What it is: A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 8.1% and operating margin about 3.2% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 0.9% to 6.1% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Inventory runs near 13% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Product 2 is 61% of revenue, with Banana the other meaningful segment at 35%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Product 261%$2.6B
Banana35%$1.5B
Totals5%$210M

By geographyNorth America59%Europe21%Middle East10%Asia9%Other2%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
										Income statement
$4.0B	$4.1B	$4.5B	$4.5B	$4.3B	$4.4B	$4.3B	$4.3B	$4.3B	$4.3B	RevenueRevenue
12%	8%	6%	7%	7%	8%	8%	8%	9%	9%	Gross marginGross mgn
5%	4%	4%	4%	5%	4%	4%	5%	5%	5%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$244M	$153M	$39M	$114M	$111M	$156M	$59M	$196M	$137M	$113M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
6.1%	3.7%	0.9%	2.5%	2.6%	3.5%	1.4%	4.6%	3.2%	2.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$225M	$121M	($22M)	$67M	$80M	$99M	($11M)	$142M	$91M	$70M	Net incomeNet inc.
5%	17%	—	24%	2%	17%	—	17%	29%	35%	Effective tax rateTax rate
										Cash flow & returns
$345M	$194M	$247M	$169M	$129M	$62M	$178M	$183M	$245M	$243M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$79M	$80M	$101M	$98M	$97M	$93M	$85M	$79M	$73M	$70M	DepreciationDeprec.
$16M	($19M)	$157M	($4M)	($56M)	($136M)	$95M	($45M)	$72M	$93M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$147M	$139M	$151M	$122M	$99M	$48M	$58M	$52M	$64M	$68M	CapexCapex
3.7%	3.4%	3.3%	2.7%	2.3%	1.1%	1.3%	1.2%	1.5%	1.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$198M	$56M	$96M	$47M	$30M	$14M	$120M	$131M	$181M	$175M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
4.9%	1.4%	2.1%	1.0%	0.7%	0.3%	2.8%	3.1%	4.2%	4.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$198M	$56M	$96M	$47M	$30M	$14M	$120M	$131M	$181M	$175M	Free cash flowFCF
4.9%	1.4%	2.1%	1.0%	0.7%	0.3%	2.8%	3.1%	4.2%	4.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$9M	$0	$358M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$28M	$30M	$29M	$7M	$24M	$29M	$36M	$48M	$57M	$57M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$108M	$142M	$29M	$18M	$0	$0	$12M	$0	$30M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
11%	6%	—	4%	5%	5%	—	7%	5%	3%	ROICROIC
13%	7%	-1%	4%	4%	5%	-1%	7%	4%	3%	Return on equityROE
11%	5%	−3%	3%	3%	4%	−2%	5%	2%	1%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$20M	$25M	$21M	$33M	$16M	$17M	$34M	$33M	$36M	$66M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$349M	$359M	$378M	$364M	$343M	$374M	$387M	$393M	$376M	$434M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$493M	$542M	$565M	$552M	$603M	$669M	$600M	$595M	$582M	$728M	InventoryInvent.
$163M	$183M	$331M	$285M	$320M	$296M	$243M	$228M	$238M	$519M	Accounts payablePayables
$680M	$718M	$613M	$631M	$626M	$747M	$744M	$761M	$720M	$644M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$961M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.4B	Current assetsCur. assets
$369M	$394M	$586M	$563M	$629M	$607M	$541M	$533M	$529M	$588M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.6×	2.6×	1.9×	1.9×	1.7×	2.0×	2.1×	2.1×	2.2×	2.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$261M	$262M	$423M	$424M	$424M	$423M	$402M	$396M	$390M	$390M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.7B	$2.8B	$3.3B	$3.3B	$3.4B	$3.5B	$3.2B	$3.1B	$3.1B	$3.4B	Total assetsAssets
$269M	$396M	$725M	$587M	$528M	$547M	$406M	$249M	$176M	$725M	Total debtDebt
$249M	$370M	$704M	$554M	$512M	$530M	$372M	$216M	$141M	$659M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
59.6×	23.9×	1.6×	4.5×	5.5×	6.4×	2.4×	10.7×	12.3×	11.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.0B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$3M	$900K	$11M	—	—	—	$22M	$1M	$7M	$7M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
										Per share
52.0M	50.6M	48.6M	48.4M	47.7M	47.9M	48.0M	48.0M	48.2M	47.9M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$77.20	$80.77	$92.42	$92.76	$89.14	$92.66	$90.05	$89.10	$89.76	$89.16	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$4.33	$2.39	$-0.45	$1.37	$1.68	$2.06	$-0.24	$2.96	$1.88	$1.45	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.81	$1.10	$1.98	$0.97	$0.63	$0.29	$2.51	$2.72	$3.77	$3.65	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.81	$1.10	$1.98	$0.97	$0.63	$0.29	$2.51	$2.72	$3.77	$3.65	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.54	$0.59	$0.60	$0.14	$0.50	$0.60	$0.75	$1.00	$1.19	$1.19	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.82	$2.74	$3.10	$2.53	$2.06	$1.00	$1.20	$1.08	$1.32	$1.42	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$34.48	$34.94	$34.80	$35.52	$37.78	$39.73	$39.52	$41.43	$41.87	$42.09	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+1.7%/yr	+0.2%/yr (4-yr)
Owner earnings / share	−0.1%/yr	+56.4%/yr (4-yr)
EPS	−8.8%/yr	+2.9%/yr (4-yr)
Dividends / share	+9.1%/yr	+24.5%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share	−8.1%/yr	−10.5%/yr (4-yr)
Book value / share	+2.2%/yr	+2.6%/yr (4-yr)

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

48Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

5%low FY2019

Gross margin

9%low FY2018

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

0.8×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$181Mowner earningsvs.$91Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $91M of profit into $181M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$91M

Owner earnings$181M · 4% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$91M	$142M	($11M)	$99M	$80M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$73M	+$79M	+$85M	+$93M	+$97M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$10M	+$7M	+$10M	+$7M	+$8M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$72M	−$45M	+$95M	−$136M	−$56M
Cash from operations	$245M	$183M	$178M	$62M	$129M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$64M	−$52M	−$58M	−$48M	−$99M
Owner earnings	$181M	$131M	$120M	$14M	$30M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	4%	3%	3%	0%	1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $10M), owner earnings is nearer $171M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 12.3×

Comfortable

Operating income $137M ÷ interest expense $11M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $689M · 5.0× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $36M − debt $725M

What this means
Netting $36M of cash and short-term investments against $725M of debt leaves $689M owed, about 5.0× a year's operating profit (5.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 64d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 32 + DIO 54 − DPO 22 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 5%

Below average through the cycle

7-yr median, range 4%–11%; 4% latest = NOPAT $97M ÷ invested capital $2.7B

Industry peers: median 14%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 2%

Thin through the cycle

9-yr median margin, range 0%–5%; latest $181M = operating cash $245M − maintenance capex $64M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $10M of SBC) leaves $171M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.70×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $245M ÷ net income $91M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 48%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $87M ÷ Owner Earnings $181M

What this means
Of $181M Owner Earnings, $87M (48%) went back to shareholders, $57M dividends, $30M buybacks. Net of $10M stock comp, the real buyback was about $20M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.88×

Maintaining

Capex $64M ÷ depreciation $73M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.16×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Near

Debt ≤ working capital · $725M vs $612M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (9-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (9)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −32%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.55/share (latest year $1.91), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $42.38/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 9

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 4% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 4% early, 3% lately, median 3%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +2%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 2% a year over the record.
Worst year 2018 · 0.9% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −0.8%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“While AI is not the sole driver of our business performance, our ability to operate efficiently and remain competitive may depend in part on the effective implementation and use of such technologies.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 27, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.4B

Cash & short-term investments$66M
Receivables$434M
Inventory$728M
Other current assets$148M

Current liabilities$588M

Accounts payable$519M
Other current liabilities$69M

Current ratio2.34×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.10×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.11×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$789Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−4.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 2.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.6Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$4MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$895M$170M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$878M · 50%
Dividends$288M · 16%
Buybacks$339M · 19%
Retained (debt / cash)$246M · 14%

Returned to owners$627M
72% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $288M as dividends and $339M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $456M and cash and short-term investments rose $46M.
Average price paid for buybacks$43.86
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 7M shares were bought for $328M, about $43.86 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $24.76 (2019) to $50.32 (2017), and 2017, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($142M).
Net change in share count−7.9%
The diluted count fell from 52M to 48M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$1.19/sh
Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 10% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained17%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($164M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $28M, so each retained $1 added about 0.17 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Abu-Ghazaleh	$5.5M	$5.7M	$30M
2022	Mr. Abu-Ghazaleh	$6.1M	$5.4M	$14M
2023	Mr. Abu-Ghazaleh	$4.4M	$4.3M	$120M
2024	Mr. Abu-Ghazaleh	$8.9M	$9.8M	$131M
2025	Mr. Abu-Ghazaleh	$10.1M	$11.3M	$181M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$10M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Del Monte Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$269M → $725M
Debt rose from $269M to $725M while owner earnings went from about $117M to $144M — about 2.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.0 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?21% → 27% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $842M to $1.2B while revenue grew 6%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (21% of revenue then, 27% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 9 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 9 years, $306M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (capital-intensive), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CTVACorteva Inc. Common Stock	$17.4B	41%	7.4%	5%	8%
HEIHeico Corp.	$4.5B	39%	21.1%	14%	18%
AYIAcuity	$4.3B	42%	12.7%	19%	11%
DFHDream Finders Homes Inc.	$4.3B	16%	7.8%	41%	3%
FDPDel Monte Corporation	$4.3B	8%	3.2%	5%	2%
GTLSChart Industries	$4.3B	30%	7.3%	5%	5%
MLIMueller Industries	$4.2B	16%	13.8%	25%	8%
PNRPentair plc. Ordinary Share	$4.2B	35%	15.0%	13%	16%
Group median	—	32%	10.2%	14%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Del Monte Corporation has delivered.

Del Monte Corporation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Del Monte Corporation earns about $92M on its 2.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($92M) Net of stock comp (−$10M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+63%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+2%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $175M on 48M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $659M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh FDP against another business →

The owners of FDP: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Del Monte Corporation (FDP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FDP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FDMT its page in the Manual FDS →

Industry order: ← DOLE the Agricultural Products chapter LND →