Share count
104Mpeak FY2025
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FTAI, FTAI Aviation Ltd.
Trading Companies & Distributors capital-intensive
FTAI Aviation Ltd. is a Cayman Islands exempted company.
We are a leading independent engine maintenance platform focused on the CFM56-5B, CFM56-7B and V2500 aircraft engines which power the 737NG and A320ceo aircraft.
In general, we seek to own a diverse mix of high-quality aviation assets and equipment that generate predictable cash flows through their use in our maintenance platform or through leasing activities.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$2.5B
+44.5% YoY · 53% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.8B 5-yr avg $1.3B
Revenue $831M +65.5% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income $138M yr-ago $102M
Net margin 16.6% yr-ago 20.4%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Aerospace Products (64%) and MRE Contract (13%), with 4 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 30% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −9.1%) on a 57% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 39% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 1 of 8 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Aerospace Products is 64% of revenue, with MRE Contract the other meaningful line at 13%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Aerospace Products64%$1.6B
- MRE Contract13%$336M
- Lease income9%$235M
- Lease income9%$235M
- Maintenance9%$218M
- Asset sales revenue4%$107M
- Other revenue0%$11M
By geographyNorth America50%Europe26%Asia17%Africa4%South America3%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $149M | $185M | $342M | $579M | $298M | $336M | $708M | $1.2B | $1.7B | $2.5B | $2.8B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | 65% | 57% | 52% | 46% | 43% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 8% | 8% | 4% | 3% | 5% | 4% | 2% | 1% | 1% | 0% | 0% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($32M) | ($39M) | ($25M) | ($53M) | ($34M) | ($84M) | $84M | $340M | $238M | $741M | $761M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −21.5% | −21.0% | −7.3% | −9.1% | −11.5% | −24.9% | 11.8% | 29.0% | 13.7% | 29.6% | 26.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($20M) | $134K | $6M | $223M | ($105M) | ($129M) | ($220M) | $212M | ($32M) | $477M | $522M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | 29% | 7% | — | — | — | — | — | 18% | 18% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $31M | $68M | $134M | $151M | $63M | ($22M) | ($21M) | $129M | ($188M) | ($311M) | ($445M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $60M | $86M | $134M | $169M | $141M | $148M | $153M | $170M | $218M | $226M | $219M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($9M) | ($18M) | ($6M) | ($241M) | $27M | ($41M) | $44M | ($255M) | ($380M) | ($1.0B) | ($1.2B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $57M | $116M | $230M | $331M | $265M | $157M | $144M | $6M | $9M | $28M | $30M | CapexCapex |
| 38.6% | 62.7% | 67.2% | 57.2% | 88.9% | 46.9% | 20.4% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 1.1% | 1.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($26M) | ($18M) | ($211K) | ($18M) | ($78M) | ($179M) | ($165M) | $123M | ($197M) | ($338M) | ($475M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −17.8% | −9.5% | −0.1% | −3.1% | −26.2% | −53.5% | −23.3% | 10.5% | −11.4% | −13.5% | −16.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($26M) | ($48M) | ($96M) | ($180M) | ($202M) | ($179M) | ($165M) | $123M | ($197M) | ($338M) | ($475M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −17.8% | −25.7% | −28.1% | −31.1% | −67.7% | −53.5% | −23.3% | 10.5% | −11.4% | −13.5% | −16.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | — | — | $0 | $0 | $627M | $4M | $30M | $148M | $49M | $49M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $100M | $100M | $111M | $114M | $114M | $118M | $128M | $120M | $122M | $128M | $138M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| -2% | -1% | -1% | -2% | -1% | -2% | — | 13% | — | 17% | 18% | ROICROIC |
| -2% | 0% | 1% | 17% | -10% | -11% | -1136% | 121% | -39% | 143% | 121% | Return on equityROE |
| −10% | −10% | −10% | 8% | −20% | −22% | n/m | 53% | −189% | 105% | 89% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $68M | $59M | $100M | $227M | $122M | $138M | $34M | $91M | $115M | $300M | $412M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $21M | $31M | $46M | $49M | $92M | $125M | $99M | $115M | $151M | $210M | $177M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | — | — | — | — | $100M | $164M | $317M | $551M | $1.2B | $1.4B | InventoryInvent. |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $42M | $69M | $208M | $204M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $21M | $31M | $46M | $49M | $92M | $225M | $263M | $390M | $633M | $1.2B | $1.3B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $671M | $1.2B | $2.1B | $2.6B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $182M | $347M | $400M | $494M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 3.7× | 3.5× | 5.3× | 5.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $117M | $117M | $116M | $123M | $123M | $257M | $0 | $5M | $61M | $94M | $94M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $1.5B | $2.0B | $2.6B | $3.2B | $3.4B | $4.9B | $2.4B | $3.0B | $4.0B | $4.4B | $4.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| $268M | $711M | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $2.6B | $2.2B | $2.5B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.5B | Total debtDebt |
| $200M | $652M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.8B | $2.5B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $3.3B | $3.1B | $3.0B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -1.7× | -1.0× | -0.4× | -0.6× | -0.4× | -0.5× | 0.5× | 2.1× | 1.1× | 3.0× | 3.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $1.2B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $19M | $175M | $81M | $334M | $432M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.4% | 0.1% | 0.3% | 0.9% | 0.8% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 75.7M | 75.8M | 83.7M | 86.0M | 86.0M | 89.9M | 99.4M | 100M | 102M | 104M | 104M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.96 | $2.44 | $4.09 | $6.73 | $3.46 | $3.73 | $7.13 | $11.66 | $17.09 | $24.15 | $27.20 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.26 | $0.00 | $0.07 | $2.60 | $-1.22 | $-1.43 | $-2.22 | $2.11 | $-0.32 | $4.60 | $5.00 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.35 | $-0.23 | $-0.00 | $-0.21 | $-0.91 | $-1.99 | $-1.66 | $1.22 | $-1.94 | $-3.26 | $-4.56 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.35 | $-0.63 | $-1.15 | $-2.09 | $-2.35 | $-1.99 | $-1.66 | $1.22 | $-1.94 | $-3.26 | $-4.56 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.32 | $1.32 | $1.32 | $1.32 | $1.32 | $1.31 | $1.29 | $1.19 | $1.20 | $1.23 | $1.33 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.76 | $1.53 | $2.75 | $3.85 | $3.08 | $1.75 | $1.45 | $0.06 | $0.09 | $0.27 | $0.29 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $15.39 | $13.66 | $12.60 | $15.56 | $12.78 | $12.50 | $0.20 | $1.75 | $0.80 | $3.22 | $4.14 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +32.2%/yr | +47.5%/yr |
| Dividends / share | −0.7%/yr | −1.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −10.9%/yr | −38.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | −16.0%/yr | −24.1%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Net income+1588.5%
“Net income (loss) Net income increased by $492.4 million, primarily due to the changes noted above.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
17%low FY2016
Gross margin
46%low FY2025
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($338M)owner earningsvs.$477Mnet incomelow FY2025
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2016FY2023
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $477M of profit but ($338M) of owner earnings: $816M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $477M | ($32M) | $212M | ($220M) | ($129M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$226M | +$218M | +$170M | +$153M | +$148M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$22M | +$6M | +$2M | +$3M | — |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$1.0B | −$380M | −$255M | +$44M | −$41M |
| Cash from operations | ($311M) | ($188M) | $129M | ($21M) | ($22M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$28M | −$9M | −$6M | −$144M | −$157M |
| Owner earnings | ($338M) | ($197M) | $123M | ($165M) | ($179M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -13% | -11% | 10% | -23% | -53% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $22M), owner earnings is nearer ($360M).
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $741M ÷ interest expense $248M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.1B · 4.2× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $300M − debt $3.4B
What this means
Netting $300M of cash and short-term investments against $3.4B of debt leaves $3.1B owed, about 4.2× a year's operating profit (4.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 31 + DIO 323 − DPO 56 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle8-yr median, range -2%–17%; 17% latest = NOPAT $607M ÷ invested capital $3.5BIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 17% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -53%–10%; latest ($338M) = operating cash ($311M) − maintenance capex $28MIndustry peers: median 15%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -13% of revenue this year, a -13% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $22M of SBC) leaves ($360M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? -0.65×Thinly cash-backedCash from ops ($311M) ÷ net income $477M
In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.12×HarvestingCapex $28M ÷ depreciation $226M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $2.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 5.28×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $3.4B vs $1.7B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.14/share (latest year $4.65), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.26/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −17% → 24% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −17% early to 24% lately, median −9% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 28%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Worst year 2021 · −24.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +3.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$2.6B
- Cash & short-term investments$412M
- Receivables$177M
- Inventory$1.4B
- Other current assets$637M
Current liabilities$494M
- Accounts payable$204M
- Other current liabilities$291M
Current ratio5.24×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.48×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.83×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$2.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway0.9 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+65.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.5× → 5.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$325Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.5Bno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $35M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$1.3B · 3859%
- Dividends$1.2B · 3313%
- Returned to owners$1.2B
$1.2B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$2.5B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $2.5B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $268M to $3.5B.
- Net change in share count37.7%
The diluted count rose from 76M to 104M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$1.23/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 1% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$114M3% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity28%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$857Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.3B of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership1.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$22M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why FTAI Aviation Ltd. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
4 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?37.7%
Diluted shares grew 37.7% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$268M → $3.5B
Debt rose from $268M to $3.5B while owner earnings went from about ($15M) to ($138M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.08×
Across the record the business reported $412M of net income but generated $35M of operating cash, a 0.08-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $185M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Trading Companies & Distributors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EQPTEquipmentShare.com Inc | $4.4B | 28% | 6.8% | 6% | -1% |
| AKAMAkamai | $4.2B | 64% | 17.7% | 9% | 26% |
| ALLEAllegion | $4.1B | 44% | 19.4% | 23% | 15% |
| CSGPCoStar Group Inc. | $3.2B | 79% | 17.7% | 9% | 21% |
| FTAIFTAI Aviation Ltd. | $2.5B | 55% | -8.2% | -1% | -12% |
| CTOSCustom Truck One Source Inc. | $1.9B | 24% | 7.0% | 4% | 11% |
| CCOClear Channel Outdoor Holdings Inc. | $1.6B | — | 12.3% | 11% | -3% |
| HRIHerc Holdings Inc. Common Stock | $862M | 95% | 11.2% | 6% | 31% |
| Group median | — | 55% | 11.7% | 8% | 13% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFFTAI Aviation Ltd. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
$
The assumptions
Revenue, delivered58%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−17%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "FTAI Aviation Ltd. (FTAI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FTAI, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← FSUN its page in the Manual FTAIM →
Industry order: ← FSTR the Trading Companies & Distributors chapter FTAIM →