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GAMB, Gambling.com Group Limited
Mark has led the Company through multiple debt and equity raises including the Company's IPO, has helped develop and implement the Company's organic and acquired growth strategies and has scaled key functions and policies to support the Company's growth.
Gillespie has overseen the Company's operations across multiple jurisdictions including Europe and the United States Under his leadership, the Company has prioritized technological investments and has completed six acquisitions to expand the breadth of the Company's portfolio.
McCrystle has developed and implemented strategies for product, marketing, content, sales, and integration of key acquisitions.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Casino (58%), Sports (39%) and Other (2%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 94% and operating margin about 20% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −19% to 40% — on a steadier 94% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 23%, above 15% in 4 of 6 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 24% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Casino at 58%.
- Casino58%$97M
- Sports39%$65M
- Other2%$4M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $19M | $28M | $42M | $77M | $109M | $127M | $165M | $165M | RevenueRevenue |
| — | 100% | 100% | 96% | 92% | 94% | 91% | 91% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $1M | $11M | $11M | $2M | $22M | $36M | ($32M) | ($32M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 7.3% | 39.8% | 26.9% | 2.5% | 20.0% | 28.1% | −19.2% | −19.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($2M) | $15M | $12M | $2M | $18M | $31M | ($33M) | ($33M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | -2% | 18% | 9% | 10% | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $4M | $11M | $14M | $19M | $18M | $38M | $19M | $19M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $2M | $2M | $2M | $7M | $2M | $6M | $14M | $14M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $4M | ($6M) | ($857K) | $9M | ($2M) | $1M | $38M | $38M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $195K | $46K | $305K | $330K | $451K | $1M | $863K | $863K | CapexCapex |
| 1.0% | 0.2% | 0.7% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 1.0% | 0.5% | 0.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $4M | $11M | $14M | $18M | $17M | $36M | $18M | $18M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 19.8% | 38.8% | 32.4% | 24.1% | 16.1% | 28.6% | 11.0% | 11.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $4M | $11M | $14M | $18M | $17M | $36M | $18M | $18M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 19.8% | 38.8% | 32.4% | 24.1% | 16.1% | 28.6% | 11.0% | 11.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | $0 | $0 | $348K | $3M | $27M | $6M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | 35% | 33% | 3% | 21% | 25% | -13% | -13% | ROICROIC |
| -15% | 44% | 16% | 3% | 15% | 25% | -31% | -31% | Return on equityROE |
| −15% | 44% | 16% | 3% | 15% | 25% | −31% | −31% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $7M | $8M | $51M | $30M | $25M | $14M | $16M | $16M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $6M | $5M | $12M | $22M | $21M | $26M | $26M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | — | $0 | $75K | $13K | — | — | $13K | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $2M | $3M | $6M | $11M | $10M | $13M | $13M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $3M | $2M | $6M | $11M | $11M | $13M | $13M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $14M | $57M | $42M | $47M | $35M | $42M | $42M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $4M | $10M | $32M | $33M | $30M | $35M | $35M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 3.7× | 5.8× | 1.3× | 1.4× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | — | — | $11M | $11M | — | $11M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $45M | $91M | $139M | $155M | $179M | $300M | $300M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $6M | $6M | $0 | $0 | $20M | $109M | $109M | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($2M) | ($45M) | ($30M) | ($25M) | $6M | $93M | $93M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.6× | 5.3× | 6.3× | 1.4× | 9.6× | 11.5× | -3.8× | -3.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $13M | $34M | $80M | $87M | $119M | $123M | $108M | $108M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 25.5M | 27.6M | 30.9M | 35.8M | 37.1M | 36.0M | 35.5M | 35.5M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.76 | $1.01 | $1.37 | $2.14 | $2.93 | $3.53 | $4.66 | $4.66 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.07 | $0.55 | $0.40 | $0.07 | $0.49 | $0.85 | $-0.93 | $-0.93 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.15 | $0.39 | $0.44 | $0.51 | $0.47 | $1.01 | $0.51 | $0.51 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.15 | $0.39 | $0.44 | $0.51 | $0.47 | $1.01 | $0.51 | $0.51 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.04 | $0.02 | $0.02 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $0.51 | $1.24 | $2.59 | $2.43 | $3.21 | $3.42 | $3.04 | $3.04 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +35.4%/yr | +35.7%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +22.9%/yr | +5.5%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +21.3%/yr | +70.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +34.8%/yr | +19.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $33M loss into $18M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($33M) | $31M | $18M | $2M | $12M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$14M | +$6M | +$2M | +$7M | +$2M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$38M | +$1M | −$2M | +$9M | −$857K |
| Cash from operations | $19M | $38M | $18M | $19M | $14M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$863K | −$1M | −$451K | −$330K | −$305K |
| Owner earnings | $18M | $36M | $17M | $18M | $14M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 11% | 29% | 16% | 24% | 32% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“We identified material weaknesses in our internal control over our financial reporting process.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -3.8×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($32M) ÷ interest expense $8M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $16M − debt $109M
What this means
Netting $16M of cash and short-term investments against $109M of debt leaves $93M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 58 + DIO 0 − DPO 322 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- High through the cycle6-yr median, range -13%–35%; -13% latest = NOPAT ($25M) ÷ invested capital $201MIndustry peers: median -20%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran -13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle7-yr median margin, range 11%–39%; latest $18M = operating cash $19M − maintenance capex $863KIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 24% median across 7 years.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($33M) · cash from operations $19M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $6M ÷ Owner Earnings $18M
What this means
Of $18M Owner Earnings, $6M (31%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $6M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.06×HarvestingCapex $863K ÷ depreciation $14M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $165M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.21×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $109M vs $7M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −38%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.15/share (latest year $-0.94), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.08/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 25% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 25% early to 10% lately, median 20% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 1%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +24%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 24% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · −19.2% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +5.7%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Changes in search engine algorithms, the proliferation of artificial intelligence within search results and as alternative answer engines, the growth of zero-click searches, and the evolving competitive and regulatory landscape could materially reduce traffic to our websites and adversely affect our business, financial…”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$16M
- Receivables$26M
- Inventory$13K
- Accounts payable$13M
- Other current liabilities$22M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $122M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$4M · 3%
- Buybacks$36M · 29%
- Retained (debt / cash)$83M · 68%
- Returned to owners$36M
30% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $36M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $36M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count39.3%
The diluted count rose from 25M to 35M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained171%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($9M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $15M, so each retained $1 added about 1.71 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Gambling.com Group Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?18.5% vs 30.3%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 30.3% early in the record and 18.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?39.3%
Diluted shares grew 39.3% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $36M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$26M · 16% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“For the year ended December 31, 2023, revenues generated from a single customer amounted to 16 % of the Group's total revenue.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, nearest by economic model
No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (asset-light compounder), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XPOFXponential Fitness Inc. | $315M | 85% | 5.5% | — | 7% |
| LFMDPLifemd, Inc. | $194M | 80% | -23.9% | — | 4% |
| HTFLHeartflow Inc. | $176M | 75% | -48.7% | -20% | -58% |
| RSVRReservoir Media Inc. | $176M | 61% | 21.8% | 3% | 25% |
| SOUNSoundHound AI Inc | $169M | 69% | -308.2% | -6% | -150% |
| GAMBGambling.com Group Limited | $165M | 95% | 20.0% | 23% | 24% |
| TLSTelos Corporation | $165M | 36% | -8.5% | -61% | 2% |
| BLZEBackblaze Inc. | $146M | 52% | -32.1% | -88% | 1% |
| Group median | — | 72% | -16.2% | -13% | 3% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Gambling.com Group Limited's US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Gambling.com Group Limited has delivered.
Through the cycle, Gambling.com Group Limited earns about $40M on its 24.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $18M on 35M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $93M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← FVRR its page in the Manual GASS →
Industry order: ← DKNG the Casinos & Gaming chapter GDHG →