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FOR, Forestar Group Inc Common Stock
Forestar Group Inc. is a national, well-capitalized residential lot development company focused primarily on making investments in land acquisition and development to sell finished single-family residential lots to homebuilders.
We generally secure entitlements while the land is under contract by creating plans that meet the needs of the markets where we operate, and we aim to have all entitlements secured before closing on the investment.
We primarily invest in entitled short-duration projects that can be developed in phases, enabling us to complete and sell lots at a pace that matches market demand, consistent with our focus on maximizing capital efficiency and returns.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 21% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 8.3% to 74% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2015–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2015’15 | 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $203M | $190M | $114M | $428M | $932M | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| ($213M) | $59M | $50M | $33M | $61M | $110M | $179M | $167M | $203M | $168M | $167M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($170M) | ($97M) | ($58M) | $37M | $66M | $110M | $178M | $168M | $197M | $167M | $166M | Funds from operationsFFO |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $619M | $293M | $130M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $130M | Real estate (gross)RE gross |
| $972M | $733M | $762M | $1.5B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.8B | $3.1B | $3.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| 39% | — | 14% | 32% | 37% | 34% | 30% | 28% | 25% | 26% | 25% | Debt / assetsDebt/assets |
| $382M | $110M | $108M | $461M | $641M | $705M | $706M | $695M | $706M | $803M | $794M | Total debtDebt |
| $285M | ($156M) | ($215M) | $78M | $247M | $551M | $441M | $79M | $225M | $424M | $431M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.7× | 7.0× | 4.7× | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $502M | $561M | $604M | $808M | $871M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 34.3M | 42.3M | 42.4M | 42.0M | 48.1M | 49.0M | 49.8M | 50.1M | 50.8M | 51.1M | 51.2M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $-4.95 | $-2.28 | $-1.36 | $0.87 | $1.36 | $2.25 | $3.58 | $3.36 | $3.88 | $3.27 | $3.24 | FFO / shareFFO/sh |
| $14.64 | $13.24 | $14.26 | $19.24 | $18.11 | $20.72 | $24.04 | $27.31 | $31.38 | $34.62 | $35.53 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 10-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +18.6%/yr | +10.9%/yr |
| EPS | — | +21.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −20.5%/yr | +28.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +9.0%/yr | +13.8%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2015–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $424M · 10.7× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $379M − debt $803M
What this means
Netting $379M of cash and short-term investments against $803M of debt leaves $424M owed, about 10.7× a year's operating profit (20.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle8-yr median, range 4%–12%; 1% latest = NOPAT $30M ÷ invested capital $2.2BIndustry peers: median 3%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -92%–32%; latest ($200M) = operating cash ($198M) − maintenance capex $2MIndustry peers: median 23%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -12% of revenue this year, a -12% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $7M of SBC) leaves ($207M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? -1.18×Thinly cash-backedCash from ops ($198M) ÷ net income $168M
In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record — about 9% of assets a year, among the widest gaps in the catalogue. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.63×HarvestingCapex $2M ÷ depreciation $4M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.7B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.52/share (latest year $3.29), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $34.66/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2015–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 40% → 16% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 40% early to 16% lately, median 13% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 10%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Worst year 2020 · 8.3% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +4.1%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Daniel C. Bartok | $2.3M | $2.3M | ($305M) |
| 2022 | Daniel C. Bartok | $2.7M | $2.3M | $106M |
| 2023 | Daniel C. Bartok | $2.6M | $3.6M | $363M |
| 2024 | Anthony W. Oxley | $2.8M | $3.4M | ($161M) |
| 2024 | Daniel C. Bartok | $993k | $1.2M | ($161M) |
| 2025 | Anthony W. Oxley | $4.2M | $3.4M | ($200M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio25:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$7M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 18% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Real Estate Development & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CWKCushman & Wakefield Ltd. | $10.3B | — | 2.2% | 4% | 1% |
| INVHInvitation Homes Inc. | $2.7B | — | 11.2% | 1% | 37% |
| FORForestar Group Inc Common Stock | $1.7B | 21% | 14.3% | 7% | -11% |
| HPPHudson Pacific Properties | $831M | — | 14.0% | 2% | -5% |
| MRPMillrose Properties Inc. | $600M | — | 80.9% | 6% | — |
| TRNOTerreno Realty | $476M | — | 37.6% | 3% | 37% |
| UEUrban Edge Properties | $472M | — | 38.1% | 8% | 10% |
| OPIOffice Properties Income Trust | $443M | — | 21.5% | 3% | 36% |
| Group median | — | — | 17.9% | 3% | 10% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Forestar Group Inc Common Stock has delivered.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $265M on 51M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-17; net debt $431M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← FOCL its page in the Manual FORM →
Industry order: ← DUO the Real Estate Development & Services chapter FPH →