Owner Scorecard


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LQDA, Liquidia Corporation

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand Distress / turnaround

We are a biopharmaceutical company driven by science and compassion to revolutionize care for patients with challenging respiratory and vascular diseases such as pulmonary arterial hypertension and pulmonary hypertension associated with interstitial lung disease.

We have the exclusive rights to conduct commercial activities for Treprostinil Injection and work jointly with Sandoz on commercial strategy for the product.

We are also planning to conduct clinical studies to evaluate YUTREPIA for the treatment of pulmonary hypertension associated with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("PH-COPD"), idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis ("IPF"), progressive pulmonary fibrosis ("PPF") and Raynaud's phenomenon associated with systemic sclerosis ("SSc-RP").

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LQDA · Liquidia Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$158M
+1031.2% YoY · 192% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $288M 5-yr avg $44M
Operating margin 15.8% 5-yr avg −365.0%
Owner-earnings margin 16% 5-yr avg −280%
Free cash flow margin 14% 5-yr avg −284%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −420% through the cycle on a 76% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 58% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −163%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$8M$740K$13M$16M$17M$14M$158M$288MRevenueRevenue
68%76%82%83%58%98%Gross marginGross mgn
168%n/m180%203%256%583%99%60%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
502%n/m160%122%247%342%25%16%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($47M)($59M)($34M)($39M)($73M)($121M)($51M)$46MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−580.1%n/m−263.0%−243.3%−419.6%−866.6%−32.5%15.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
($48M)($60M)($35M)($41M)($79M)($128M)($69M)$22MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($48M)($54M)($34M)($29M)($42M)($93M)($36M)$48MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$3M$3M$6M$4M$2M$2M$2M$2MDepreciationDeprec.
($7M)($1M)($12M)($518K)$25M$14M$2M($7M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$2M$752K$107K$592K$1M$5M$4M$7MCapexCapex
22.9%101.7%0.8%3.7%7.4%35.4%2.7%2.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($50M)($55M)($34M)($29M)($43M)($96M)($37M)$46MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−621.1%n/m−265.6%−183.1%−245.0%−683.2%−23.5%16.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($50M)($55M)($34M)($29M)($43M)($98M)($40M)$41MFree cash flowFCF
−621.1%n/m−265.6%−183.1%−245.0%−702.9%−25.3%14.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
-73%-291%-147%-180%ROICROIC
-136%-84%-53%-45%-166%-162%-154%21%Return on equityROE
−136%−84%−53%−45%−166%−162%−154%21%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$65M$57M$93M$84M$176M$191M$223MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$3M$5M$4M$3M$54M$74MReceivablesReceiv.
$241K$24M$29MInventoryInvent.
$3M$4M$1M$2M$1M$5M$4M$11MAccounts payablePayables
$2M$3M$3M($2M)$74M$92MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$56M$66M$61M$100M$90M$185M$273M$333MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$17M$12M$7M$9M$19M$42M$136M$150MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.3×5.6×8.4×11.3×4.8×4.4×2.0×2.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$0$4M$4M$4M$4M$4M$4M$4MGoodwillGoodwill
$69M$100M$94M$129M$118M$230M$328M$402MTotal assetsAssets
$16M$10M$10M$20M$20MTotal debtDebt
$16M($55M)($47M)($73M)($203M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-34.1×-68.9×-44.4×-16.6×-11.7×-8.3×-2.1×1.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$35M$71M$65M$90M$47M$79M$45M$109MShareholders’ equityEquity
41.8%534.6%52.5%58.3%57.7%134.4%18.6%10.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
18.5M33.9M49.7M61.0M65.0M78.7M86.1M101MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.44$0.02$0.26$0.26$0.27$0.18$1.84$2.85Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.57$-1.76$-0.70$-0.67$-1.21$-1.63$-0.80$0.22EPS (diluted)EPS
$-2.71$-1.62$-0.69$-0.48$-0.66$-1.21$-0.43$0.46Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-2.71$-1.62$-0.69$-0.48$-0.66$-1.25$-0.47$0.41Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.10$0.02$0.00$0.01$0.02$0.06$0.05$0.07Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.89$2.10$1.31$1.48$0.73$1.01$0.52$1.07Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.83 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.47 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
6-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+27.1%/yr+142.7%/yr
Capital spending / share−10.8%/yr+17.8%/yr
Book value / share−19.4%/yr−24.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
86Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−180%low FY2020
Gross margin
58%low FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($37M)owner earningsvs.($69M)net incomelow FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($37M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2M it takes just to hold its position. It put $3M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($40M).

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($69M)($128M)($79M)($41M)($35M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$2M+$2M+$2M+$4M+$6M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$29M+$19M+$10M+$9M+$7M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$2M+$14M+$25M−$518K−$12M
Cash from operations($36M)($93M)($42M)($29M)($34M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$2M−$2M−$1M−$592K−$107K
Owner earnings($37M)($96M)($43M)($29M)($34M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$3M−$3M
Free cash flow($40M)($98M)($43M)($29M)($34M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-24%-683%-245%-183%-266%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $3M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $29M), owner earnings is nearer ($67M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($51M) ÷ interest expense $24M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash
    Cash $191M − debt $20M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $171M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 125 + DIO 1478 − DPO 228 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Not meaningful here
    Invested capital ($126M) = debt $20M + equity $45M − cash
    Industry peers: median -48%
    What this means

    Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    7-yr median margin, range -7422%–-24%; latest ($37M) = operating cash ($36M) − maintenance capex $2M
    Industry peers: median -176%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -24% of revenue this year, a -266% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $29M of SBC) leaves ($67M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($69M) · cash from operations ($36M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.84×
    Expanding
    Capex $4M ÷ depreciation $2M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $158M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.01×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $20M vs $138M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (7-yr record) · 7 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.03/share (latest year $-0.78), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.50/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 7
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −2944% → −440% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −2944% early to −440% lately, median −420% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2020 · −7989.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“If we fail to obtain protection for intellectual property rights for any of our intellectual property that may incorporate or be developed using AI technologies, or later have our intellectual property rights invalidated or otherwise diminished, our competitors may be able to take advantage of our research and developm…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$333M
  • Cash & short-term investments$223M
  • Receivables$74M
  • Inventory$29M
  • Other current assets$8M
Current liabilities$150M
  • Accounts payable$11M
  • Other current liabilities$139M
Current ratio2.22×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.03×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.49×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$183Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+4158.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters6.1× → 2.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$102Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$40MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$23M$3M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Roger A. Jeffs, Ph.D$10.8M$13.9M($29M)
2023Roger A. Jeffs, Ph.D$4.9M$15.5M($43M)
2024Roger A. Jeffs, Ph.D$6.8M$6.2M($96M)
2025Roger A. Jeffs, Ph.D$7.7M$34.9M($37M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership25.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$29M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 19% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
RYTMRhythm Pharmaceuticals Inc.$190M90%-238.1%-67%-176%
MRVIMaravai LifeSciences Holdings Inc.$186M53%16.8%-32%21%
STOKStoke Therapeutics Inc.$184M-559.3%-79%-254%
CYRXCryoPort Inc.$176M46%-44.0%-14%-17%
PHATPhathom Pharmaceuticals Inc.$175M86%-502.2%-483%
SNDXSyndax Pharmaceuticals Inc.$172M-3263.2%-64%-2251%
LQDALiquidia Corporation$158M76%-419.6%-163%-266%
XNCRXencor Inc.$126M-69.2%-12%-30%
Group median76%-328.9%-64%-215%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Liquidia Corporation has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $41M on 89M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net cash $203M. The if-converted diluted count is 101M, 14% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($7M) runs well above depreciation ($2M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $46M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Liquidia Corporation (LQDA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LQDA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LPX its page in the Manual LQDT →

Industry order: ← LLY the Pharmaceuticals chapter LXRX →