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LND, BrasilAgro – Brazilian Agricultural Real Estate Company
Revenue is led by Agricultural activity Grains (49%) and Sugarcane (37%), with 3 more segments behind.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 31% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −20% and 66% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 28% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →The largest slice of sales is Agricultural activity Grains at 49%, but the profit engine is Real estate: 1% of revenue and 57% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Cotton ran a R$16M operating loss; Other ran a R$21M operating loss.
- Agricultural activity Grains49%R$432M12% of profit
- Sugarcane37%R$322M25% of profit
- Cotton10%R$88Mloss of R$16M
- Cattle raising3%R$25M6% of profit
- Real estate1%R$9M57% of profit
- Other0%R$591Kloss of R$21M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| R$147M | R$147M | R$244M | R$358M | R$488M | R$663M | R$1.2B | R$903M | R$771M | R$877M | R$877M | RevenueRevenue |
| (R$29M) | (R$185K) | R$161M | R$187M | R$164M | R$394M | R$690M | R$276M | R$186M | R$206M | R$206M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −19.7% | −0.1% | 65.8% | 52.2% | 33.7% | 59.4% | 59.1% | 30.5% | 24.1% | 23.5% | 23.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| R$8M | R$27M | R$126M | R$177M | (R$6M) | (R$9M) | R$520M | R$269M | R$227M | R$138M | (R$9M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| (R$6M) | R$65M | (R$2M) | R$51M | R$60M | R$117M | R$205M | R$156M | R$79M | R$72M | R$72M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| R$22M | R$15M | R$23M | R$23M | R$60M | R$110M | R$83M | R$21M | R$30M | R$75M | R$30M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (R$36M) | R$23M | (R$152M) | (R$149M) | R$6M | R$16M | (R$398M) | (R$134M) | (R$177M) | (R$141M) | R$51M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | — | — | — | — | R$19M | R$51M | R$61M | R$68M | R$80M | R$80M | CapexCapex |
| — | — | — | — | — | 2.8% | 4.4% | 6.7% | 8.9% | 9.1% | 9.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| — | — | — | — | — | R$99M | R$154M | R$135M | R$50M | (R$8M) | R$42M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | — | — | — | — | 14.9% | 13.2% | 14.9% | 6.5% | −1.0% | 4.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| — | — | — | — | — | R$99M | R$154M | R$95M | R$11M | (R$8M) | (R$8M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| — | — | — | — | — | 14.9% | 13.2% | 10.5% | 1.4% | −1.0% | −1.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| R$81M | R$32M | R$13M | R$41M | R$50M | R$42M | R$460M | R$320M | R$319M | R$156M | R$156M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 1% | 4% | 17% | 20% | -1% | -0% | 23% | 12% | 10% | 6% | -0% | Return on equityROE |
| −11% | −1% | 15% | 15% | −5% | −2% | 3% | −2% | −4% | −1% | −8% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| R$54M | R$51M | R$116M | R$111M | R$171M | R$1.1B | R$530M | R$384M | R$171M | R$143M | R$238M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | R$54M | R$95M | R$125M | R$111M | R$187M | R$442M | R$430M | R$415M | R$429M | R$429M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | R$23M | R$70M | R$97M | R$139M | R$266M | R$290M | R$214M | R$234M | R$294M | R$294M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | R$56M | R$106M | R$93M | R$111M | R$187M | R$253M | R$176M | R$174M | R$176M | R$176M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | R$21M | R$58M | R$129M | R$139M | R$266M | R$479M | R$468M | R$474M | R$547M | R$547M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | R$171M | R$372M | R$441M | R$617M | — | R$1.6B | R$1.3B | — | — | R$1.3B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | R$157M | R$203M | R$227M | R$400M | R$661M | R$484M | R$632M | R$527M | R$658M | R$658M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.1× | 1.8× | 1.9× | 1.5× | — | 3.3× | 2.1× | — | — | 2.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | R$2M | R$1M | R$2M | R$47K | — | — | — | — | — | R$1M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | R$883M | R$1.2B | R$1.4B | R$2.0B | R$3.4B | R$3.3B | R$3.5B | R$3.6B | R$3.8B | R$3.8B | Total assetsAssets |
| -0.2× | -0.0× | 1.2× | 0.6× | 0.4× | 0.4× | 1.9× | 0.8× | 0.6× | 0.5× | 0.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| R$687M | R$667M | R$756M | R$881M | R$1.1B | R$2.2B | R$2.2B | R$2.2B | R$2.2B | R$2.2B | R$2.2B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 39K | 38K | 35.8M | 35.9M | 37.8M | 46.4M | 65.9M | 65.9M | 66.4M | 66.4M | 63.3M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| R$3790.20 | R$3849.80 | R$6.82 | R$9.98 | R$12.90 | R$14.28 | R$17.73 | R$13.71 | R$11.61 | R$13.21 | R$13.86 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| R$205.81 | R$715.66 | R$3.53 | R$4.94 | R$-0.15 | R$-0.19 | R$7.89 | R$4.08 | R$3.42 | R$2.08 | R$-0.14 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | — | — | — | — | R$2.13 | R$2.34 | R$2.05 | R$0.75 | R$-0.13 | R$0.66 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | — | — | — | — | R$2.13 | R$2.34 | R$1.44 | R$0.17 | R$-0.13 | R$-0.13 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| R$2078.13 | R$839.69 | R$0.36 | R$1.14 | R$1.32 | R$0.90 | R$6.98 | R$4.86 | R$4.80 | R$2.35 | R$2.46 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | — | — | — | — | R$0.40 | R$0.77 | R$0.92 | R$1.03 | R$1.20 | R$1.26 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| R$17710.55 | R$17490.99 | R$21.09 | R$24.55 | R$29.68 | R$47.01 | R$33.63 | R$33.36 | R$32.82 | R$32.79 | R$34.40 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×939.01 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.42 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Share counts before TTM are restated ×1/1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −46.7%/yr | +0.5%/yr |
| EPS | −40.0%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | −52.9%/yr | +12.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +31.5%/yr (4-yr) | +31.5%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | −50.3%/yr | +2.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported R$138M of profit but (R$8M) of owner earnings: R$146M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | R$138M | R$227M | R$269M | R$520M | (R$9M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +R$75M | +R$30M | +R$21M | +R$83M | +R$110M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −R$141M | −R$177M | −R$134M | −R$398M | +R$16M |
| Cash from operations | R$72M | R$79M | R$156M | R$205M | R$117M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −R$80M | −R$30M | −R$21M | −R$51M | −R$19M |
| Owner earnings | (R$8M) | R$50M | R$135M | R$154M | R$99M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | −R$39M | −R$40M | — | — |
| Free cash flow | (R$8M) | R$11M | R$95M | R$154M | R$99M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -1% | 6% | 15% | 13% | 15% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income R$206M ÷ interest expense R$418M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Debt under-captured — leverage unknown, not low
What this means
This company pays far more interest than its tagged debt implies (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so its net cash or net debt cannot be read honestly: the gap is unknown, not zero, and 'net cash' here would be exactly the fiction the figure is meant to prevent. Judge it on the record and owner earnings instead.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 179 + DIO 128 − DPO 77 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Debt under-capturedIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
This company's interest bill implies far more debt than its filings tag at the consolidated level (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so invested capital, and the return on it, cannot be read honestly. Judge this one on Owner Earnings and the record instead.
- Solid through the cycle5-yr median margin, range -1%–15%; latest R$42M = operating cash R$72M − maintenance capex R$30MIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 5 years. It chose to put R$50M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (R$8M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income (R$9M) · cash from operations R$72M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks R$156M ÷ Owner Earnings R$42M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against R$42M of Owner Earnings, R$156M (372%) went back to shareholders, R$156M dividends, R$0 buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.70×ExpandingCapex R$80M ÷ depreciation R$30M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · R$877M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.05×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt —Debt ≤ working capital · —
What this means
The filings tag only a fraction of the debt this company's interest bill implies (much of it sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so this test can't be run honestly.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +292%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are R$2119.57/share (latest year R$-86.85), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is R$21861.45/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin 15% → 26% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 15% early to 26% lately, median 31% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Owner earnings growth −36%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 36% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · −19.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Jun 30, 2023Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investmentsR$238M
- ReceivablesR$429M
- InventoryR$294M
- Other current assetsR$389M
- Accounts payableR$176M
- Other current liabilitiesR$482M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2021–2025
Over the record, the business generated R$629M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- ReinvestedR$279M · 44%
- DividendsR$1.3B · 206%
- Returned to ownersR$1.3B
302% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, R$1.3B as dividends and R$0 as buybacks.
- Source of funding−R$946M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran R$946M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from R$341M to R$530M, and cash and short-term investments drew down R$821M.
- Net change in share count36.3%
The diluted count rose from 46M to 63M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend recordR$2.35/sh
Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 27% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why BrasilAgro – Brazilian Agricultural Real Estate Company is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
All 3 tests turned up something to look into. A record that trips every wire is one to understand slowly.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.7% vs 14.0%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 14.0% early in the record and 2.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?36.3%
Diluted shares grew 36.3% over 2021–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.54×
Across the record the business reported R$1.5B of net income but generated R$797M of operating cash, a 0.54-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈R$562M · 64% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Of these three customers, one accounts for 64 % of the revenues from the sugarcane segment and two account for 50 % of the revenues from the grain/cotton segments.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Agricultural Products
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CTVACorteva Inc. Common Stock | $17.4B | 41% | 7.4% | 5% | 8% |
| DMCDel Monte Corporation | $4.3B | 8% | 3.2% | 5% | 2% |
| LNDBrasilAgro – Brazilian Agricultural Real Estate Company | R$877M | — | 32.1% | — | 13% |
| VFFVillage Farms International Inc. | $216M | 13% | -3.6% | -4% | -1% |
| Group median | — | — | 5.3% | — | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing one ordinary”; BrasilAgro – Brazilian Agricultural Real Estate Company reports in BRL, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at BRL 1 = $0.197 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in BRL.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what BrasilAgro – Brazilian Agricultural Real Estate Company has delivered.
BrasilAgro – Brazilian Agricultural Real Estate Company’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, BrasilAgro – Brazilian Agricultural Real Estate Company earns about $23M on its 13.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($2M) on 0M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $57M. The if-converted diluted count is 63M, 63447% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($16M) runs well above depreciation ($6M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $8M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← LKFT its page in the Manual LOMA →
Industry order: ← FDP the Agricultural Products chapter PFAI →