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TBRG, TruBridge Inc.

IT Services & Consulting asset-light CyclicalSerial acquirer

TruBridge Inc. is a leading provider of healthcare solutions and services for community hospitals, their clinics and other healthcare systems.

TruBridge is a trusted partner to more than 1,500 healthcare organizations with a broad range of technology-first solutions that address the unique needs and challenges of diverse communities, promoting equitable access to quality care and fostering positive outcomes.

TruBridge has over four decades of experience in connecting providers, patients and communities with innovative data-driven solutions that create real value by supporting both the financial and clinical side of healthcare delivery.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

TBRG · TruBridge Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$347M

+1.4% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $346M 5-yr avg $327M

Gross margin 53% 5-yr avg 50%

Operating margin 4.5% 5-yr avg 2.0%

Owner-earnings margin 13% 5-yr avg 9%

Free cash flow margin 13% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Financial Health (64%) and Patient Care (36%).
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 59% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 52% and operating margin about 6.0% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −14% to 9.0% — on a steadier 52% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Financial Health is 64% of revenue, with Patient Care the other meaningful segment at 36%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Financial Health64%$222M
Patient Care36%$125M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$267M	$277M	$280M	$275M	$264M	$281M	$327M	$337M	$342M	$347M	$346M	RevenueRevenue
50%	53%	53%	52%	52%	52%	49%	48%	51%	53%	53%	Gross marginGross mgn
20%	17%	17%	16%	18%	17%	17%	23%	22%	23%	25%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
11%	12%	13%	13%	13%	12%	10%	12%	10%	9%	9%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$14M	($5M)	$25M	$25M	$21M	$25M	$23M	($46M)	$6M	$21M	$16M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
5.4%	−1.7%	8.9%	9.0%	8.0%	8.8%	7.0%	−13.6%	1.9%	6.0%	4.5%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$4M	($17M)	$18M	$20M	$14M	$18M	$16M	($48M)	($21M)	$4M	$4M	Net incomeNet inc.
51%	—	3%	14%	24%	20%	12%	—	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$2M	$24M	$24M	$44M	$49M	$48M	$32M	($522K)	$31M	$37M	$47M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$3M	$2M	$2M	$1M	$2M	$2M	$2M	$2M	$1M	$1M	$1M	DepreciationDeprec.
($10M)	$31M	($5M)	$12M	$26M	$22M	$9M	$42M	$45M	$23M	$32M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$39K	$726K	$978K	$2M	$3M	$920K	$270K	$346K	$2M	$1M	$2M	CapexCapex
0.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.6%	1.3%	0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	0.5%	0.4%	0.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2M	$23M	$23M	$42M	$47M	$47M	$32M	($868K)	$29M	$36M	$46M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
0.8%	8.3%	8.2%	15.4%	17.9%	16.7%	9.8%	−0.3%	8.6%	10.3%	13.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$2M	$23M	$23M	$42M	$46M	$47M	$32M	($868K)	$29M	$36M	$45M	Free cash flowFCF
0.8%	8.3%	8.2%	15.2%	17.3%	16.7%	9.8%	−0.3%	8.6%	10.3%	12.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$163M	$0	$0	$11M	$0	$60M	$43M	$37M	$664K	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$25M	$12M	$6M	$6M	$4M	$0	$0	—	—	—	$0	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	—	$0	$0	$1M	$1M	$12M	$3M	$404K	$2M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
2%	-1%	8%	7%	6%	6%	6%	-10%	—	—	—	ROICROIC
2%	-13%	11%	11%	7%	8%	7%	-26%	-13%	2%	2%	Return on equityROE
−13%	−21%	8%	8%	5%	8%	7%	—	—	—	2%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$2M	$520K	$6M	$7M	$13M	$11M	$7M	$4M	$12M	$25M	$35M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$32M	$38M	$40M	$39M	$32M	$34M	$51M	$56M	$53M	$55M	$51M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$2M	$1M	$1M	$1M	$1M	$855K	$784K	$475K	$767K	$623K	$958K	InventoryInvent.
$7M	$8M	$6M	$9M	$8M	$8M	$7M	$10M	$15M	$20M	$22M	Accounts payablePayables
$27M	$32M	$36M	$31M	$26M	$27M	$45M	$47M	$39M	$36M	$29M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$45M	$58M	$70M	$67M	$67M	$69M	$75M	$109M	$94M	$105M	$110M	Current assetsCur. assets
$31M	$41M	$39M	$42M	$37M	$46M	$44M	$48M	$56M	$58M	$62M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×	1.4×	1.8×	1.6×	1.8×	1.5×	1.7×	2.3×	1.7×	1.8×	1.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$168M	$140M	$140M	$150M	$150M	$178M	$198M	$172M	$173M	$173M	$173M	GoodwillGoodwill
$339M	$318M	$328M	$340M	$326M	$383M	$431M	$432M	$396M	$403M	$408M	Total assetsAssets
$153M	$142M	$131M	$108M	$77M	$99M	$140M	$198M	$172M	$165M	$164M	Total debtDebt
$151M	$142M	$125M	$101M	$64M	$88M	$133M	$195M	$159M	$140M	$128M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
2.2×	-0.6×	3.3×	3.7×	5.9×	7.8×	3.6×	-3.6×	0.4×	1.7×	1.4×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$158M	$136M	$160M	$184M	$200M	$223M	$230M	$183M	$167M	$178M	$179M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.0%	2.6%	3.5%	3.6%	2.6%	1.9%	1.6%	1.0%	1.6%	2.5%	2.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
13.3M	13.4M	13.6M	13.8M	14.0M	14.3M	14.4M	14.2M	14.3M	14.5M	14.6M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$20.16	$20.64	$20.67	$19.93	$18.84	$19.60	$22.75	$23.75	$23.93	$23.94	$23.75	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.30	$-1.30	$1.30	$1.49	$1.01	$1.29	$1.11	$-3.39	$-1.46	$0.30	$0.30	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.16	$1.71	$1.69	$3.06	$3.37	$3.27	$2.24	$-0.06	$2.06	$2.46	$3.13	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.16	$1.71	$1.69	$3.04	$3.26	$3.27	$2.24	$-0.06	$2.06	$2.46	$3.06	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.89	$0.87	$0.41	$0.42	$0.31	$0.00	$0.00	—	—	—	$0.00	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.00	$0.05	$0.07	$0.13	$0.24	$0.06	$0.02	$0.02	$0.11	$0.09	$0.14	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.92	$10.14	$11.78	$13.38	$14.25	$15.54	$16.04	$12.89	$11.68	$12.28	$12.27	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+1.9%/yr	+4.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+35.9%/yr	−6.1%/yr
EPS	+0.1%/yr	−21.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	+46.5%/yr	−17.4%/yr
Book value / share	+0.3%/yr	−2.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

14Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−10%low FY2023

Gross margin

53%low FY2023

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

3.9×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$36Mowner earningsvs.$4Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $4M of profit into $36M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$4M

Owner earnings$36M · 10% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$4M	($21M)	($48M)	$16M	$18M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$1M	+$1M	+$2M	+$2M	+$2M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$9M	+$6M	+$3M	+$5M	+$5M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$23M	+$45M	+$42M	+$9M	+$22M
Cash from operations	$37M	$31M	($522K)	$32M	$48M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$1M	−$2M	−$346K	−$270K	−$920K
Owner earnings	$36M	$29M	($868K)	$32M	$47M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	10%	9%	0%	10%	17%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $9M), owner earnings is nearer $27M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“We continue to have identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 1.7×

Thin

Operating income $21M ÷ interest expense $12M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $140M · 6.7× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $25M − debt $165M

What this means
Netting $25M of cash and short-term investments against $165M of debt leaves $140M owed, about 6.7× a year's operating profit (7.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 15d

Tight

DSO 58 + DIO 1 − DPO 44 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 6%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range -10%–8%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit

Industry peers: median -8%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 9%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -0%–18%; latest $36M = operating cash $37M − maintenance capex $1M

Industry peers: median 14%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $9M of SBC) leaves $27M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 8.49×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $37M ÷ net income $4M

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 5%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $2M ÷ Owner Earnings $36M

What this means
Of $36M Owner Earnings, $2M (5%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $2M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($9M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.21×

Expanding

Capex $1M ÷ depreciation $1M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $347M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.81×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $165M vs $47M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −1660%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.44/share (latest year $0.29), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $11.86/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 4% → −2% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
The recent-years average (−2%) sits below the early years (4%), but the latest year (6%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 6% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +11%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 11% a year over the record.
Worst year 2023 · −13.6% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +1.0%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Conversely, if we are unable to make adequate investments related to AI or unable to make them in a timely manner, our financial results and competitive position in the market may be adversely impacted.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$110M

Cash & short-term investments$35M
Receivables$51M
Inventory$958K
Other current assets$22M

Current liabilities$62M

Debt due within a year$3M
Accounts payable$22M
Other current liabilities$36M

Current ratio1.78×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.77×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.58×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$48Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$3M due · $35M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 1.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($55M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($119M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$168M$5M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$10Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $290M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$11M · 4%
Dividends$52M · 18%
Buybacks$19M · 7%
Retained (debt / cash)$207M · 71%

Returned to owners$72M
26% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $52M as dividends and $19M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$35.62
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $17M, about $35.62 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $26.89 (2020) to $51.72 (2023); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $35.00 ($12M).
Net change in share count9.9%
The diluted count rose from 13M to 15M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$237M59% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity97%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$314Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $11M of capital spent building

$64M written down across 2 years (2017, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 20% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2020	J. Boyd Douglas	$1.3M	$991k	$47M
2021	J. Boyd Douglas	$1.9M	$1.8M	$47M
2022	Christopher L. Fowler	$2.0M	$1.3M	$32M
2022	J. Boyd Douglas	$1.6M	$984k	$32M
2023	Christopher L. Fowler	$2.3M	$332k	($868K)
2024	Christopher L. Fowler	$2.4M	$3.8M	$29M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership10.7%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$9M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 42% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why TruBridge Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?9.9%
Diluted shares grew 9.9% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $19M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Does management own its misses?
1 plain admission in this year's filing
“Measurement period adjustments relate to adjustments to the fair value of assets acquired and liabilities assumed based on information that we should have known at the time of acquisition.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
DOCSDoximity	$645M	88%	33.0%	16%	40%
TBRGTruBridge Inc.	$347M	52%	6.5%	6%	9%
DSPViant Technology Inc.	$344M	46%	1.2%	-8%	13%
AMPLAmplitude Inc.	$343M	70%	-32.2%	-77%	-4%
MKTWMarketWise Inc.	$328M	57%	11.6%	—	14%
AGYSAgilysys	$319M	61%	-2.5%	-14%	17%
DOMODomo, Inc.	$319M	73%	-34.5%	—	-8%
HSTMHealthStream Inc.	$304M	86%	5.8%	4%	18%
Group median	—	66%	3.5%	-2%	13%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what TruBridge Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, TruBridge Inc. earns about $32M on its 9.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($32M) Net of stock comp (−$9M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($45M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−5%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+11%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $45M on 15M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net debt $128M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($2M) runs well above depreciation ($1M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $45M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh TBRG against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "TruBridge Inc. (TBRG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TBRG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TBPH its page in the Manual TCBI →

Industry order: ← TASK the IT Services & Consulting chapter TCX →