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DSX, Diana Shipping inc.
A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 94% and operating margin about 17% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −299% and 49% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −145 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 21% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $114M | $162M | $226M | $221M | $170M | $214M | $290M | $262M | $228M | $214M | $214M | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 94% | 92% | 97% | — | — | — | — | 97% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ($88M) | ($484M) | $38M | $18M | ($113M) | $64M | $143M | $86M | $59M | $42M | $42M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −77.3% | −298.9% | 16.9% | 8.0% | −66.4% | 29.7% | 49.2% | 32.7% | 25.8% | 19.8% | 19.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($164M) | ($512M) | $17M | ($11M) | ($134M) | $57M | $119M | $50M | $13M | $18M | $17M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($21M) | $23M | $80M | $50M | $17M | $90M | $159M | $70M | $84M | $48M | $48M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $82M | $87M | $52M | $49M | $43M | $40M | $43M | $50M | $45M | $47M | $47M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $62M | $448M | $11M | $12M | $108M | ($8M) | ($4M) | ($29M) | $26M | ($17M) | ($16M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $51M | $126M | $3M | $3M | $6M | $17M | $230M | $30M | $4M | $2M | $30M | CapexCapex |
| 44.6% | 77.7% | 1.1% | 1.3% | 3.5% | 8.1% | 79.4% | 11.3% | 1.6% | 0.8% | 13.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($72M) | ($64M) | $77M | $47M | $11M | $72M | $116M | $41M | $80M | $46M | $18M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −62.9% | −39.3% | 34.2% | 21.3% | 6.6% | 33.8% | 39.8% | 15.5% | 35.0% | 21.5% | 8.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($72M) | ($102M) | $77M | $47M | $11M | $72M | ($71M) | $41M | $80M | $46M | $18M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −62.9% | −63.2% | 34.2% | 21.3% | 6.6% | 33.8% | −24.6% | 15.5% | 35.0% | 21.5% | 8.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | — | — | $9M | $80M | $41M | $29M | $5M | $5M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $0 | $15M | $50M | $12M | $45M | $4M | $0 | $0 | $23M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -4% | -32% | 3% | 1% | -11% | 7% | 12% | 8% | 5% | 3% | 3% | ROICROIC |
| -16% | -82% | 3% | -2% | -31% | 15% | 24% | 10% | 3% | 4% | 3% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | — | — | — | 12% | 8% | 2% | −3% | 3% | 2% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $98M | $40M | $127M | $107M | $63M | $110M | $76M | $102M | $125M | $75M | $75M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $6M | $5M | $3M | $8M | $5M | $3M | $6M | $6M | $7M | $4M | $4M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $6M | $6M | $6M | $6M | $5M | $6M | $5M | $5M | $4M | $4M | $4M | InventoryInvent. |
| $7M | $8M | $11M | $11M | $9M | $10M | $11M | $10M | $9M | $11M | $11M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $5M | $3M | ($2M) | $2M | $1M | ($856K) | ($571K) | $1M | $2M | ($3M) | ($3M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $115M | $139M | $142M | $137M | $105M | $126M | $141M | $182M | $207M | $245M | $245M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $78M | $80M | $125M | $65M | $62M | $65M | $132M | $85M | $80M | $90M | $90M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.5× | 1.7× | 1.1× | 2.1× | 1.7× | 1.9× | 1.1× | 2.1× | 2.6× | 2.7× | 2.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1.7B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $872M | $842M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| $598M | $601M | $531M | $475M | $420M | $424M | $523M | $511M | $515M | $523M | $523M | Total debtDebt |
| $500M | $561M | $404M | $368M | $357M | $313M | $446M | $409M | $390M | $448M | $448M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -4.0× | -18.2× | 1.3× | 0.6× | -5.2× | 3.1× | 5.2× | 1.7× | 1.2× | 1.0× | 1.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $1.1B | $625M | $628M | $570M | $429M | $393M | $487M | $489M | $505M | $502M | $502M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 80.4M | 95.7M | 105M | 95.2M | 86.1M | 84.9M | 83.3M | 102M | 119M | 110M | 116M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.42 | $1.69 | $2.16 | $2.32 | $1.97 | $2.52 | $3.48 | $2.57 | $1.92 | $1.93 | $1.84 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-2.04 | $-5.35 | $0.16 | $-0.11 | $-1.56 | $0.68 | $1.43 | $0.49 | $0.11 | $0.16 | $0.14 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.89 | $-0.66 | $0.74 | $0.49 | $0.13 | $0.85 | $1.39 | $0.40 | $0.67 | $0.41 | $0.15 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.89 | $-1.07 | $0.74 | $0.49 | $0.13 | $0.85 | $-0.86 | $0.40 | $0.67 | $0.41 | $0.15 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | — | — | — | $0.10 | $0.96 | $0.41 | $0.24 | $0.04 | $0.04 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.63 | $1.31 | $0.02 | $0.03 | $0.07 | $0.20 | $2.76 | $0.29 | $0.03 | $0.02 | $0.26 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $13.13 | $6.53 | $5.99 | $5.99 | $4.98 | $4.63 | $5.85 | $4.80 | $4.26 | $4.55 | $4.34 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +3.5%/yr | −0.4%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | +26.0%/yr |
| Dividends / share | −20.3%/yr (4-yr) | −20.3%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −34.0%/yr | −26.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | −11.1%/yr | −1.8%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $18M of profit into $46M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $18M | $13M | $50M | $119M | $57M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$47M | +$45M | +$50M | +$43M | +$40M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$17M | +$26M | −$29M | −$4M | −$8M |
| Cash from operations | $48M | $84M | $70M | $159M | $90M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$2M | −$4M | −$30M | −$43M | −$17M |
| Owner earnings | $46M | $80M | $41M | $116M | $72M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | — | −$187M | — |
| Free cash flow | $46M | $80M | $41M | ($71M) | $72M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 21% | 35% | 16% | 40% | 34% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income $42M ÷ interest expense $43M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $448M · 10.6× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $51M + ST investments $24M − debt $523M
What this means
Netting $75M of cash and short-term investments against $523M of debt leaves $448M owed, about 10.6× a year's operating profit (12.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 6 + DIO 271 − DPO 695 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -32%–12%; 3% latest = NOPAT $33M ÷ invested capital $975MIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -63%–40%; latest $18M = operating cash $48M − maintenance capex $30MIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 21% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $48M ÷ net income $17M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $28M ÷ Owner Earnings $18M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $18M of Owner Earnings, $28M (156%) went back to shareholders, $5M dividends, $23M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.64×HarvestingCapex $30M ÷ depreciation $47M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $214M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.73×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $523M vs $155M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.23/share (latest year $0.14), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.34/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 6 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −120% → 26% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −120% early to 26% lately, median 17% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2017 · −298.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +3.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$75M
- Receivables$4M
- Inventory$4M
- Other current assets$162M
- Debt due within a year$50M
- Accounts payable$11M
- Other current liabilities$29M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $599M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$471M · 79%
- Dividends$164M · 27%
- Buybacks$149M · 25%
- Returned to owners$313M
88% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $164M as dividends and $149M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$184M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $184M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $149M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count43.9%
The diluted count rose from 80M to 116M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.04/sh
Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 20% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Diana Shipping inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?43.9%
Diluted shares grew 43.9% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $149M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Marine Shipping
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KEXKirby | $3.4B | — | 7.7% | 4% | 10% |
| MATXMatson | $3.3B | 96% | 11.4% | 11% | 12% |
| TDWTidewater Inc. | $1.4B | — | -12.5% | -6% | 3% |
| INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock | $843M | — | 12.3% | 3% | 33% |
| PANLPangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd. | $632M | — | 7.7% | 10% | 10% |
| LPGDorian LPG Ltd. | $482M | — | 35.2% | 7% | 38% |
| GNKGenco Shipping & Trading Limited | $342M | — | -1.1% | -0% | 31% |
| DSXDiana Shipping inc. | $214M | 94% | 18.3% | 3% | 21% |
| Group median | — | — | 9.6% | 3% | 17% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Diana Shipping inc.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Diana Shipping inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Diana Shipping inc. earns about $39M on its 18.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $18M on 116M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $448M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← DSWL its page in the Manual DUO →
Industry order: ← DHT the Marine Shipping chapter ECO →