Owner Scorecard


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DOCS, Doximity

We are the leading physician-first tech company, with over 3 million registered members 1 as of March 31, 2026.

We are physician-first, putting technology to work for doctors instead of the other way around.

That guiding principle has enabled Doximity to become an essential and trusted professional platform for physicians and their colleagues.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
DOCS · Doximity
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$645M
+13.1% YoY · 26% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $645M 5-yr avg $491M
Gross margin 89% 5-yr avg 89%
Operating margin 33.3% 5-yr avg 34.1%
ROIC 23% 5-yr avg 18%
Owner-earnings margin 51% 5-yr avg 43%
Free cash flow margin 51% 5-yr avg 43%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 88% and operating margin about 33% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. Stock-based pay runs about 11% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 3 of 5 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 40% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$116M$207M$344M$419M$475M$570M$645M$645MRevenueRevenue
87%85%88%87%89%90%89%89%Gross marginGross mgn
6%8%10%9%8%8%10%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
28%21%18%19%17%16%20%20%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$22M$53M$114M$125M$164M$228M$215M$215MOperating incomeOp. inc.
19.0%25.8%33.0%29.9%34.5%39.9%33.3%33.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$30M$50M$155M$113M$148M$223M$196M$196MNet incomeNet inc.
13%15%20%15%22%22%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$26M$83M$127M$180M$184M$273M$326M$326MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$900K$4M$5M$10M$10M$11M$14M$14MDepreciationDeprec.
($7M)$22M($65M)$9M($25M)($33M)($6M)($6M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$285K$245K$2M$2M$147K$0$0$0CapexCapex
0.2%0.1%0.6%0.4%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$26M$83M$125M$178M$184M$273M$326M$326MOwner earningsOwner earn.
22.3%40.0%36.3%42.5%38.7%47.9%50.6%50.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$26M$83M$125M$178M$184M$273M$326M$326MFree cash flowFCF
22.3%40.0%36.3%42.5%38.7%47.9%50.6%50.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$32M$0$54M$0$0$27M$27MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$2M$3M$85M$281M$120M$432MBuybacksBuybacks
15%13%16%22%23%23%ROICROIC
2618%75%18%12%16%21%21%21%Return on equityROE
n/m75%18%12%16%21%21%21%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$48M$66M$113M$158M$97M$210M$219M$219MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$50M$81M$107M$101M$128M$145M$145MReceivablesReceiv.
$2M$463K$1M$2M$1M$4M$4MAccounts payablePayables
$49M$81M$106M$99M$127M$141M$141MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$209M$904M$975M$913M$1.1B$944M$944MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$102M$111M$140M$147M$156M$155M$155MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.1×8.1×7.0×6.2×7.0×6.1×6.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$19M$19M$68M$68M$68M$85M$85MGoodwillGoodwill
$252M$991M$1.1B$1.1B$1.3B$1.1B$1.1BTotal assetsAssets
($48M)($66M)($113M)($158M)($97M)($210M)($219M)($219M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$1M$67M$879M$966M$901M$1.1B$951M$951MShareholders’ equityEquity
2.0%3.5%9.2%11.4%10.7%12.7%18.9%18.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
81.7M95.1M191M213M206M201M199M199MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.42$2.17$1.80$1.96$2.31$2.83$3.24$3.24Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.36$0.53$0.81$0.53$0.72$1.11$0.98$0.98EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.32$0.87$0.65$0.83$0.89$1.36$1.64$1.64Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.32$0.87$0.65$0.83$0.89$1.36$1.64$1.64Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.01$0.01$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.01$0.70$4.60$4.53$4.38$5.38$4.78$4.78Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.01 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
6-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+14.7%/yr+8.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+31.5%/yr+13.5%/yr
EPS+18.0%/yr+13.3%/yr
Book value / share+164.7%/yr+46.8%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+13.1%
    “Revenue Fiscal Year Ended March 31, Change 2026 2025 $ % (in thousands, except percentages) Revenue $ 644,863 $ 570,399 $ 74,464 13 % Revenue for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2026 increased $74.5 million as compared to the fiscal year ended 2025. The increase was primarily driven by a $64.6 million increase in subscription revenue.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2020–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
199Mpeak FY2023
ROIC
23%low FY2023
Gross margin
89%low FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$326Mowner earningsvs.$196Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2020FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned $196M of profit into $326M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$196M
Owner earnings$326M · 51% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$196M$223M$148M$113M$155M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$14M+$11M+$10M+$10M+$5M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$122M+$72M+$51M+$48M+$31M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$6M−$33M−$25M+$9M−$65M
Cash from operations$326M$273M$184M$180M$127M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$147K−$2M−$2M
Owner earnings$326M$273M$184M$178M$125M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue51%48%39%42%36%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $122M), owner earnings is nearer $205M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $219M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $219M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 82 + DIO 0 − DPO 21 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median -22%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • High through the cycle
    7-yr median margin, range 22%–51%; latest $326M = operating cash $326M − maintenance capex $0
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 51% of revenue this year, a 40% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $122M of SBC) leaves $205M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $326M ÷ net income $196M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $432M ÷ Owner Earnings $326M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $326M of Owner Earnings, $432M (132%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $432M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $122M stock comp, the real buyback was about $310M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.00×
    Harvesting
    Capex $0 ÷ depreciation $14M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $645M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 6.09×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (7-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +141%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.03/share (latest year $1.07), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.19/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 7
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Operating margin 26% → 36% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 26% early to 36% lately, median 33% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Owner earnings growth +33%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 33% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 19.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Our development, deployment, and use of artificial intelligence (AI) may not achieve the expected benefits and may create operational, reputational, competitive, regulatory, legal, and liability risks.”

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$944M
  • Cash & short-term investments$219M
  • Receivables$145M
  • Other current assets$580M
Current liabilities$155M
  • Accounts payable$4M
  • Other current liabilities$151M
Current ratio6.09×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio6.09×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.41×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$789Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+9.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters6.7× → 6.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$831Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$771MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$10M$10M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$106Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2020–2026

Over the record, the business generated $1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$4M · 0%
  • Buybacks$923M · 77%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$272M · 23%
  • Returned to owners$923M

    77% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $923M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $923M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count143.6%

    The diluted count rose from 82M to 199M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Jeff Tangney$243k$217.5M$125M
2023Jeff Tangney$244k−$101.7M$178M
2024Jeff Tangney$299k−$15.7M$184M
2025Jeff Tangney$17.2M$84.8M$273M
2026Jeff Tangney$19.6M−$34.1M$326M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.2%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$122M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 19% of revenue, equal to 57% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Doximity is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2026.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?143.6%

    Diluted shares grew 143.6% over 2020–2026, even as the company spent $923M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Health Care Technology

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
NAVNNavan Inc.$702M68%-28.0%-21%-10%
EVEREverQuote Inc.$693M94%-3.7%-34%1%
QLYSQualys$669M78%24.5%25%40%
DOCSDoximity$645M88%33.0%16%40%
MQMarqeta Inc.$625M45%-28.0%-57%10%
VRNSVaronis$624M85%-23.5%-22%5%
HNGEHinge Health Inc.$588M77%-44.6%12%
TBRGTruBridge Inc.$347M52%6.5%6%9%
Group median78%-13.6%-21%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Doximity has delivered.

Doximity’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Doximity earns about $258M on its 40.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 50.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+19%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’26+33%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $326M on 183M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2026-03-31; net cash $219M. The if-converted diluted count is 199M, 9% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Doximity (DOCS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DOCS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← DOCN its page in the Manual DOCU →

Industry order: ← 2413 the Health Care Technology chapter EVH →