Owner Scorecard


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LND, BrasilAgro – Brazilian Agricultural Real Estate Company

Agricultural Products capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclical

Revenue is led by Agricultural activity Grains (49%) and Sugarcane (37%), with 3 more segments behind.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · figures as filed, in BRL · 1 ADS = 1 ordinary share
LND · BrasilAgro – Brazilian Agricultural Real Estate Company
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
R$877M
+13.8% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue R$877M 5-yr avg R$877M
Operating margin 23.5% 5-yr avg 39.3%
Owner-earnings margin 5% 5-yr avg 10%
Free cash flow margin −1% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 31% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −20% and 66% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 28% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

The largest slice of sales is Agricultural activity Grains at 49%, but the profit engine is Real estate: 1% of revenue and 57% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Cotton ran a R$16M operating loss; Other ran a R$21M operating loss.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
Operating profit profitable segments only
  • Agricultural activity Grains49%R$432M12% of profit
  • Sugarcane37%R$322M25% of profit
  • Cotton10%R$88Mloss of R$16M
  • Cattle raising3%R$25M6% of profit
  • Real estate1%R$9M57% of profit
  • Other0%R$591Kloss of R$21M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2025
Income statement
R$147MR$147MR$244MR$358MR$488MR$663MR$1.2BR$903MR$771MR$877MR$877MRevenueRevenue
(R$29M)(R$185K)R$161MR$187MR$164MR$394MR$690MR$276MR$186MR$206MR$206MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−19.7%−0.1%65.8%52.2%33.7%59.4%59.1%30.5%24.1%23.5%23.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
R$8MR$27MR$126MR$177M(R$6M)(R$9M)R$520MR$269MR$227MR$138M(R$9M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
(R$6M)R$65M(R$2M)R$51MR$60MR$117MR$205MR$156MR$79MR$72MR$72MOperating cash flowOp. cash
R$22MR$15MR$23MR$23MR$60MR$110MR$83MR$21MR$30MR$75MR$30MDepreciationDeprec.
(R$36M)R$23M(R$152M)(R$149M)R$6MR$16M(R$398M)(R$134M)(R$177M)(R$141M)R$51MWorking capital & otherWC & other
R$19MR$51MR$61MR$68MR$80MR$80MCapexCapex
2.8%4.4%6.7%8.9%9.1%9.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
R$99MR$154MR$135MR$50M(R$8M)R$42MOwner earningsOwner earn.
14.9%13.2%14.9%6.5%−1.0%4.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
R$99MR$154MR$95MR$11M(R$8M)(R$8M)Free cash flowFCF
14.9%13.2%10.5%1.4%−1.0%−1.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
R$81MR$32MR$13MR$41MR$50MR$42MR$460MR$320MR$319MR$156MR$156MDividends paidDiv. paid
1%4%17%20%-1%-0%23%12%10%6%-0%Return on equityROE
−11%−1%15%15%−5%−2%3%−2%−4%−1%−8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
R$54MR$51MR$116MR$111MR$171MR$1.1BR$530MR$384MR$171MR$143MR$238MCash & investmentsCash+inv
R$54MR$95MR$125MR$111MR$187MR$442MR$430MR$415MR$429MR$429MReceivablesReceiv.
R$23MR$70MR$97MR$139MR$266MR$290MR$214MR$234MR$294MR$294MInventoryInvent.
R$56MR$106MR$93MR$111MR$187MR$253MR$176MR$174MR$176MR$176MAccounts payablePayables
R$21MR$58MR$129MR$139MR$266MR$479MR$468MR$474MR$547MR$547MOperating working capitalOper. WC
R$171MR$372MR$441MR$617MR$1.6BR$1.3BR$1.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
R$157MR$203MR$227MR$400MR$661MR$484MR$632MR$527MR$658MR$658MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×1.8×1.9×1.5×3.3×2.1×2.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
R$2MR$1MR$2MR$47KR$1MGoodwillGoodwill
R$883MR$1.2BR$1.4BR$2.0BR$3.4BR$3.3BR$3.5BR$3.6BR$3.8BR$3.8BTotal assetsAssets
-0.2×-0.0×1.2×0.6×0.4×0.4×1.9×0.8×0.6×0.5×0.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
R$687MR$667MR$756MR$881MR$1.1BR$2.2BR$2.2BR$2.2BR$2.2BR$2.2BR$2.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
39K38K35.8M35.9M37.8M46.4M65.9M65.9M66.4M66.4M63.3MShares out (diluted)Shares
R$3790.20R$3849.80R$6.82R$9.98R$12.90R$14.28R$17.73R$13.71R$11.61R$13.21R$13.86Revenue / shareRev/sh
R$205.81R$715.66R$3.53R$4.94R$-0.15R$-0.19R$7.89R$4.08R$3.42R$2.08R$-0.14EPS (diluted)EPS
R$2.13R$2.34R$2.05R$0.75R$-0.13R$0.66Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
R$2.13R$2.34R$1.44R$0.17R$-0.13R$-0.13Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
R$2078.13R$839.69R$0.36R$1.14R$1.32R$0.90R$6.98R$4.86R$4.80R$2.35R$2.46Dividends / shareDiv/sh
R$0.40R$0.77R$0.92R$1.03R$1.20R$1.26Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
R$17710.55R$17490.99R$21.09R$24.55R$29.68R$47.01R$33.63R$33.36R$32.82R$32.79R$34.40Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×939.01 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.42 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Share counts before TTM are restated ×1/1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−46.7%/yr+0.5%/yr
EPS−40.0%/yr
Dividends / share−52.9%/yr+12.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+31.5%/yr (4-yr)+31.5%/yr (4-yr)
Book value / share−50.3%/yr+2.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
100Mpeak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

(R$8M)owner earningsvs.R$138Mnet incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported R$138M of profit but (R$8M) of owner earnings: R$146M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net incomeR$138MR$227MR$269MR$520M(R$9M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+R$75M+R$30M+R$21M+R$83M+R$110M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−R$141M−R$177M−R$134M−R$398M+R$16M
Cash from operationsR$72MR$79MR$156MR$205MR$117M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−R$80M−R$30M−R$21M−R$51M−R$19M
Owner earnings(R$8M)R$50MR$135MR$154MR$99M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−R$39M−R$40M
Free cash flow(R$8M)R$11MR$95MR$154MR$99M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-1%6%15%13%15%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income R$206M ÷ interest expense R$418M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Debt under-captured — leverage unknown, not low
    What this means

    This company pays far more interest than its tagged debt implies (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so its net cash or net debt cannot be read honestly: the gap is unknown, not zero, and 'net cash' here would be exactly the fiction the figure is meant to prevent. Judge it on the record and owner earnings instead.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 179 + DIO 128 − DPO 77 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Debt under-captured
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    This company's interest bill implies far more debt than its filings tag at the consolidated level (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so invested capital, and the return on it, cannot be read honestly. Judge this one on Owner Earnings and the record instead.

  • Solid through the cycle
    5-yr median margin, range -1%–15%; latest R$42M = operating cash R$72M − maintenance capex R$30M
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 5 years. It chose to put R$50M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (R$8M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income (R$9M) · cash from operations R$72M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks R$156M ÷ Owner Earnings R$42M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against R$42M of Owner Earnings, R$156M (372%) went back to shareholders, R$156M dividends, R$0 buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.70×
    Expanding
    Capex R$80M ÷ depreciation R$30M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size
    Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · R$877M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.05×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt
    Debt ≤ working capital ·
    What this means

    The filings tag only a fraction of the debt this company's interest bill implies (much of it sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so this test can't be run honestly.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +292%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are R$2119.57/share (latest year R$-86.85), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is R$21861.45/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin 15% → 26% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 15% early to 26% lately, median 31% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Owner earnings growth −36%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 36% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · −19.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Jun 30, 2023

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assetsR$1.3B
  • Cash & short-term investmentsR$238M
  • ReceivablesR$429M
  • InventoryR$294M
  • Other current assetsR$389M
Current liabilitiesR$658M
  • Accounts payableR$176M
  • Other current liabilitiesR$482M
Current ratio2.05×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.60×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.36×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capitalR$691Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueR$2.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(R$310M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesR$955MR$426M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2021–2025

Over the record, the business generated R$629M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • ReinvestedR$279M · 44%
  • DividendsR$1.3B · 206%
  • Returned to ownersR$1.3B

    302% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, R$1.3B as dividends and R$0 as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−R$946M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran R$946M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from R$341M to R$530M, and cash and short-term investments drew down R$821M.

  • Net change in share count36.3%

    The diluted count rose from 46M to 63M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend recordR$2.35/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 27% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why BrasilAgro – Brazilian Agricultural Real Estate Company is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

All 3 tests turned up something to look into. A record that trips every wire is one to understand slowly.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.7% vs 14.0%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 14.0% early in the record and 2.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?36.3%

    Diluted shares grew 36.3% over 2021–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.54×

    Across the record the business reported R$1.5B of net income but generated R$797M of operating cash, a 0.54-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈R$562M · 64% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “Of these three customers, one accounts for 64 % of the revenues from the sugarcane segment and two account for 50 % of the revenues from the grain/cotton segments.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Agricultural Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CTVACorteva Inc. Common Stock$17.4B41%7.4%5%8%
DMCDel Monte Corporation$4.3B8%3.2%5%2%
LNDBrasilAgro – Brazilian Agricultural Real Estate CompanyR$877M32.1%13%
VFFVillage Farms International Inc.$216M13%-3.6%-4%-1%
Group median5.3%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing one ordinary”; BrasilAgro – Brazilian Agricultural Real Estate Company reports in BRL, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at BRL 1 = $0.197 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in BRL.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what BrasilAgro – Brazilian Agricultural Real Estate Company has delivered.

BrasilAgro – Brazilian Agricultural Real Estate Company’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, BrasilAgro – Brazilian Agricultural Real Estate Company earns about $23M on its 13.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−36%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($2M) on 0M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $57M. The if-converted diluted count is 63M, 63447% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($16M) runs well above depreciation ($6M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $8M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "BrasilAgro – Brazilian Agricultural Real Estate Company (LND), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LND, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LKFT its page in the Manual LOMA →

Industry order: ← FDP the Agricultural Products chapter PFAI →