Share count
18Mpeak FY2025
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SNDA, Sonida Senior Living Inc.
Sonida Senior Living, Inc. is a leading owner, operator and investor in senior housing communities in the United States in terms of resident capacity.
We primarily provide residential housing and services to people aged 75 years and older, including independent living, assisted living, and memory care services.
The CHP Merger more than doubles our owned units to approximately 14,700 and strengthens our presence in the South, Southeast and Midwest, while strategically expanding our national exposure to attractive markets in the Mountain West and Pacific Northwest.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$381M
+25.2% YoY · −0% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $412M 5-yr avg $283M
Revenue $123M +33.4% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income ($41M) yr-ago ($13M)
Net margin −33.8% yr-ago −14.2%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 23% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −3.3%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Read this kind of business on volume, payer mix and reimbursement. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −4%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $447M | $467M | $460M | $447M | $384M | $235M | $238M | $255M | $304M | $381M | $412M | RevenueRevenue |
| 5% | 5% | 6% | 6% | 7% | 14% | 13% | 13% | 11% | 10% | 10% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $14M | $8M | $8M | ($15M) | ($56M) | ($40M) | ($31M) | $58M | $69M | ($42M) | $74M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 3.2% | 1.7% | 1.7% | −3.3% | −14.5% | −17.1% | −13.0% | 22.7% | 22.6% | −11.1% | 17.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($28M) | ($44M) | ($54M) | ($36M) | ($295M) | $126M | ($54M) | ($21M) | ($2M) | ($71M) | ($99M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $52M | $56M | $37M | $5M | ($7M) | ($29M) | ($3M) | $11M | ($2M) | $24M | ($15M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $60M | $66M | $63M | $64M | $60M | $38M | $38M | $40M | $44M | $57M | $63M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $8M | $26M | $19M | ($25M) | $227M | ($195M) | $9M | ($11M) | ($48M) | $33M | $15M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $62M | $40M | $22M | $20M | $16M | $10M | $25M | $18M | $25M | $33M | $32M | CapexCapex |
| 13.9% | 8.6% | 4.8% | 4.5% | 4.1% | 4.4% | 10.3% | 7.0% | 8.3% | 8.7% | 7.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($10M) | $16M | $15M | ($15M) | ($22M) | ($39M) | ($27M) | ($7M) | ($27M) | ($9M) | ($47M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −2.3% | 3.3% | 3.2% | −3.4% | −5.8% | −16.7% | −11.4% | −2.8% | −8.9% | −2.3% | −11.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($10M) | $16M | $15M | ($15M) | ($22M) | ($39M) | ($27M) | ($7M) | ($27M) | ($9M) | ($47M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −2.3% | 3.3% | 3.2% | −3.4% | −5.8% | −16.7% | −11.4% | −2.8% | −8.9% | −2.3% | −11.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $139M | $85M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $85M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| 14% | 10% | — | -1% | -7% | -7% | -4% | — | — | -5% | — | ROICROIC |
| -24% | -55% | -152% | -251% | — | — | — | — | -3% | — | -11% | Return on equityROE |
| −24% | −55% | −152% | −251% | — | — | — | — | −3% | — | −11% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $34M | $18M | $31M | $24M | $18M | $79M | $17M | $4M | $17M | $11M | $84M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $14M | $12M | $11M | $8M | $6M | $4M | $6M | $8M | $19M | $19M | $26M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $5M | $8M | $9M | $10M | $15M | $9M | $7M | $11M | $9M | $5M | $18M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $9M | $5M | $1M | ($2M) | ($9M) | ($5M) | ($1M) | ($3M) | $10M | $14M | $8M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $82M | $64M | $73M | $63M | $43M | $106M | $44M | $32M | $64M | $78M | $147M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $81M | $87M | $85M | $129M | $373M | $120M | $94M | $101M | $76M | $105M | $334M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.0× | 0.7× | 0.9× | 0.5× | 0.1× | 0.9× | 0.5× | 0.3× | 0.8× | 0.7× | 0.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $703M | $729M | $661M | $621M | $842M | $845M | $2.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | $927M | $910M | $683M | $671M | $629M | $651M | $690M | $1.6B | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | $903M | $892M | $604M | $654M | $625M | $634M | $679M | $1.5B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | -0.3× | -1.2× | -1.1× | -0.9× | 1.6× | 1.9× | -1.1× | 1.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $117M | $80M | $35M | $14M | ($279M) | ($47M) | ($102M) | ($115M) | $72M | ($11K) | $885M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 2.6% | 1.6% | 1.8% | 0.6% | 0.4% | 1.2% | 1.8% | 1.1% | 1.4% | 1.3% | 1.6% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 3.9M | 3.9M | 4.0M | 4.0M | 4.1M | 5.5M | 12.7M | 13.6M | 14.1M | 18.1M | 25.7M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $116.08 | $118.92 | $115.76 | $110.89 | $93.63 | $42.32 | $18.75 | $18.81 | $21.57 | $21.07 | $16.03 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-7.27 | $-11.25 | $-13.49 | $-8.94 | $-72.04 | $22.65 | $-4.28 | $-1.56 | $-0.15 | $-3.91 | $-3.87 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-2.62 | $3.98 | $3.75 | $-3.74 | $-5.47 | $-7.08 | $-2.13 | $-0.53 | $-1.91 | $-0.49 | $-1.83 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-2.62 | $3.98 | $3.75 | $-3.74 | $-5.47 | $-7.08 | $-2.13 | $-0.53 | $-1.91 | $-0.49 | $-1.83 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $16.18 | $10.18 | $5.53 | $5.04 | $3.81 | $1.88 | $1.93 | $1.32 | $1.78 | $1.84 | $1.23 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $30.33 | $20.48 | $8.87 | $3.57 | $-68.11 | $-8.44 | $-8.00 | $-8.48 | $5.09 | $-0.00 | $34.44 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/15 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
The diluted share count moved ×2.29 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Share counts before 2024 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
The diluted share count moved ×1.42 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −17.3%/yr | −25.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −21.5%/yr | −13.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
ROIC
−5%low FY2020
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($9M)owner earningsvs.($71M)net incomelow FY2021
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $71M loss into ($9M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($71M) | ($2M) | ($21M) | ($54M) | $126M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$57M | +$44M | +$40M | +$38M | +$38M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$5M | +$4M | +$3M | +$4M | +$3M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$33M | −$48M | −$11M | +$9M | −$195M |
| Cash from operations | $24M | ($2M) | $11M | ($3M) | ($29M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$33M | −$25M | −$18M | −$25M | −$10M |
| Owner earnings | ($9M) | ($27M) | ($7M) | ($27M) | ($39M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -2% | -9% | -3% | -11% | -17% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $5M), owner earnings is nearer ($14M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income $69M ÷ interest expense $39M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $899M · 13.1× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $11M − debt $910M
What this means
Netting $11M of cash and short-term investments against $910M of debt leaves $899M owed, about 13.1× a year's operating profit (13.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -7%–14%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -17%–3%; latest ($9M) = operating cash $24M − maintenance capex $33MIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -2% of revenue this year, a -3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $5M of SBC) leaves ($14M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($71M) · cash from operations $24M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.59×HarvestingCapex $33M ÷ depreciation $57M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $381M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.74×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $910M vs ($27M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.66/share (latest year $-1.49), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-0.00/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 2% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 11% lately, median −3% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2021 · −17.1% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −5.1%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“We are integrating generative AI tools into certain of our systems and our third-party business partners, including residents and vendors, as well as our competitors, may also develop or use such tools.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$147M
- Cash & short-term investments$84M
- Receivables$26M
- Other current assets$36M
Current liabilities$334M
- Debt due within a year$219M
- Accounts payable$18M
- Other current liabilities$97M
Current ratio0.44×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.44×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.25×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($187M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$219M due · $84M cash
cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway1.8 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+33.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 0.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$623Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.6B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.6B$274K of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$9Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $145M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$272M · 187%
- Buybacks$2M · 2%
- Returned to owners$2M
$0 as dividends and $2M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$129M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $129M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks$1945.74
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $2M, about $1945.74 each.
- Net change in share count566.6%
The diluted count rose from 4M to 26M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Brandon M. Ribar | $1.8M | $955k | ($7M) |
| 2024 | Brandon M. Ribar | $3.2M | $4.2M | ($27M) |
| 2025 | Brandon M. Ribar | $2.2M | $3.9M | ($9M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership39.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$5M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Sonida Senior Living Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
All 4 tests turned up something to look into. A record that trips every wire is one to understand slowly.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−4.7% vs 1.4%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 1.4% early in the record and −4.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?566.6%
Diluted shares grew 566.6% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $2M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?3% → 6% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $14M to $26M while revenue grew −8%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (3% of revenue then, 6% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $50M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Health Care Providers & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BKDBrookdale Senior Living Inc. | $3.2B | — | -1.3% | -1% | -1% |
| RDNTRadNet | $2.0B | 13% | 4.9% | 4% | 5% |
| NHCNational HealthCare Corporation | $1.5B | — | 5.3% | 6% | 7% |
| SHCSotera Health | $1.2B | 55% | 25.2% | 7% | 13% |
| INNVInnovAge Holding Corp. | $854M | — | -2.5% | -6% | 1% |
| SNDASonida Senior Living Inc. | $381M | — | -0.8% | -4% | -3% |
| CSTLCastle Biosciences Inc. | $344M | 81% | -14.6% | -18% | -0% |
| VMDViemed Healthcare Inc. | $270M | 61% | 9.2% | 12% | 10% |
| Group median | — | — | 2.0% | 1% | 3% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFSonida Senior Living Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Revenue, delivered2%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−11%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Sonida Senior Living Inc. (SNDA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SNDA, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← SNAP its page in the Manual SNDK →
Industry order: ← SHC the Health Care Providers & Services chapter SRTA →