Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← EBC Manual EBS → ← EBAY Commercial Services & Supplies EEX →

EBF, Ennis Inc.

Commercial Services & Supplies capital-intensive Serial acquirer

Ennis is primarily a "trade printer" that manufactures a broad range of printed products that are resold throughout the United States through a network of independent distributors.

We are in the business of manufacturing, designing and selling business forms and other printed business products primarily to distributors located in the United States.

Approximately 95% of the business products we manufacture are custom and semi-custom products, constructed in a wide variety of sizes, colors, number of parts and quantities on an individual job basis, depending upon the customers' specifications.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
EBF · Ennis Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$392M
−0.6% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $394M 5-yr avg $408M
Gross margin 31% 5-yr avg 30%
Operating margin 13.5% 5-yr avg 13.3%
ROIC 13% 5-yr avg 16%
Owner-earnings margin 14% 5-yr avg 12%
Free cash flow margin 14% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 41% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 7 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 30% and operating margin about 12% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 6 of 9 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMay 2026
Income statement
$357M$370M$401M$438M$358M$400M$432M$420M$395M$392M$394MRevenueRevenue
29%32%31%29%29%29%30%30%30%31%31%Gross marginGross mgn
18%19%18%18%19%18%16%16%17%17%17%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$42M$48M$50M$51M$36M$44M$66M$56M$52M$53M$53MOperating incomeOp. inc.
11.7%12.9%12.5%11.6%10.0%10.9%15.3%13.4%13.2%13.4%13.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$2M$33M$37M$38M$24M$29M$47M$43M$40M$43M$43MNet incomeNet inc.
30%25%25%28%31%27%28%27%27%27%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$59M$45M$51M$57M$53M$51M$47M$69M$66M$53M$66MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$8M$8M$9M$10M$10M$10M$10M$10M$9M$9M$9MDepreciationDeprec.
$48M$3M$3M$7M$18M$9M($13M)$15M$13M($1M)$12MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$3M$3M$5M$3M$4M$7M$4M$7M$6M$12M$11MCapexCapex
0.9%0.7%1.2%0.8%1.0%1.6%1.0%1.5%1.5%3.0%2.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$56M$43M$47M$54M$49M$44M$42M$63M$60M$41M$55MOwner earningsOwner earn.
15.6%11.5%11.6%12.3%13.7%11.0%9.8%14.9%15.2%10.5%14.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$56M$43M$47M$54M$49M$44M$42M$63M$60M$41M$55MFree cash flowFCF
15.6%11.5%11.6%12.3%13.7%11.0%9.8%14.9%15.2%10.5%14.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$19M$1M$27M$19M$19M$4M$9M$20M$6M$39M$4MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$57M$22M$23M$23M$23M$25M$26M$26M$92M$26M$26MDividends paidDiv. paid
$8M$3M$5M$2M$1M$5M$1M$586K$2M$14MBuybacksBuybacks
17%16%17%12%14%20%15%16%14%13%ROICROIC
1%13%13%13%8%10%14%12%13%14%14%Return on equityROE
−22%4%5%5%0%1%6%5%−17%5%5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$96M$88M$68M$75M$86M$94M$111M$72M$35M$49MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$37M$36M$40M$43M$38M$39M$54M$47M$37M$38M$35MReceivablesReceiv.
$28M$26M$35M$35M$33M$39M$47M$40M$39M$55M$56MInventoryInvent.
$14M$12M$14M$17M$15M$17M$18M$12M$14M$14M$15MAccounts payablePayables
$51M$50M$62M$61M$56M$61M$82M$75M$62M$79M$76MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$149M$163M$166M$150M$148M$165M$197M$201M$153M$132M$143MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$30M$30M$32M$38M$35M$37M$41M$34M$33M$35M$41MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
5.0×5.5×5.3×3.9×4.2×4.4×4.8×6.0×4.6×3.7×3.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$71M$71M$82M$83M$89M$89M$92M$94M$94M$107M$107MGoodwillGoodwill
$324M$329M$363M$366M$364M$369M$394M$399M$349M$357M$364MTotal assetsAssets
$30M$30M$30M$30MTotal debtDebt
$30M($66M)($58M)($19M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
68.4×61.5×43.4×83.9×3263.7×4842.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$251M$262M$289M$294M$301M$304M$331M$350M$302M$309M$311MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.4%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.7%0.6%0.3%1.0%0.6%0.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
25.7M25.4M25.8M26.0M26.0M26.1M26.0M25.9M26.2M25.7M25.5MShares out (diluted)Shares
$13.86$14.56$15.51$16.84$13.77$15.32$16.64$16.20$15.09$15.27$15.43Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.07$1.29$1.45$1.47$0.93$1.11$1.82$1.64$1.54$1.66$1.67EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.17$1.68$1.80$2.07$1.89$1.69$1.64$2.41$2.29$1.60$2.17Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.17$1.68$1.80$2.07$1.89$1.69$1.64$2.41$2.29$1.60$2.17Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.22$0.88$0.87$0.90$0.90$0.97$1.00$1.00$3.52$1.01$1.01Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.12$0.10$0.19$0.13$0.14$0.25$0.17$0.25$0.23$0.46$0.42Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$9.76$10.30$11.19$11.30$11.56$11.64$12.77$13.49$11.54$12.02$12.17Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.1%/yr+2.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share−3.3%/yr−3.3%/yr
EPS+42.4%/yr+12.3%/yr
Dividends / share−8.4%/yr+2.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+16.1%/yr+26.3%/yr
Book value / share+2.3%/yr+0.8%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue-0.6%
    “Our net sales were $392.4 million for fiscal year 2026, compared to $394.6 million for fiscal year 2025, a decrease of $2.2 million, or 0.6%. The decrease was primarily driven by lower organic volumes of approximately $25.0 million, reflecting continued softness in portions of the print market and ongoing pricing competition.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
26Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
14%low FY2021
Gross margin
31%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$41Mowner earningsvs.$43Mnet incomelow FY2026

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business reported $43M of profit but $41M of owner earnings: $2M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$43M
Owner earnings$41M · 10% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$43M$40M$43M$47M$29M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$9M+$9M+$10M+$10M+$10M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$3M+$4M+$1M+$3M+$3M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$1M+$13M+$15M−$13M+$9M
Cash from operations$53M$66M$69M$47M$51M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$12M−$6M−$7M−$4M−$7M
Owner earnings$41M$60M$63M$42M$44M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue10%15%15%10%11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $3M), owner earnings is nearer $39M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash
    Cash $35M − debt $30M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $5M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 35 + DIO 74 − DPO 19 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 12%–20%; 13% latest = NOPAT $38M ÷ invested capital $304M
    Industry peers: median 3%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 10%–16%; latest $41M = operating cash $53M − maintenance capex $12M
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $3M of SBC) leaves $39M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $53M ÷ net income $43M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $40M ÷ Owner Earnings $41M
    What this means

    Of $41M Owner Earnings, $40M (98%) went back to shareholders, $26M dividends, $14M buybacks. Net of $3M stock comp, the real buyback was about $12M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.29×
    Expanding
    Capex $12M ÷ depreciation $9M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $392M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.72×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $30M vs $96M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +74%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.65/share (latest year $1.68), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.20/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 3 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 12% early, 13% lately, median 12%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +0%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 0% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · 10.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Not named

Despite the structural exposure, the latest 10-K does not name AI as a competitive risk, which is itself worth a question.

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$143M
  • Cash & short-term investments$49M
  • Receivables$35M
  • Inventory$56M
  • Other current assets$4M
Current liabilities$41M
  • Accounts payable$15M
  • Other current liabilities$25M
Current ratio3.53×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.15×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.21×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$103Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters6.3× → 3.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$167Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$91MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$38M$8M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $551M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$53M · 10%
  • Dividends$344M · 62%
  • Buybacks$43M · 8%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$111M · 20%
  • Returned to owners$387M

    78% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $344M as dividends and $43M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$17.56

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $27M, about $17.56 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $15.83 (2021) to $19.97 (2024); its heaviest year, 2017, paid $15.85 ($8M).

  • Net change in share count−0.9%

    The diluted count barely moved (26M to 26M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.01/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 8% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$145M41% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity35%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$163Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $53M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Keith S. Walters$2.4M$1.9M$49M
2022Keith S. Walters$5.7M$5.1M$44M
2023Keith S. Walters$2.6M$4.0M$42M
2024Keith S. Walters$1.7M$715k$63M
2025Keith S. Walters$5.3M$5.9M$60M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.2%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio43:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$3M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Ennis Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?18% → 23% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $65M to $91M while revenue grew 10%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (18% of revenue then, 23% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (capital-intensive), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
MVSTMicrovast Holdings Inc.$428M10%-34.8%-30%-9%
CLNEClean Energy Fuels Corp.$425M49%-10.5%-4%5%
ESOAEnergy Services of America Corporation$411M11%2.9%9%2%
EBFEnnis Inc.$392M30%12.7%16%12%
REPXRiley Exploration Permian Inc.$392M21.7%10%31%
LXFRLuxfer Holdings PLC$385M24%7.8%10%5%
SNDASonida Senior Living Inc.$381M-0.8%-4%-3%
HLITHarmonic Inc.$361M50%3.5%3%2%
Group median27%3.2%6%3%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ennis Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Ennis Inc. earns about $47M on its 11.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+4%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+0%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $55M on 25M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-18; net cash $19M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ennis Inc. (EBF), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EBF, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← EBC its page in the Manual EBS →

Industry order: ← EBAY the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter EEX →