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FSTR, L.B. Foster Company

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L.B. Foster Company is a global technology solutions provider of engineered, manufactured products and services that builds and supports infrastructure.

The Company's innovative engineering and product development solutions address the safety, reliability, and performance needs of its customers' most challenging requirements.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

FSTR · L.B. Foster Company

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$540M

+1.7% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $563M 5-yr avg $525M

Gross margin 21% 5-yr avg 20%

Operating margin 4.6% 5-yr avg 1.8%

ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 3%

Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg 2%

Free cash flow margin 7% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Rail, Technologies, and Services (57%) and Infrastructure Solutions (43%).
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 20% and operating margin about 3.9% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −1.4% to 6.7% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 2 segments, the largest Rail, Technologies, and Services at 57%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Rail, Technologies, and Services57%$306M
Infrastructure Solutions43%$234M

By geographyUnited States89%United Kingdom6%Canada4%Other1%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
										Income statement
$536M	$581M	$616M	$497M	$514M	$497M	$544M	$531M	$540M	$563M	RevenueRevenue
20%	12%	20%	19%	17%	18%	21%	22%	21%	21%	Gross marginGross mgn
15%	14%	13%	15%	15%	17%	18%	18%	16%	16%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$29M	$39M	$37M	$16M	$4M	($7M)	$9M	$21M	$22M	$26M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
5.3%	6.7%	5.9%	3.1%	0.9%	−1.4%	1.7%	3.9%	4.1%	4.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$5M	($31M)	$43M	$8M	$4M	($46M)	$1M	$43M	$8M	$11M	Net incomeNet inc.
47%	—	—	—	24%	—	—	—	57%	49%	Effective tax rateTax rate
										Cash flow & returns
$39M	$26M	$29M	$21M	($810K)	($11M)	$37M	$23M	$36M	$51M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$20M	$15M	$14M	$14M	$14M	$15M	$15M	$14M	$12M	$12M	DepreciationDeprec.
$12M	$38M	($31M)	($2M)	($20M)	$18M	$16M	($38M)	$11M	$22M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$6M	$4M	$6M	$9M	$5M	$8M	$5M	$10M	$10M	$11M	CapexCapex
1.1%	0.6%	1.0%	1.8%	0.9%	1.5%	0.8%	1.8%	1.9%	1.9%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$33M	$22M	$23M	$11M	($5M)	($18M)	$32M	$13M	$25M	$41M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
6.2%	3.8%	3.8%	2.3%	−1.1%	−3.7%	6.0%	2.4%	4.7%	7.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$33M	$22M	$23M	$11M	($5M)	($18M)	$32M	$13M	$25M	$41M	Free cash flowFCF
6.2%	3.8%	3.8%	2.3%	−1.1%	−3.7%	6.0%	2.4%	4.7%	7.2%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$0	$1M	$229K	$58M	$1M	$416K	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$103K	$316K	$621K	$2M	$732K	$410K	$3M	$8M	$17M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	—	—	2%	-3%	—	9%	5%	6%	ROICROIC
3%	-26%	25%	4%	2%	-33%	1%	24%	4%	6%	Return on equityROE
3%	−26%	25%	4%	2%	−33%	1%	24%	4%	6%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$38M	$10M	$14M	$8M	$10M	$3M	$3M	$2M	$4M	$4M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$72M	$82M	$73M	$58M	$56M	—	—	—	—	$56M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$103M	$125M	$118M	$79M	$63M	$76M	$73M	$71M	$60M	$68M	InventoryInvent.
$52M	$78M	$63M	$55M	$41M	$49M	$40M	$50M	$53M	$44M	Accounts payablePayables
$123M	$129M	$129M	$82M	$77M	$27M	$34M	$20M	$8M	$80M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$226M	$227M	$217M	$195M	$179M	$206M	$167M	$162M	$157M	$162M	Current assetsCur. assets
$94M	$124M	$117M	$95M	$86M	$103M	$95M	$88M	$84M	$73M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.4×	1.8×	1.9×	2.0×	2.1×	2.0×	1.8×	1.8×	1.9×	2.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$20M	$19M	$20M	$20M	$20M	$31M	$33M	$32M	$33M	$33M	GoodwillGoodwill
$402M	$383M	$405M	$370M	$343M	$365M	$312M	$335M	$330M	$334M	Total assetsAssets
$130M	$75M	$58M	$45M	$31M	$92M	$55M	$47M	$43M	$60M	Total debtDebt
$92M	$65M	$44M	$37M	$21M	$89M	$53M	$44M	$38M	$56M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
3.5×	6.3×	7.4×	4.2×	1.5×	-2.2×	1.6×	—	—	4.9×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$154M	$122M	$170M	$177M	$183M	$137M	$142M	$178M	$175M	$174M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%	0.7%	0.5%	0.2%	0.4%	0.5%	0.8%	0.7%	0.9%	1.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
10.5M	10.4M	10.6M	10.7M	10.8M	10.7M	11.0M	11.0M	10.9M	10.6M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$51.17	$56.08	$57.91	$46.61	$47.77	$46.41	$49.45	$48.04	$49.62	$53.23	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.51	$-3.01	$4.00	$0.71	$0.34	$-4.25	$0.13	$3.89	$0.69	$1.05	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.17	$2.15	$2.19	$1.07	$-0.51	$-1.70	$2.95	$1.16	$2.32	$3.83	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.17	$2.15	$2.19	$1.07	$-0.51	$-1.70	$2.95	$1.16	$2.32	$3.83	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.59	$0.35	$0.57	$0.86	$0.43	$0.71	$0.41	$0.89	$0.96	$1.02	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$14.74	$11.79	$15.96	$16.57	$17.03	$12.80	$12.93	$16.14	$16.11	$16.40	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−0.4%/yr	+1.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−3.8%/yr	+16.8%/yr
EPS	+3.9%/yr	−0.5%/yr
Capital spending / share	+6.3%/yr	+2.2%/yr
Book value / share	+1.1%/yr	−0.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

11Mpeak FY2024

ROIC

5%low FY2022

Gross margin

21%low FY2018

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

1.5×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$25Mowner earningsvs.$8Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $8M of profit into $25M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$8M

Owner earnings$25M · 5% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$8M	$43M	$1M	($46M)	$4M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$12M	+$14M	+$15M	+$15M	+$14M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$5M	+$4M	+$4M	+$2M	+$2M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$11M	−$38M	+$16M	+$18M	−$20M
Cash from operations	$36M	$23M	$37M	($11M)	($810K)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$10M	−$10M	−$5M	−$8M	−$5M
Owner earnings	$25M	$13M	$32M	($18M)	($5M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	5%	2%	6%	-4%	-1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $5M), owner earnings is nearer $20M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 4.0×

Adequate

Operating income $22M ÷ interest expense $6M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $38M · 1.8× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $4M − debt $43M

What this means
Netting $4M of cash and short-term investments against $43M of debt leaves $38M owed, about 1.8× a year's operating profit (2.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 44d

Tight

DSO 38 + DIO 52 − DPO 45 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 2%

Below average through the cycle

4-yr median, range -3%–9%; 5% latest = NOPAT $11M ÷ invested capital $214M

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 5%

Thin, recently turned positive

latest $25M = operating cash $36M − maintenance capex $10M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (9-yr median 4%)

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $5M of SBC) leaves $20M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 4.72×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $36M ÷ net income $8M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 66%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $17M ÷ Owner Earnings $25M

What this means
Of $25M Owner Earnings, $17M (66%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $17M buybacks. Net of $5M stock comp, the real buyback was about $11M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.84×

Maintaining

Capex $10M ÷ depreciation $12M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $540M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.87×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $43M vs $73M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (9-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +210%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.66/share (latest year $0.72), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.76/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 9

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 6% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 6% early to 3% lately, median 4% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −5%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 5% a year over the record.
Worst year 2022 · −1.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +0.5%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$162M

Cash & short-term investments$4M
Receivables$56M
Inventory$68M
Other current assets$34M

Current liabilities$73M

Accounts payable$44M
Other current liabilities$29M

Current ratio2.22×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.28×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.05×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$89Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+23.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.4× → 2.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$130Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$28M$28M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$9Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $199M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.

Reinvested$62M · 31%
Buybacks$31M · 16%
Retained (debt / cash)$106M · 53%

Returned to owners$31M
23% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $31M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $70M and cash and short-term investments fell $34M.
Average price paid for buybacks$26.92
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $27M, about $26.92 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $19.56 (2023) to $28.35 (2025), and 2025, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($17M).
Net change in share count1.0%
The diluted count barely moved (10M to 11M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid no dividend over the span; it returns cash through buybacks or retains it.
Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$45M13% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity19%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$61Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $62M of capital spent building

$3M written down across 1 year (2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2023	John F. Kasel	$2.9M	$5.2M	$32M
2024	John F. Kasel	$3.1M	$3.6M	$13M
2025	John F. Kasel	$2.9M	$2.8M	$25M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership7.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$5M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 23% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why L.B. Foster Company is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Trading Companies & Distributors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
RSReliance Inc.	$14.3B	29%	8.3%	11%	7%
RYZRyerson Holding Corporation	$4.6B	18%	3.7%	12%	2%
SCSCScanSource	$3.0B	12%	2.8%	8%	2%
BXCBluelinx Holdings Inc.	$3.0B	15%	2.2%	11%	2%
DSGRDistribution Solutions Group Inc.	$2.0B	35%	2.9%	6%	3%
GICGlobal Industrial Company	$1.4B	34%	7.0%	38%	5%
FSTRL.B. Foster Company	$540M	20%	3.9%	3%	4%
ASPNAspen Aerogels Inc.	$271M	17%	-21.1%	-22%	-11%
Group median	—	19%	3.3%	9%	2%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what L.B. Foster Company has delivered.

L.B. Foster Company’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, L.B. Foster Company earns about $20M on its 3.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($20M) Net of stock comp (−$6M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25−5%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $41M on 10M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $56M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh FSTR against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "L.B. Foster Company (FSTR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FSTR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FSS its page in the Manual FSUN →

Industry order: ← FERG the Trading Companies & Distributors chapter FTAI →