Owner Scorecard


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DUO, Fangdd Network Group Ltd.

A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · figures as filed, in CNY · 1 ADS = 1 ordinary share
DUO · Fangdd Network Group Ltd.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
CN¥355M
+4.6% YoY · −32% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue CN¥355M 5-yr avg CN¥384M
Return on equity −15% 5-yr avg −136%
Return on tangible equity −25% 5-yr avg −138%
Equity / assets 73.4% 5-yr avg 35.5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on going-concern doubt, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median -24%, above 12% in only 0 of 8 years). A mortgage REIT lives on the spread between what its mortgages earn and what its borrowing costs, levered many times over; weigh the worst rate and credit years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
CN¥1.8BCN¥2.3BCN¥3.6BCN¥2.5BCN¥942MCN¥773KCN¥285MCN¥339MCN¥355MCN¥355MRevenueRevenue
(CN¥621K)CN¥2MCN¥83KCN¥83KNet interest incomeNet int.
CN¥3M(CN¥493K)CN¥614KCN¥614KCN¥27M(CN¥20M)CN¥2MCN¥2MCredit-loss provisionProvision
CN¥649KCN¥104M(CN¥510M)(CN¥221M)(CN¥1.2B)(CN¥240M)(CN¥93M)CN¥28M(CN¥86M)(CN¥86M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
3.6%-11.7%-5.5%-62.9%-22.3%-12.1%3.9%-10.9%-10.9%Return on assetsROA
-32%-15%-384%-239%-48%7%-15%-15%Return on equityROE
−32%−15%−384%−239%−48%7%−15%−15%Retained to equityRetained/eq
-32%-16%-384%-240%-48%7%-25%-25%Return on tangible equityROTCE
Balance sheet
CN¥2.9BCN¥4.4BCN¥4.0BCN¥1.9BCN¥1.1BCN¥770MCN¥731MCN¥788MCN¥788MTotal assetsAssets
CN¥31MCN¥454KCN¥454KCN¥508KCN¥621KCN¥621KGoodwillGoodwill
(CN¥1.9B)CN¥1.6BCN¥1.4BCN¥313MCN¥100MCN¥196MCN¥386MCN¥578MCN¥578MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
1.89B1.89B2.18B1.99B2.02B370M257M681M6.5M946MShares out (diluted)Shares
CN¥0.00CN¥0.05CN¥-0.23CN¥-0.11CN¥-0.59CN¥-0.65CN¥-0.36CN¥0.04CN¥-13.15CN¥-0.09EPS (diluted)EPS
CN¥-0.99CN¥0.73CN¥0.72CN¥0.15CN¥0.27CN¥0.76CN¥0.57CN¥88.47CN¥0.61Book value / shareBVPS
CN¥-0.99CN¥0.73CN¥0.71CN¥0.15CN¥0.27CN¥0.76CN¥0.56CN¥52.57CN¥0.36Tangible book / shareTBVPS

Share counts before 2020 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×1/5.47 into 2022 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1/1.44 into 2023 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×2.66 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1/104.22 into 2025 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×144.64 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+65.8%/yr+113.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+148.7%/yr+270.3%/yr
Book value / share+161.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
7Mpeak FY2019
Revenue
CN¥355Mlow FY2022
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“To remedy the identified material weakness, we have adopted and are in the process of implementing a number of measures to improve our internal control over financial reporting, including: (i) hiring additional qualified personnel with U.S.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Is it a good business?

  • Loss on equity
    Net income (CN¥86M) ÷ equity CN¥578M
    Industry peers: median 9%

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Loss
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill CN¥621K − intangibles CN¥234M)
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 63%
    What this means

    Noninterest expense or revenue missing.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 73.4%
    Well capitalized
    Equity CN¥578M ÷ assets CN¥788M
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Borrowed against book
    Assets CN¥788M ÷ equity CN¥578M
    What this means

    A mortgage REIT finances a pool of mortgages with borrowed money — mostly short-term repo, which sits in liabilities rather than as tagged debt — so its true leverage is the whole balance sheet against the owners' equity, not just labeled debt. That leverage magnifies both the spread it earns and the loss when rates or credit move against it; read it beside the book value, the question being whether the spread compensated for the leverage through a cycle.

  • Credit cost (provision / NII) 2051%
    Elevated
    Provision for credit losses CN¥2M ÷ net interest income CN¥83K
    What this means

    What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assetsCN¥390M
  • Cash & short-term investmentsCN¥144M
  • ReceivablesCN¥148M
  • InventoryCN¥5M
  • Other current assetsCN¥93M
Current liabilitiesCN¥209M
  • Accounts payableCN¥73M
  • Other current liabilitiesCN¥137M
Current ratio1.86×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.84×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.69×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capitalCN¥181Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway1.7 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueCN¥344Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset valueCN¥181MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesCN¥806KCN¥806K of it operating leases
Deferred revenueCN¥18Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangiblesCN¥235M30% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiringCN¥0over 9 years buying other businesses, against CN¥70M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (reit / real estate), compared on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEROTCEEfficiencyNII / assets
DUOFangdd Network Group Ltd.CN¥355M-32%-32%0.0%
FMBHFirst Mid Bancshares Inc.$349M9%12%63%2.9%
BHRBBurke & Herbert Financial Services Corp.$342M9%9%65%2.9%
OSBCOld Second Bancorp Inc.$339M11%12%62%3.4%
BRSPBrightSpire Capital Inc.$331M-5%-5%1.5%
UVSPUnivest Financial Corporation$328M9%11%63%2.8%
TFSLTFS Financial Corporation$321M5%5%66%1.7%
CMTGClaros Mortgage Trust Inc.$188M5%5%2.8%
Group median7%7%2.8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American depositary shares, each of which previously represented one Class”; Fangdd Network Group Ltd. reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.

A mortgage REIT is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Fangdd Network Group Ltd.’s record justifies.

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The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered113%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A mortgage REIT earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a mortgage REIT.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity−32%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $51M on 7M shares, a −32% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the mortgage REIT keeps earning that return; a rate shock, a spread that compresses or a credit cycle changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Fangdd Network Group Ltd. (DUO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DUO, data as of 2026-07-09.

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