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EVER, EverQuote Inc.

Software asset-light Net current asset value

We operate a leading online marketplace for insurance shopping, connecting consumers with insurance provider customers, which includes both carriers and agents.

Our results-driven marketplace, powered by our proprietary data and technology platform, is improving the way insurance providers attract and connect with consumers shopping for insurance.

We operate a marketplace to connect insurance providers to a large volume of high-intent, pre-validated consumer referrals that match the insurers' specific underwriting and profitability requirements.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

EVER · EverQuote Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$693M

+38.5% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $717M 5-yr avg $461M

Gross margin 97% 5-yr avg 95%

Operating margin 10.3% 5-yr avg −2.9%

ROIC 106% 5-yr avg 4%

Owner-earnings margin 14% 5-yr avg 4%

Free cash flow margin 13% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Net current asset value. Current assets alone exceed every liability combined, and the surplus is most of the balance sheet: the shape Graham called a net-net.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −3.7% through the cycle on a 94% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 5.1% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −34%, above 15% in 2 of 8 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
										Income statement
$126M	$163M	$249M	$347M	$419M	$404M	$288M	$500M	$693M	$717M	RevenueRevenue
94%	93%	94%	94%	94%	94%	92%	96%	97%	97%	Gross marginGross mgn
4%	7%	7%	6%	6%	7%	9%	6%	5%	5%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
7%	9%	8%	9%	9%	8%	10%	6%	5%	5%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($5M)	($14M)	($8M)	($12M)	($22M)	($25M)	($52M)	$32M	$58M	$74M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−3.7%	−8.5%	−3.2%	−3.4%	−5.2%	−6.1%	−18.1%	6.3%	8.4%	10.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($5M)	($14M)	($7M)	($11M)	($19M)	($24M)	($51M)	$32M	$99M	$110M	Net incomeNet inc.
										Cash flow & returns
($2M)	($2M)	$4M	$11M	$7M	($16M)	($3M)	$67M	$95M	$102M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$1M	$1M	$2M	$3M	$5M	$6M	$6M	$6M	$4M	$3M	DepreciationDeprec.
$179K	$3M	($3M)	($6M)	($8M)	($26M)	$18M	$8M	($32M)	($36M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$1M	$4M	$3M	$4M	$3M	$4M	$4M	$4M	$5M	$5M	CapexCapex
0.9%	2.2%	1.2%	1.1%	0.7%	1.1%	1.3%	0.8%	0.7%	0.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($3M)	($3M)	$2M	$7M	$4M	($20M)	($7M)	$62M	$92M	$98M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−2.3%	−2.0%	0.9%	2.0%	1.0%	−5.0%	−2.3%	12.5%	13.2%	13.7%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($3M)	($6M)	$1M	$7M	$4M	($20M)	($7M)	$62M	$90M	$96M	Free cash flowFCF
−2.3%	−3.4%	0.6%	2.0%	1.0%	−5.0%	−2.3%	12.5%	13.0%	13.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	$15M	$16M	—	—	—	—	$16M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	-709%	-111%	-33%	-34%	-26%	-96%	90%	88%	106%	ROICROIC
—	-32%	-14%	-16%	-23%	-23%	-63%	24%	42%	46%	Return on equityROE
—	−32%	−14%	−16%	−23%	−23%	−63%	24%	42%	46%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$2M	$42M	$46M	$43M	$35M	$31M	$38M	$102M	$171M	$178M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$15M	$17M	$32M	$46M	$36M	$30M	$21M	$61M	$75M	$72M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$12M	$17M	$24M	$33M	$30M	$31M	$17M	$60M	$77M	$68M	Accounts payablePayables
$3M	$634K	$9M	$13M	$6M	($1M)	$4M	$1M	($2M)	$4M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$18M	$61M	$85M	$97M	$85M	$81M	$69M	$172M	$256M	$257M	Current assetsCur. assets
$15M	$21M	$38M	$47M	$47M	$45M	$30M	$73M	$87M	$82M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×	2.8×	2.2×	2.1×	1.8×	1.8×	2.3×	2.4×	2.9×	3.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	—	$10M	$22M	$22M	$22M	$22M	$22M	$22M	GoodwillGoodwill
$21M	$66M	$91M	$129M	$144M	$157M	$111M	$211M	$327M	$324M	Total assetsAssets
-12.3×	-69.9×	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	370.6×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($51M)	$43M	$52M	$71M	$85M	$107M	$81M	$135M	$238M	$241M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.5%	4.4%	5.1%	7.0%	7.2%	7.2%	8.4%	4.1%	3.5%	3.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
8.8M	16.9M	25.8M	27.3M	29.1M	31.6M	33.4M	36.6M	37.8M	36.9M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$14.39	$9.65	$9.66	$12.69	$14.39	$12.78	$8.63	$13.65	$18.34	$19.40	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.58	$-0.81	$-0.28	$-0.41	$-0.67	$-0.77	$-1.54	$0.88	$2.63	$2.98	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.33	$-0.19	$0.09	$0.25	$0.15	$-0.64	$-0.20	$1.70	$2.43	$2.66	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.33	$-0.33	$0.06	$0.25	$0.15	$-0.64	$-0.20	$1.70	$2.39	$2.60	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.14	$0.22	$0.12	$0.14	$0.10	$0.14	$0.12	$0.11	$0.13	$0.15	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-5.76	$2.55	$2.01	$2.60	$2.93	$3.40	$2.43	$3.69	$6.31	$6.52	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.93 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.52 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.1%/yr	+7.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+57.5%/yr
Capital spending / share	−0.1%/yr	−0.9%/yr
Book value / share	—	+19.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

38Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

88%low FY2018

Gross margin

97%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$92Mowner earningsvs.$99Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $92M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $4M it takes just to hold its position. It put $1M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $90M.

Reported net income$99M

Owner earnings$92M · 13% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$99M	$32M	($51M)	($24M)	($19M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$4M	+$6M	+$6M	+$6M	+$5M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$24M	+$21M	+$24M	+$29M	+$30M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$32M	+$8M	+$18M	−$26M	−$8M
Cash from operations	$95M	$67M	($3M)	($16M)	$7M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$4M	−$4M	−$4M	−$4M	−$3M
Owner earnings	$92M	$62M	($7M)	($20M)	$4M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$1M	—	—	—	—
Free cash flow	$90M	$62M	($7M)	($20M)	$4M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	13%	12%	-2%	-5%	1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $4M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $1M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $24M), owner earnings is nearer $67M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 293.1×

Comfortable

Operating income $58M ÷ interest expense $199K

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$167M

Net cash

Cash $171M − debt $5M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $167M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -1408d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 40 + DIO 0 − DPO 1448 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -34%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range -709%–90%; 82% latest = NOPAT $58M ÷ invested capital $71M

Industry peers: median -0%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 82% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 1%

Thin through the cycle

9-yr median margin, range -5%–13%; latest $92M = operating cash $95M − maintenance capex $4M

Industry peers: median 17%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $24M of SBC) leaves $67M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 0.96×

Mostly cash-backed

Cash from ops $95M ÷ net income $99M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 23%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $21M ÷ Owner Earnings $92M

What this means
Of $92M Owner Earnings, $21M (23%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $21M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($24M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.33×

Expanding

Capex $5M ÷ depreciation $4M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $693M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.94×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $5M vs $169M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (9-yr record) · 7 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.74/share (latest year $2.76), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.62/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 2 of 9

What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin −5% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −5% early to −1% lately, median −4% — pricing power intact or improving.
Worst year 2023 · −18.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“We use and may further incorporate AI and machine learning in our business, and challenges with properly managing its use could result in reputational harm, competitive harm, and legal liability, and adversely affect our results of operations.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$257M

Cash & short-term investments$178M
Receivables$72M
Other current assets$7M

Current liabilities$82M

Debt due within a year$361K
Accounts payable$68M
Other current liabilities$13M

Current ratio3.14×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio3.14×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio2.18×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$175Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$361K due · $178M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+14.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 3.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$219Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$174MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$10M$2M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$2Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $162M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

Reinvested$32M · 20%
Buybacks$30M · 19%
Retained (debt / cash)$100M · 62%

Returned to owners$30M
22% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $30M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $3M and cash and short-term investments rose $176M.
Average price paid for buybacks$6.88
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $9M, about $6.88 each.
Net change in share count321.0%
The diluted count rose from 9M to 37M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	Jayme Mendal	$2.8M	$2.2M	($20M)
2023	Jayme Mendal	$4.1M	$2.5M	($7M)
2024	Jayme Mendal	$5.7M	$9.5M	$62M
2025	Jayme Mendal	$9.2M	$13.5M	$92M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$24M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 42% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why EverQuote Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?321.0%
Diluted shares grew 321.0% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent $30M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$272M · 38% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Furthermore, total revenue from our two largest customers accounted for 38% and 11%, respectively, of our total revenue for the year ended December 31, 2025 and revenue from our largest auto insurance carrier customer was 39% of our revenue for the year ended December 31, 2024.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
TEMTempus AI Inc.	$1.3B	—	-59.8%	-210%	-37%
BMBLBumble Inc.	$966M	71%	-14.5%	-6%	—
DOCNDigitalOcean	$901M	60%	-2.6%	-0%	15%
DVDoubleVerify	$748M	83%	12.5%	7%	18%
MGNIMagnite Inc.	$714M	62%	-18.6%	-13%	18%
EVEREverQuote Inc.	$693M	94%	-3.7%	-34%	1%
ZIPZipRecruiter Inc.	$449M	89%	0.3%	10%	14%
GRNDGrindr Inc.	$440M	—	21.4%	22%	26%
Group median	—	77%	-3.2%	-3%	15%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what EverQuote Inc. has delivered.

EverQuote Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, EverQuote Inc. earns about $6M on its 0.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($6M) Net of stock comp (−$24M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($98M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+45%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $96M on 36M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $171M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($5M) runs well above depreciation ($3M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $98M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh EVER against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "EverQuote Inc. (EVER), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EVER, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← EVCM its page in the Manual EVGO →

Industry order: ← EVCM the Software chapter FDS →