $21.88 | $21.62 | $23.54 | $30.01 | $31.15 | $30.44 | $32.44 | $37.82 | $39.16 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.41 into 2016 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.48 into 2017 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 11-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +6.1%/yr | +6.7%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +8.8%/yr | +14.0%/yr |
| EPS | — | +16.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +8.5%/yr | +5.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | +9.8%/yr | +4.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2015–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned $1.4B of profit into $1.6B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $1.4B | $1.3B | $199M | $685M | $753M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$290M | +$290M | +$331M | +$333M | +$325M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$95M | +$85M | +$77M | +$73M | +$67M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$83M | −$194M | +$580M | −$99M | −$112M |
| Cash from operations | $1.8B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $992M | $1.0B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$125M | −$149M | −$207M | −$129M | −$104M |
| Owner earnings | $1.6B | $1.3B | $980M | $863M | $929M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 9% | 8% | 6% | 6% | 7% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $95M), owner earnings is nearer $1.5B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 11.6×ComfortableOperating income $2.1B ÷ interest expense $182M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.5B · 1.7× operating profitModest net debtCash $1.1B − debt $4.6B
What this means
Netting $1.1B of cash and short-term investments against $4.6B of debt leaves $3.5B owed, about 1.7× a year's operating profit (2.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 58 + DIO 9 − DPO 16 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range -10%–19%; 19% latest = NOPAT $1.6B ÷ invested capital $8.5BIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 19% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 4%–9%; latest $1.6B = operating cash $1.8B − maintenance capex $125MIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $95M of SBC) leaves $1.5B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.8B ÷ net income $1.4B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $400M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.6B
What this means
Of $1.6B Owner Earnings, $400M (25%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $400M buybacks. Net of $95M stock comp, the real buyback was about $305M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.43×HarvestingCapex $125M ÷ depreciation $290M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $17.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.70×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $4.6B vs $2.0B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +911%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $7.69/share (latest year $11.51), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $39.08/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2015–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 2% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 9% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 24%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +13%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 13% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2015 · −4.2% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2015, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +5.3%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“Techniques used by others to gain unauthorized access to personal, confidential, proprietary, or sensitive information or disrupt systems and networks for economic or strategic gain are constantly evolving, increasingly sophisticated, increasingly difficult to detect and successfully defend against and may see their fr…”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Apr 3, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$457M
- Receivables$3.0B
- Inventory$336M
- Other current assets$582M
- Debt due within a year$320M
- Accounts payable$2.1B
- Other current liabilities$687M
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Apr 3, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $2.1B against the $20M due in the twelve months after the Jan 2, 2026 schedule: 104 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Jan 2, 2026 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $5.4B, of which the leases are 14%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jan 2, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2015–2026
Over the record, the business generated $9.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$1.0B · 11%
- Dividends$993M · 10%
- Buybacks$1.9B · 20%
- Retained (debt / cash)$5.6B · 59%
- Returned to owners$2.9B
34% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $993M as dividends and $1.9B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $4.9B and cash and short-term investments fell $2M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $1.9B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count73.0%
The diluted count rose from 74M to 128M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained30%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($3.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $886M, so each retained $1 added about 0.30 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$1.1B written down across 2 years (2015, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 82% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $12.9M | $5.0M | $929M |
| 2022 | $13.5M | $19.2M | $863M |
| 2023 | $9.2M | $11.6M | $980M |
| 2023 | $6.7M | $6.1M | $980M |
| 2025 | $12.5M | $20.5M | $1.3B |
| 2026 | $14.7M | $28.3M | $1.6B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- CEO pay ratio122:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$95M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Leidos Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2026.
3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?73.0%
Diluted shares grew 73.0% over 2015–2026, even as the company spent $1.9B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$1.2B → $6.0B
Debt rose from $1.2B to $6.0B while owner earnings went from about $411M to $1.3B — about 2.8 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 4.7 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $1.2B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CTSHCognizant | $21.1B | — | 15.3% | 18% | 12% |
| ADPAutomatic Data Processing Inc. | $20.6B | 43% | 21.3% | 46% | 19% |
| INTUIntuit Inc. | $18.8B | 99% | 26.0% | 35% | 32% |
| LDOSLeidos Holdings Inc. | $17.1B | 14% | 7.5% | 10% | 7% |
| FLUTFlutter Entertainment plc | $16.4B | 48% | -0.4% | -0% | 8% |
| KDKyndryl Holdings Inc. | $15.1B | 15% | -2.5% | -7% | -0% |
| CACICACI International Inc. | $8.6B | 7% | 8.0% | 9% | 6% |
| SAICScience Applications International Corporation | $7.3B | 11% | 6.1% | 11% | 6% |
| Group median | — | 15% | 7.7% | 11% | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Leidos Holdings Inc. has delivered.
Leidos Holdings Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Leidos Holdings Inc. earns about $1.2B on its 6.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $1.9B on 126M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net debt $5.6B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← LDI its page in the Manual LE →
Industry order: ← KVYO the Software chapter LGCL →