Owner Scorecard


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FNF, Fidelity National Fin

We are a leading provider of title insurance, escrow and other title-related services, including trust activities, trustee sales guarantees, recordings and reconveyances and home warranty and transaction services to the real estate and mortgage industries.

Through our subsidiary ServiceLink Holdings, LLC ("ServiceLink"), we provide mortgage transaction services including title-related services and facilitation of production and management of mortgage loans.

We are also a leading provider of insurance solutions serving retail annuity and life customers and institutional clients through our majority-owned subsidiary, F&G Annuities & Life, Inc.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
FNF · Fidelity National Fin
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$14.4B
+5.6% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $14.9B 5-yr avg $13.4B
Operating margin 12.7% 5-yr avg 14.0%
ROIC 10% 5-yr avg 17%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 14% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from 7.5% to 24% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on cyclicality & demand, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 17%, above 15% in 7 of 10 years). Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$7.3B$7.7B$7.6B$8.5B$10.8B$15.7B$11.6B$11.8B$13.7B$14.4B$14.9BRevenueRevenue
$1.1B$1.1B$791M$1.4B$1.8B$3.7B$1.8B$883M$1.8B$1.4B$1.9BOperating incomeOp. inc.
14.6%13.8%10.4%16.7%17.1%23.8%16.0%7.5%13.5%9.4%12.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$650M$771M$628M$1.1B$1.4B$2.8B$1.3B$517M$1.3B$602M$762MNet incomeNet inc.
35%23%16%22%18%23%25%27%22%56%54%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$1.2B$737M$943M$1.1B$1.6B$4.1B$4.4B$6.5B$6.8B$5.8B$5.6BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$431M$389M$182M$178M$296M$432M$491M$593M$739M$844M$863MDepreciationDeprec.
$23M($467M)$102M($157M)($145M)$819M$2.5B$5.3B$4.7B$4.3B$3.9BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$0$202M$0$0$1.1B$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$239M$278M$328M$344M$389M$446M$489M$500M$532M$546M$550MDividends paidDiv. paid
$276M$23M$20M$86M$236M$463M$553M$6M$0$251MBuybacksBuybacks
12%20%16%23%18%35%20%8%17%7%10%ROICROIC
11%17%14%20%17%30%21%7%16%8%11%Return on equityROE
7%11%6%13%12%25%13%0%10%1%3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.5B$1.4B$1.7B$2.3B$3.5B$4.9B$4.9B$4.9B$6.5B$4.6B$4.1BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$292M$284M$321M$404M$524M$349M$317M$362M$375M$368MReceivablesReceiv.
$292M$284M$321M$404M$524M$349M$317M$362M$375M$368MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$2.6B$2.7B$2.7B$2.7B$4.5B$4.5B$4.6B$4.8B$5.3B$5.3B$5.2BGoodwillGoodwill
$14.5B$9.2B$9.3B$10.7B$50.5B$61.3B$65.1B$80.6B$95.3B$109.0B$111.5BTotal assetsAssets
$987M$759M$836M$838M$2.7B$3.1B$3.2B$3.9B$4.3B$4.4B$4.4BTotal debtDebt
($544M)($646M)($901M)($1.4B)($826M)($1.8B)($1.6B)($999M)($2.2B)($156M)$280MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
16.6×22.0×18.4×30.1×20.4×32.7×16.1×5.1×8.8×8.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$6.0B$4.4B$4.6B$5.4B$8.4B$9.4B$6.1B$6.9B$7.8B$7.4B$7.3BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.8%0.6%0.4%0.4%0.3%0.4%0.5%0.6%0.6%0.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
278M277M286M287M277M271M273M272M269MShares out (diluted)Shares
$27.32$30.57$37.69$54.55$41.75$43.37$50.11$53.11$55.55Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.26$3.83$4.99$9.75$4.67$1.91$4.65$2.21$2.83EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.18$1.24$1.36$1.55$1.77$1.85$1.95$2.01$2.04Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$16.65$19.43$29.20$32.80$22.08$25.49$28.40$27.29$26.97Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+10.0%/yr (7-yr)+7.1%/yr
EPS−0.3%/yr (7-yr)−15.0%/yr
Dividends / share+7.9%/yr (7-yr)+8.1%/yr
Book value / share+7.3%/yr (7-yr)−1.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
272Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
7%low FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $602M of profit into $5.6B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$602M
Owner earnings$5.6B · 39% of revenue
FY2025
Reported net income$602M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$844M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$88M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$4.3B
Cash from operations$5.8B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$210M
Owner earnings$5.6B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue39%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $88M), owner earnings is nearer $5.5B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $1.6B ÷ interest expense $209M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $2.6B + ST investments $1.9B − debt $4.4B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $156M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 7%–35%; 9% latest = NOPAT $782M ÷ invested capital $9.2B
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High
    Owner earnings $5.6B = operating cash $5.8B − maintenance capex $210M
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 39% of revenue this year. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $88M of SBC) leaves $5.5B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $5.8B ÷ net income $602M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $797M ÷ Owner Earnings $5.6B
    What this means

    Of $5.6B Owner Earnings, $797M (14%) went back to shareholders, $546M dividends, $251M buybacks. Net of $88M stock comp, the real buyback was about $163M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.25×
    Harvesting
    Capex $210M ÷ depreciation $844M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $14.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity
    Current ratio ≥ 2× ·
    What this means

    Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +17%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.96/share (latest year $2.24), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $27.58/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 7 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 13% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 13% early to 10% lately, median 14% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Worst year 2023 · 7.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.2%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$32M
'27$0
'28$950M
'29$550M
'30$650M
later$2.3B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$32Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$32Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$950Min 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$4.5Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$4.1B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$5.6B
Together, against $32M due next year304.4×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $9.7B against the $32M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 304 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Net income
2021Mr. Nolan$10.5M$13.6M$2.8B
2022Mr. Nolan$7.7M$6.5M$1.3B
2022Mr. Nolan$8.1M$5.0M$1.3B
2023Mr. Nolan$9.9M$12.7M$517M
2024Mr. Nolan$10.6M$11.5M$1.3B
2025Mr. Nolan$11.6M$11.4M$602M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

  • CEO pay ratio137:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$88M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Fidelity National Fin is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?10.1% vs 12.9%

    The operating margin averaged 12.9% early in the record and 10.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Does management own its misses?
    1 plain admission in this year's filing
    “As of December 31, 2025, and 2024, respectively, $1,185 million and $771 million of collateral was posted by our counterparties as they did not meet the net exposure thresholds.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (general), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ACMAECOM$16.1B6%3.6%9%4%
FNFFidelity National Fin$14.4B14.2%17%39%
AMTMAmentum Holdings Inc.$14.4B10%2.5%3%1%
LHLabcorp$14.0B30%11.9%8%9%
DASHDoorDash Inc.$13.7B-12.2%-14%8%
DVADaVita$13.6B14.8%13%11%
GXOGXO Logistics$13.2B1.9%4%2%
BTSGBrightSpring Health Services Inc.$12.9B1.7%6%1%
Group median3.0%7%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Fidelity National Fin has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $5.4B on 269M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $280M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Fidelity National Fin (FNF), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FNF, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FND its page in the Manual FNKO →

Industry order: ← FAF the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter GBLI →