Owner Scorecard


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EEX, Emerald Holding Inc.

Commercial Services & Supplies asset-light UnprofitableCyclicalSerial acquirer

Emerald is a leading business-to-business event organizer principally in the United States, with expanding operations in the U.K. and other international markets.

Leveraging our shows as key market-driven platforms, we deliver live events, including trade shows, conferences, B2C showcases, and executive peer networks, supported by media content, industry insights, digital tools, and data-driven solutions that enhance the live experience and extend customer engagement.

All of our trade show franchises typically hold market-leading positions within their respective industry verticals, with significant brand value established over a long period of time.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
EEX · Emerald Holding Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$463M
+16.2% YoY · 29% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $471M 5-yr avg $343M
Operating margin 1.3% 5-yr avg 7.3%
ROIC 1% 5-yr avg 21%
Owner-earnings margin 12% 5-yr avg 29%
Free cash flow margin 12% 5-yr avg 29%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 80% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 10 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 71% and operating margin about 4.9% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −526% to 55% — on a steadier 71% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 2 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 23% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$324M$342M$381M$361M$127M$146M$326M$383M$399M$463M$471MRevenueRevenue
74%72%71%67%75%Gross marginGross mgn
31%36%32%37%93%98%44%44%43%52%55%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$100M$88M($4M)($25M)($671M)($65M)$180M$35M$47M$23M$6MOperating incomeOp. inc.
31.0%25.8%−1.1%−6.8%−526.4%−44.5%55.2%9.1%11.7%4.9%1.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$22M$82M($25M)($50M)($634M)($80M)$131M($8M)$2M($31M)($39M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$93M$111M$104M$68M($37M)$90M$175M$40M$47M$43M$59MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$40M$43M$47M$52M$49M$48M$60M$45M$28M$31M$33MDepreciationDeprec.
$28M($17M)$76M$58M$541M$112M($21M)($4M)$11M$31M$53MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$2M$900K$800K$2M$900K$2M$2M$600K$1M$1M$1MCapexCapex
0.7%0.3%0.2%0.4%0.7%1.0%0.6%0.2%0.3%0.3%0.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$91M$110M$103M$66M($38M)$89M$173M$40M$46M$41M$58MOwner earningsOwner earn.
28.0%32.2%27.1%18.3%−29.8%60.8%53.2%10.4%11.4%8.9%12.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$91M$110M$103M$66M($38M)$89M$173M$40M$46M$41M$58MFree cash flowFCF
28.0%32.2%27.1%18.3%−29.8%60.8%53.2%10.4%11.4%8.9%12.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$49M$93M$71M$13M$33M$125M$38M$10M$16M$195M$175MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$15M$21M$21M$5M$0$0$0$6M$12M$9MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$19M$8M$900K$12M$10M$17M$14M$18MBuybacksBuybacks
5%7%-0%-2%-245%-32%105%27%4%2%1%ROICROIC
4%11%-4%-8%1%-9%-11%Return on equityROE
4%9%−7%−11%−1%−13%−14%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$15M$11M$21M$10M$295M$231M$239M$204M$195M$101M$171MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$50M$49M$50M$53M$26M$42M$53M$55M$58M$76M$76MReceivablesReceiv.
$4M$5M$3M$6M$4M$12M$20M$24M$17M$16M$16MAccounts payablePayables
$46M$44M$46M$47M$22M$30M$33M$31M$40M$60M$60MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$96M$94M$103M$94M$352M$290M$332M$311M$307M$235M$277MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$209M$223M$269M$229M$116M$192M$222M$230M$241M$289M$304MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.5×0.4×0.4×0.4×3.0×1.5×1.5×1.4×1.3×0.8×0.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$930M$994M$1.0B$980M$404M$401M$546M$554M$574M$784M$780MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.6B$1.6B$1.6B$1.6B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.0B$1.2B$1.2BTotal assetsAssets
$693M$549M$524M$520M$515M$511M$414M$399M$399M$499M$555MTotal debtDebt
$678M$538M$504M$510M$220M$280M$175M$195M$204M$398M$384MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$528M$761M$708M$640M($4M)($121M)($33M)($93M)$386M$339M$338MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.9%0.8%1.6%2.1%5.3%7.1%1.8%2.0%1.5%2.4%2.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$69M$603M$7M$6MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
63.3M72.1M72.9M71.7M71.4M71.3M69.1M64.0M157M199M199MShares out (diluted)Shares
$5.11$4.74$5.22$5.03$1.78$2.04$4.71$5.99$2.55$2.33$2.36Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.35$1.13$-0.34$-0.70$-8.87$-1.12$1.89$-0.13$0.01$-0.15$-0.19EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.43$1.52$1.41$0.92$-0.53$1.24$2.51$0.62$0.29$0.21$0.29Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.43$1.52$1.41$0.92$-0.53$1.24$2.51$0.62$0.29$0.21$0.29Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.21$0.29$0.30$0.08$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.04$0.06$0.04Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.04$0.01$0.01$0.02$0.01$0.02$0.03$0.01$0.01$0.01$0.01Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.34$10.56$9.72$8.93$-0.05$-1.70$-0.48$-1.45$2.46$1.70$1.70Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.45 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−8.4%/yr+5.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share−19.3%/yr
Dividends / share−4.6%/yr
Capital spending / share−18.5%/yr−13.7%/yr
Book value / share−16.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
199Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
2%low FY2020
Gross margin
67%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
9.6×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$41Mowner earningsvs.($31M)net incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $31M loss into $41M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($31M)$2M($8M)$131M($80M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$31M+$28M+$45M+$60M+$48M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$11M+$6M+$8M+$6M+$10M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$31M+$11M−$4M−$21M+$112M
Cash from operations$43M$47M$40M$175M$90M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$1M−$1M−$600K−$2M−$2M
Owner earnings$41M$46M$40M$173M$89M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue9%11%10%53%61%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $11M), owner earnings is nearer $30M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $398M · 17.7× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $101M − debt $499M
    What this means

    Netting $101M of cash and short-term investments against $499M of debt leaves $398M owed, about 17.7× a year's operating profit (22.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 60 + DIO 0 − DPO 48 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -245%–105%; 2% latest = NOPAT $18M ÷ invested capital $737M
    Industry peers: median -4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -30%–61%; latest $41M = operating cash $43M − maintenance capex $1M
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 18% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $11M of SBC) leaves $30M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($31M) · cash from operations $43M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $29M ÷ Owner Earnings $41M
    What this means

    Of $41M Owner Earnings, $29M (71%) went back to shareholders, $12M dividends, $18M buybacks. Net of $11M stock comp, the real buyback was about $6M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.04×
    Harvesting
    Capex $1M ÷ depreciation $31M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $463M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.82×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $499M vs ($53M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 6 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −147%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.06/share (latest year $-0.16), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.71/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 19% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 19% early to 9% lately, median 5% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −9%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 9% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −526.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 6 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Not named

Despite the structural exposure, the latest 10-K does not name AI as a competitive risk, which is itself worth a question.

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$277M
  • Cash & short-term investments$171M
  • Receivables$76M
  • Other current assets$30M
Current liabilities$304M
  • Accounts payable$16M
  • Other current liabilities$288M
Current ratio0.91×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.91×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.56×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($27M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 0.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($617M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($628M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$563M$8M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$224Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $733M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$13M · 2%
  • Dividends$81M · 11%
  • Buybacks$100M · 14%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$540M · 74%
  • Returned to owners$181M

    25% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $81M as dividends and $100M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $139M and cash and short-term investments rose $156M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$11.92

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $19M, about $11.92 each.

  • Net change in share count215.2%

    The diluted count rose from 63M to 199M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.06/sh

    Paid in 6 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$965M80% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$642Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $13M of capital spent building

$686M written down across 4 years (2019, 2020, 2021, 2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2023Mr. Sedky$6.2M$14.9M$40M
2024Mr. Sedky$1.1M−$3.1M$46M
2025Mr. Sedky$2.7M−$758k$41M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership5.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$11M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 50% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Emerald Holding Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?10.2% vs 29.1%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 29.1% early in the record and 10.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?215.2%

    Diluted shares grew 215.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $100M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $835M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
HQYHealthEquity$1.3B60%14.0%5%24%
GETYGetty Images Holdings Inc.$981M73%19.2%10%
PRTHPriority Technology Holdings Inc.$953M30%8.0%16%6%
NUTXNutex Health Inc.$875M39%-12.8%-182%10%
EEXEmerald Holding Inc.$463M71%7.0%3%23%
SPTSprout Social Inc$458M76%-20.6%-52%2%
RMNIRimini Street Inc. (DE)$422M62%8.3%8%
RPAYRepay Holdings Corporation$309M76%-20.6%-4%24%
Group median67%7.5%-0%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Emerald Holding Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Emerald Holding Inc. earns about $105M on its 22.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.9% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−24%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−9%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $58M on 198M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-07; net debt $384M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Emerald Holding Inc. (EEX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EEX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← EEFT its page in the Manual EFOR →

Industry order: ← EBF the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter ETSY →