Share count
50Mpeak FY2025
← All companies ← CYH Manual CYTK → ← CTMX Pharmaceuticals CYTK →
CYRX, CryoPort Inc.
We are a leading global provider of integrated, temperature-controlled supply chain solutions for the life sciences, with a strong focus on supporting the rapidly growing cell and gene therapy market.
Our solutions are purpose-built to support a broad range of global life sciences markets, including biopharmaceutical and pharmaceutical companies, the animal health markets, reproductive medicine, academic institutions, research, and government agencies.
Our solutions help our customers ensure the safe, compliant storage, handling, and delivery of high value, temperature sensitive biological materials, including cell and gene therapies and immunotherapies.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$176M
+12.4% YoY · 17% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $183M 5-yr avg $192M
Revenue $48M +16.5% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −20.1% yr-ago −17.5%
Net income ($11M) yr-ago ($12M)
Net margin −22.1% yr-ago −29.2%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Life Sciences Services (57%) and Life Sciences Products (43%).
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −44% through the cycle on a 46% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Capital spending runs about 11% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −14%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 2 segments, the largest Life Sciences Services at 57%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Life Sciences Services57%$101M
- Life Sciences Products43%$75M
By geographyAmericas75%EMEA14%Asia Pacific11%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| $12M | $20M | $34M | $79M | $223M | $237M | $169M | $157M | $176M | $183M | RevenueRevenue |
| 50% | 52% | 51% | 46% | 43% | 44% | 45% | 44% | 47% | 47% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 62% | 50% | 92% | 72% | 44% | 51% | 64% | 70% | 58% | 59% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 10% | 9% | 11% | 12% | 8% | 7% | 11% | 11% | 10% | 9% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($8M) | ($9M) | ($18M) | ($30M) | ($18M) | ($32M) | ($101M) | ($122M) | ($37M) | ($39M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −66.0% | −44.0% | −52.1% | −38.1% | −8.0% | −13.4% | −59.6% | −77.6% | −20.9% | −21.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($8M) | ($10M) | ($18M) | ($33M) | ($276M) | ($37M) | ($100M) | ($115M) | $78M | $80M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ($4M) | ($3M) | ($1M) | ($15M) | $8M | ($2M) | ($757K) | ($16M) | ($9M) | ($503K) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $665K | $858K | $2M | $10M | $20M | $23M | $27M | $31M | $28M | $26M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $103K | ($133K) | ($2M) | ($958K) | $248M | ($7M) | $52M | $51M | ($125M) | ($116M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $2M | $3M | $5M | $9M | $24M | $22M | $39M | $17M | $16M | $23M | CapexCapex |
| 14.3% | 14.8% | 15.7% | 11.3% | 10.7% | 9.3% | 23.0% | 11.0% | 9.3% | 12.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($4M) | ($4M) | ($4M) | ($24M) | ($16M) | ($24M) | ($28M) | ($34M) | ($25M) | ($24M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −35.5% | −21.5% | −11.0% | −30.2% | −7.1% | −10.1% | −16.7% | −21.4% | −14.2% | −13.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($5M) | ($6M) | ($7M) | ($24M) | ($16M) | ($24M) | ($40M) | ($34M) | ($25M) | ($24M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −44.3% | −31.9% | −19.6% | −30.2% | −7.1% | −10.1% | −23.4% | −21.4% | −14.2% | −13.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | $0 | $20M | $363M | $6M | $7M | $7M | $313K | — | $313K | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $38M | — | — | $10M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -219% | -43% | -18% | -5% | -2% | -3% | -10% | -17% | -14% | -6% | ROICROIC |
| -44% | -25% | -15% | -9% | -43% | -7% | -20% | -29% | 16% | 16% | Return on equityROE |
| −44% | −25% | −15% | −9% | −43% | −7% | −20% | −29% | 16% | 16% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| $15M | $47M | $94M | $93M | $629M | $516M | $446M | $251M | $411M | $404M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $2M | $4M | $7M | $31M | $39M | $44M | $42M | $25M | $33M | $39M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $115K | $221K | $474K | $11M | $17M | $28M | $26M | $21M | $23M | $22M | InventoryInvent. |
| $1M | $2M | $2M | $25M | $29M | $28M | $27M | $16M | $15M | $16M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $537K | $2M | $5M | $17M | $27M | $43M | $41M | $31M | $41M | $45M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $17M | $52M | $103M | $147M | $694M | $604M | $535M | $342M | $476M | $471M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $2M | $3M | $5M | $35M | $43M | $41M | $46M | $65M | $219M | $225M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 7.9× | 16.9× | 18.9× | 4.2× | 16.3× | 14.8× | 11.7× | 5.3× | 2.2× | 2.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $0 | $11M | $145M | $147M | $151M | $76M | $21M | $22M | $22M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $20M | $57M | $136M | $552M | $1.1B | $1.0B | $958M | $703M | $765M | $764M | Total assetsAssets |
| $0 | $15M | $0 | $111M | $404M | $407M | $379M | $184M | $1M | $379M | Total debtDebt |
| ($15M) | ($33M) | ($94M) | $18M | ($225M) | ($109M) | ($67M) | ($67M) | ($410M) | ($24M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -502.9× | -124.8× | -12.9× | -11.7× | -3.8× | -5.2× | -18.3× | -30.6× | -15.6× | -17.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $18M | $39M | $126M | $383M | $642M | $556M | $489M | $402M | $503M | $495M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 29.7% | 27.9% | 48.7% | 11.3% | 6.9% | 8.5% | 11.8% | 10.6% | 5.7% | 5.1% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 23.0M | 28.2M | 33.4M | 38.6M | 45.9M | 49.0M | 48.7M | 49.3M | 50.1M | 49.9M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.52 | $0.70 | $1.02 | $2.04 | $4.85 | $4.84 | $3.46 | $3.18 | $3.52 | $3.67 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.34 | $-0.34 | $-0.55 | $-0.85 | $-6.00 | $-0.76 | $-2.04 | $-2.33 | $1.56 | $1.60 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.18 | $-0.15 | $-0.11 | $-0.62 | $-0.34 | $-0.49 | $-0.58 | $-0.68 | $-0.50 | $-0.48 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.23 | $-0.22 | $-0.20 | $-0.62 | $-0.34 | $-0.49 | $-0.81 | $-0.68 | $-0.50 | $-0.48 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.07 | $0.10 | $0.16 | $0.23 | $0.52 | $0.45 | $0.80 | $0.35 | $0.33 | $0.47 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $0.78 | $1.37 | $3.78 | $9.92 | $13.97 | $11.35 | $10.03 | $8.14 | $10.04 | $9.92 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +27.0%/yr | +11.5%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +20.3%/yr | +7.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | +37.6%/yr | +0.2%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Net income+168.2%
“Net income (loss) increased by $193.1 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, as compared to the prior year. This increase was primarily due to the gain on divestiture of the CRYOPDP business of $117.0 million recorded in 2025, and the impairment loss of $63.8 million recorded in 2024, which did not reoccur in 2025.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2017–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−14%low FY2017
Gross margin
47%low FY2021
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($25M)owner earningsvs.$78Mnet incomelow FY2024
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $78M of profit but ($25M) of owner earnings: $103M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $78M | ($115M) | ($100M) | ($37M) | ($276M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$28M | +$31M | +$27M | +$23M | +$20M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$10M | +$17M | +$20M | +$20M | +$15M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$125M | +$51M | +$52M | −$7M | +$248M |
| Cash from operations | ($9M) | ($16M) | ($757K) | ($2M) | $8M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$16M | −$17M | −$27M | −$22M | −$24M |
| Owner earnings | ($25M) | ($34M) | ($28M) | ($24M) | ($16M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | −$11M | — | — |
| Free cash flow | ($25M) | ($34M) | ($40M) | ($24M) | ($16M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -14% | -21% | -17% | -10% | -7% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $10M), owner earnings is nearer ($35M).
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -15.6×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($37M) ÷ interest expense $2M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cashCash $250M + ST investments $161M − debt $379M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $33M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 69 + DIO 91 − DPO 60 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range -219%–-2%; -6% latest = NOPAT ($36M) ÷ invested capital $631MIndustry peers: median -66%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle9-yr median margin, range -36%–-7%; latest ($25M) = operating cash ($9M) − maintenance capex $16MIndustry peers: median -254%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -14% of revenue this year, a -17% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $10M of SBC) leaves ($35M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? -0.11×Thinly cash-backedCash from ops ($9M) ÷ net income $78M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.59×HarvestingCapex $16M ÷ depreciation $28M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $176M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.17×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $379M vs $257M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (9-yr record) · 8 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.90/share (latest year $1.55), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $9.97/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 9
What this means
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −54% → −53% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about −54% early, −53% lately, median −44%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −12%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2024 · −77.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
Results have held roughly flat while the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary — watch whether the words are doing work the numbers are not.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$471M
- Cash & short-term investments$404M
- Receivables$39M
- Inventory$22M
- Other current assets$6M
Current liabilities$225M
- Accounts payable$16M
- Other current liabilities$209M
Current ratio2.09×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.00×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.79×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$246Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+16.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters8.4× → 2.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$334Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$202MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$44M$43M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$2Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$160M21% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity4%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$403Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $137M of capital spent building
$104M written down across 2 years (2023, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 26% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Shelton | $5.1M | $9.6M | ($16M) |
| 2022 | Mr. Shelton | $2.5M | −$7.4M | ($24M) |
| 2023 | Mr. Shelton | $2.2M | $1.5M | ($28M) |
| 2024 | Mr. Shelton | $1.9M | $963k | ($34M) |
| 2025 | Mr. Shelton | $2.4M | $2.7M | ($25M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership9.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio37:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$10M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 6% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why CryoPort Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$0 → $379M
Debt rose from $0 to $379M while owner earnings went from about ($4M) to ($29M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?15% → 33% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $2M to $61M while revenue grew 1430%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (15% of revenue then, 33% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Stock compensation, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Pharmaceuticals
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMRNAmarin Corporation plc | $214M | 77% | -24.3% | -15% | -18% |
| RYTMRhythm Pharmaceuticals Inc. | $190M | 90% | -238.1% | -67% | -176% |
| MRVIMaravai LifeSciences Holdings Inc. | $186M | 53% | 16.8% | -32% | 21% |
| STOKStoke Therapeutics Inc. | $184M | — | -559.3% | -79% | -254% |
| CYRXCryoPort Inc. | $176M | 46% | -44.0% | -14% | -17% |
| PHATPhathom Pharmaceuticals Inc. | $175M | 86% | -502.2% | — | -483% |
| SNDXSyndax Pharmaceuticals Inc. | $172M | — | -3263.2% | -64% | -2251% |
| LQDALiquidia Corporation | $158M | 76% | -419.6% | -163% | -266% |
| Group median | — | 77% | -328.9% | -64% | -215% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFCryoPort Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Revenue, delivered8%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−13%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "CryoPort Inc. (CYRX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CYRX, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← CYH its page in the Manual CYTK →
Industry order: ← CTMX the Pharmaceuticals chapter CYTK →