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EPD, Enterprise Products Partners L.P.

EPD owns the pipelines, storage, processing plants, and export terminals that move crude oil, natural gas liquids, natural gas, and petrochemicals across North America. It is a master limited partnership built on midstream asset networks, charging fees to gather, process, transport, and store hydrocarbons rather than owning the molecules, so the relevant question is whether its take rides on the volume crossing the system or on the price of the commodity itself. The bulk of the revenue comes from crude-oil and natural-gas-liquids pipelines and services, with other segments behind.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

EPD · Enterprise Products Partners L.P.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$52.6B

−6.4% YoY · 14% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $51.6B 5-yr avg $51.5B

Gross margin 28% 5-yr avg 25%

Operating margin 14.4% 5-yr avg 13.5%

Owner-earnings margin 11% 5-yr avg 12%

Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Crude Oil Pipelines & Services (39%) and NGL Pipelines and Services (33%), with 2 more segments behind.
What moves the needle: The question is whether a pipeline network is a toll road or a price-taker. The filing's own emphasis points to two levers: the expenditure and regulatory hurdle of constructing a competing network — the test of whether these are franchise assets or merely long steel a rival can parallel — and a customer base it describes as largely investment-grade, which decides how dependable the fees stay when energy turns down. Against that, keep the bad case in view: this is a capital-intensive business carried on net debt, fed by third-party volumes it does not control and bound by indenture covenants, so the reinvestment runway and the durability of contracted volumes weigh more than any single year. The figures are in the record below.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest Crude Oil Pipelines & Services at 39%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Crude Oil Pipelines & Services39%$20.8B
NGL Pipelines and Services33%$17.3B
Petrochemical and Refined Products Services20%$10.4B
Natural Gas Pipelines & Services8%$4.2B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$23.0B	$29.2B	$36.5B	$32.8B	$27.2B	$40.8B	$58.2B	$49.7B	$56.2B	$52.6B	$51.6B	RevenueRevenue
32%	27%	27%	33%	39%	27%	21%	26%	24%	27%	28%	Gross marginGross mgn
1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$3.6B	$3.9B	$5.4B	$6.1B	$5.0B	$6.1B	$6.9B	$6.9B	$7.3B	$7.3B	$7.4B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
15.6%	13.4%	14.8%	18.5%	18.5%	15.0%	11.9%	13.9%	13.1%	13.8%	14.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$2.5B	$2.8B	$4.2B	$4.6B	$3.8B	$4.6B	$5.5B	$5.5B	$5.9B	$5.8B	$5.9B	Net incomeNet inc.
1%	1%	1%	1%	-3%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$4.1B	$4.7B	$6.1B	$6.5B	$5.9B	$8.5B	$8.0B	$7.6B	$8.1B	$8.6B	$7.7B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.1B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.1B	DepreciationDeprec.
$2M	$223M	$162M	($20M)	$44M	$2.2B	$773M	$180M	$244M	$688M	($293M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$3.0B	$3.1B	$4.2B	$4.5B	$3.3B	$2.2B	$2.0B	$3.3B	$4.5B	$5.6B	$5.5B	CapexCapex
13.0%	10.6%	11.6%	13.8%	12.1%	5.4%	3.4%	6.6%	8.1%	10.7%	10.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2.5B	$3.0B	$4.3B	$4.6B	$3.8B	$6.8B	$6.1B	$5.7B	$6.1B	$6.5B	$5.6B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
10.9%	10.3%	11.9%	13.9%	14.0%	16.7%	10.4%	11.5%	10.9%	12.4%	10.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.1B	$1.6B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$2.6B	$6.3B	$6.1B	$4.3B	$3.6B	$3.0B	$2.2B	Free cash flowFCF
4.7%	5.4%	5.2%	6.1%	9.6%	15.4%	10.4%	8.7%	6.4%	5.6%	4.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1.0B	$199M	$151M	$0	$0	$0	$3.2B	$0	$949M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0	$0	$31M	$81M	$186M	$214M	$250M	$188M	$219M	$300M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
											Balance sheet
$63M	$5M	$345M	$335M	$1.1B	$2.8B	$76M	$180M	$583M	$969M	$191M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$3.3B	$4.4B	$3.7B	$4.9B	$4.8B	$7.0B	$7.0B	—	—	—	$6.6B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$1.8B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$2.1B	$3.3B	$2.7B	$2.6B	$3.4B	$4.0B	$3.9B	$5.2B	InventoryInvent.
$398M	$802M	$1.1B	$1.0B	$705M	$632M	$743M	—	—	—	$750M	Accounts payablePayables
$4.7B	$5.2B	$4.1B	$6.0B	$7.4B	$9.0B	$8.8B	$3.4B	$4.0B	$3.9B	$11.1B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$6.5B	$6.5B	$6.1B	$7.9B	$9.9B	$13.3B	$10.6B	$12.2B	$15.1B	$13.4B	$15.7B	Current assetsCur. assets
$8.3B	$9.3B	$7.2B	$9.1B	$9.0B	$11.6B	$12.3B	$13.1B	$15.2B	$12.8B	$17.2B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.8×	0.7×	0.8×	0.9×	1.1×	1.1×	0.9×	0.9×	1.0×	1.0×	0.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$5.7B	$5.7B	$5.7B	$5.7B	$5.4B	$5.4B	$5.6B	$5.6B	$5.7B	$5.7B	$5.7B	GoodwillGoodwill
$52.2B	$54.4B	$57.0B	$61.7B	$64.1B	$67.5B	$68.1B	$71.0B	$77.2B	$77.9B	$80.6B	Total assetsAssets
$23.7B	$24.6B	$26.2B	$27.6B	$29.9B	$29.5B	$28.3B	$28.7B	$31.9B	$34.4B	$33.9B	Total debtDebt
$23.6B	$24.6B	$25.8B	$27.3B	$28.8B	$26.7B	$28.2B	$28.6B	$31.3B	$33.4B	$33.7B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
3.6×	4.0×	4.9×	4.9×	3.9×	4.8×	5.6×	5.5×	5.4×	5.2×	5.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
											Per share
2.09B	2.15B	2.19B	2.20B	2.20B	2.20B	2.20B	2.19B	2.19B	2.19B	2.19B	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$11.02	$13.57	$16.71	$14.89	$12.35	$18.52	$26.46	$22.66	$25.65	$24.04	$23.58	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.20	$1.30	$1.91	$2.09	$1.71	$2.10	$2.50	$2.52	$2.69	$2.66	$2.70	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.20	$1.40	$1.98	$2.08	$1.73	$3.09	$2.76	$2.60	$2.80	$2.97	$2.56	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.52	$0.73	$0.87	$0.90	$1.18	$2.86	$2.76	$1.96	$1.63	$1.36	$1.01	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.43	$1.44	$1.93	$2.06	$1.49	$1.01	$0.89	$1.49	$2.07	$2.57	$2.53	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+9.1%/yr	+14.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+10.6%/yr	+11.4%/yr
EPS	+9.2%/yr	+9.1%/yr
Capital spending / share	+6.7%/yr	+11.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

2.2Bpeak FY2021

Gross margin

27%low FY2022

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

5.1×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$6.5Bowner earningsvs.$5.8Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $6.5B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2.1B it takes just to hold its position. It put $3.5B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $3.0B.

Reported net income$5.8B

Owner earnings$6.5B · 12% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$5.8B	$5.9B	$5.5B	$5.5B	$4.6B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$2.1B	+$2.0B	+$1.9B	+$1.8B	+$1.7B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$688M	+$244M	+$180M	+$773M	+$2.2B
Cash from operations	$8.6B	$8.1B	$7.6B	$8.0B	$8.5B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$2.1B	−$2.0B	−$1.9B	−$2.0B	−$1.7B
Owner earnings	$6.5B	$6.1B	$5.7B	$6.1B	$6.8B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$3.5B	−$2.6B	−$1.4B	—	−$518M
Free cash flow	$3.0B	$3.6B	$4.3B	$6.1B	$6.3B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	12%	11%	11%	10%	17%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2.1B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $3.5B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 5.2×

Comfortable

Operating income $7.3B ÷ interest expense $1.4B

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $33.4B · 4.6× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $969M − debt $34.4B

What this means
Netting $969M of cash and short-term investments against $34.4B of debt leaves $33.4B owed, about 4.6× a year's operating profit (4.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 78d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 48 + DIO 37 − DPO 7 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin 11%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 10%–17%; latest $6.5B = operating cash $8.6B − maintenance capex $2.1B

Industry peers: median 13%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 12% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. It chose to put $3.5B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $3.0B — the gap is investment, not weakness.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.48×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $8.6B ÷ net income $5.8B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 5%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $300M ÷ Owner Earnings $6.5B

What this means
Of $6.5B Owner Earnings, $300M (5%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $300M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 2.69×

Expanding

Capex $5.6B ÷ depreciation $2.1B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $52.6B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.04×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $34.4B vs $528M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +82%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.66/share (latest year $2.69), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Operating margin 15% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 15% early, 14% lately, median 14%.
Owner earnings growth +10%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 10% a year over the record.
Worst year 2022 · 11.9% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +0.5%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$15.7B

Cash & short-term investments$191M
Receivables$6.6B
Inventory$5.2B
Other current assets$3.6B

Current liabilities$17.2B

Debt due within a year$2.7B
Accounts payable$750M
Other current liabilities$13.8B

Current ratio0.91×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.61×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.01×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($1.5B)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$2.7B due · $191M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−6.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.9×

Deeper floors

Debt incl. operating leases$34.4B$451M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$435Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$34.7B

'27$1.6B

'28$1.6B

'29$1.8B

'30$1.3B

later$1.3B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$34.7Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$36.3Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$34.7Bin 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$42.2Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$191M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$6.5B

Together, against $34.7B due next year0.19×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $6.7B against the $34.7B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: about 19% of it, so the near maturities lean on refinancing or the rest of the year’s cash.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $68.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$35.7B · 52%
Buybacks$1.5B · 2%
Retained (debt / cash)$30.9B · 45%

Returned to owners$1.5B
3% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.5B as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $10.2B and cash and short-term investments rose $128M.
Average price paid for buybacks$28.79
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 28M shares were bought for $819M, about $28.79 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $24.90 (2018) to $31.59 (2025), and 2025, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($300M).
Net change in share count4.7%
The diluted count rose from 2089M to 2187M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained6%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($43.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $2.8B, so each retained $1 added about 0.06 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$9.9B13% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$5.5Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $35.7B of capital spent building

$296M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership32.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2022 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Enterprise Products Partners L.P. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?4.7%
Diluted shares grew 4.7% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $1.5B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $1.9B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Pipelines & Midstream

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
ETEnergy Transfer LP Common	$85.5B	25%	10.3%	8%	8%
EPDEnterprise Products Partners L.P.	$52.6B	27%	14.4%	—	12%
OKEONEOK Inc.	$33.6B	29%	15.8%	8%	13%
NRGNRG Energy	$30.3B	24%	7.6%	13%	9%
LNGCheniere Energy Inc.	$19.5B	45%	25.7%	19%	18%
TRGPTarga Resources Inc.	$17.0B	19%	4.0%	5%	8%
KMIKinder Morgan Inc.	$15.2B	68%	27.8%	5%	20%
WMBWilliams Companies Inc. (The)	$14.9B	77%	22.1%	6%	20%
Group median	—	28%	15.1%	—	12%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Enterprise Products Partners L.P. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Enterprise Products Partners L.P. earns about $6.1B on its 11.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 12.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($6.1B) Net of stock comp Steady-state · maintenance capex ($5.7B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−0%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+11%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $2.2B on 2164M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $33.7B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($5.5B) runs well above depreciation ($2.1B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $5.7B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh EPD against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Enterprise Products Partners L.P. (EPD), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EPD, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← EPC its page in the Manual EPR →

Industry order: ← DTM the Pipelines & Midstream chapter ET →