Share count
235Mpeak FY2025
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CWK, Cushman & Wakefield Ltd.
Cushman & Wakefield Ltd. is a leading global commercial real estate services firm driven to solve complex problems for real estate occupiers and investors.
Cushman & Wakefield Ltd. is focused on meeting the increasing demands of our clients through comprehensive global offerings including (i) Services, (ii) Leasing, (iii) Capital markets and (iv) Valuation and other services.
Today, Cushman & Wakefield is one of the top three real estate services providers as measured by revenue and workforce.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$10.3B
+8.9% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $10.5B 5-yr avg $9.7B
Revenue $2.5B +11.0% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 2.3% yr-ago 2.0%
Net income ($13M) yr-ago $2M
Net margin −0.5% yr-ago 0.1%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Americas (73%), APAC (17%) and EMEA (10%).
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 2.1% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −4.8% to 5.3% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Americas is 73% of revenue, with APAC the other meaningful segment at 17%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Americas73%$7.5B
- APAC17%$1.7B
- EMEA10%$1.1B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $6.2B | $6.9B | $8.2B | $8.8B | $7.8B | $9.4B | $10.1B | $9.5B | $9.4B | $10.3B | $10.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| ($434M) | ($221M) | ($186M) | $200K | ($221M) | $250M | $196M | ($35M) | $131M | $88M | $74M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($174M) | $49M | $104M | $297M | $43M | $422M | $343M | $110M | $254M | $192M | $177M | Funds from operationsFFO |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| — | $5.8B | $6.5B | $7.2B | $7.3B | $7.9B | $7.9B | $7.8B | $7.5B | $7.7B | $7.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | 49% | 41% | 37% | 45% | 41% | 41% | 42% | 40% | 36% | 43% | Debt / assetsDebt/assets |
| — | $2.8B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $3.3B | $3.3B | $3.3B | $3.2B | $3.0B | $2.7B | $3.3B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $2.4B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.2B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $2.7B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -1.7× | -0.9× | 0.1× | 1.2× | -0.3× | 2.8× | 2.8× | 0.7× | 1.5× | 2.1× | 2.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $586M | $499M | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 141M | 144M | 171M | 225M | 221M | 227M | 228M | 227M | 233M | 235M | 233M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $-1.23 | $0.34 | $0.61 | $1.32 | $0.20 | $1.86 | $1.51 | $0.49 | $1.09 | $0.82 | $0.76 | FFO / shareFFO/sh |
| $4.14 | $3.47 | $7.94 | $5.80 | $4.96 | $6.39 | $7.29 | $7.39 | $7.54 | $8.33 | $8.39 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −0.0%/yr | +4.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −10.5%/yr | +1.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | +8.1%/yr | +10.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
6%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
6.7×peak FY2023
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $453M ÷ interest expense $216M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.5B · 5.5× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $784M − debt $3.3B
What this means
Netting $784M of cash and short-term investments against $3.3B of debt leaves $2.5B owed, about 5.5× a year's operating profit (7.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -5%–9%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin, recently turned positivelatest $293M = operating cash $340M − maintenance capex $47M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -0%)Industry peers: median -1%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a -0% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $58M of SBC) leaves $235M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $340M ÷ net income $88M
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.45×HarvestingCapex $47M ÷ depreciation $104M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $10.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.10×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $3.3B vs $251M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.26/share (latest year $0.38), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.35/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −2% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −2% early to 3% lately, median 2% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 40%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Worst year 2016 · −4.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +5.8%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“We continue to make significant investments in new systems and tools to achieve competitive advantages and efficiencies, including increasingly focusing on the adoption and integration of Artificial Intelligence ("AI"), such as generative AI and advanced analytics, into our core service lines.…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$2.7B
- Cash & short-term investments$601M
- Other current assets$2.1B
Current liabilities$2.4B
- Debt due within a year$126M
- Accounts payable$1.2B
- Other current liabilities$1.1B
Current ratio1.13×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.13×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.25×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$322Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$126M due · $601M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+11.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($752M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.2B$467M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $3.6B (annual-report basis)
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Operating leasesFinance leases
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$131Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$439Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$381Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$3.3B
Lease obligations (present value)$381M
Total fixed claims on the business$3.6B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.6B, of which the leases are 10%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$2.7B35% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$622Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $656M of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $20.0M | $31.0M | $496M |
| 2022 | $8.6M | $1.8M | ($2M) |
| 2023 | $4.7M | $3.8M | $101M |
| 2023 | $5.3M | $3.8M | $101M |
| 2024 | $9.7M | $12.6M | $167M |
| 2025 | $9.5M | $15.6M | $293M |
| 2025 | $9.5M | $15.6M | $293M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$58M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 13% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Real Estate Development & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CBRECBRE Group Inc Common Stock Class A | $40.5B | 22% | 4.8% | 12% | 4% |
| CWKCushman & Wakefield Ltd. | $10.3B | — | 2.2% | 4% | 1% |
| COMPCompass Inc. | $7.0B | — | -7.3% | -95% | -1% |
| VACMarriott Vacations Worldwide Corporation | $5.0B | 68% | 10.4% | 6% | 6% |
| AGNTAGNT Inc. | $4.8B | 11% | -0.4% | -14% | 5% |
| OPENOpendoor Technologies Inc | $4.4B | 8% | -6.4% | -20% | -1% |
| NMRKNewmark Group Inc. | $3.3B | — | 10.4% | 14% | -2% |
| FORForestar Group Inc Common Stock | $1.7B | 21% | 14.3% | 7% | -11% |
| Group median | — | — | 3.5% | 5% | -0% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Cushman & Wakefield Ltd. has delivered.
Cushman & Wakefield Ltd.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, Cushman & Wakefield Ltd. earns about $54M on its 0.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−2%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+70%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+70%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $204M on 234M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $2.7B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($55M) runs well above depreciation ($103M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $212M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Cushman & Wakefield Ltd. (CWK), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CWK, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← CWH its page in the Manual CWST →
Industry order: ← CURB the Real Estate Development & Services chapter DUO →