Owner Scorecard


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GEO, Geo Group Inc (The) REIT

Commercial Services & Supplies capital-intensive

We specialize in the ownership, leasing and management of secure facilities, processing centers and reentry facilities and the provision of community-based services in the United States, Australia and South Africa.

We provide innovative technologies, industry-leading monitoring services, and evidence-based supervision and treatment programs for community-based programs.

We conduct our business through four reportable business segments: our U.S.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
GEO · Geo Group Inc (The) REIT
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.6B
+8.6% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.7B 5-yr avg $2.4B
Operating margin 10.5% 5-yr avg 13.2%
ROIC 7% 5-yr avg 7%
Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin −1% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by U.S. Secure Services (69%) and Electronic Monitoring and Supervision Services (12%), with 2 more segments behind.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 12% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

U.S. Secure Services is 69% of revenue, with Electronic Monitoring And Supervision Services the other meaningful segment at 12%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • U.S. Secure Services69%$1.8B
  • Electronic Monitoring And Supervision Services12%$321M
  • Reentry Services11%$287M
  • International7%$197M
By geographyUnited States93%Australia7%South Africa1%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$2.2B$2.3B$2.3B$2.5B$2.4B$2.3B$2.4B$2.4B$2.4B$2.6B$2.7BRevenueRevenue
7%8%8%8%8%9%8%8%9%9%9%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$266M$248M$265M$303M$229M$288M$384M$352M$310M$257M$286MOperating incomeOp. inc.
12.2%11.0%11.4%12.2%9.8%12.8%16.2%14.6%12.8%9.8%10.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$149M$146M$145M$167M$113M$77M$172M$107M$32M$254M$273MNet incomeNet inc.
5%11%9%9%15%27%25%23%25%27%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($28M)$381M$274M$338M$442M$283M$288M$278M$242M$73M$158MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$115M$124M$126M$131M$135M$135M$133M$126M$126M$132M$134MDepreciationDeprec.
($304M)$91M($19M)$18M$170M$51M($33M)$30M$66M($337M)($274M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$82M$148M$196M$117M$109M$69M$90M$73M$79M$198M$188MCapexCapex
3.7%6.6%8.4%4.7%4.6%3.1%3.8%3.0%3.2%7.5%6.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($110M)$233M$148M$221M$333M$213M$198M$205M$164M($59M)$24MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−5.0%10.3%6.3%8.9%14.2%9.4%8.3%8.5%6.7%−2.3%0.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($110M)$233M$79M$221M$333M$213M$198M$205M$164M($125M)($31M)Free cash flowFCF
−5.0%10.3%3.4%8.9%14.2%9.4%8.3%8.5%6.7%−4.7%−1.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$354M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$195M$227M$229M$233M$216M$30M$30MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$95M$0$9M$91MBuybacksBuybacks
8%7%6%8%8%5%9%9%6%7%ROICROIC
15%12%14%17%12%8%15%8%2%17%18%Return on equityROE
−5%−7%−8%−7%−11%5%16%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$68M$81M$31M$32M$284M$506M$95M$94M$77M$69M$80MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$356M$390M$446M$431M$363M$366M$416M$390M$376M$593M$573MReceivablesReceiv.
$9M$21M$25M$36M$41M$41MInventoryInvent.
$80M$93M$93M$99M$86M$64M$79M$64M$67M$59M$59MAccounts payablePayables
$277M$297M$352M$332M$277M$311M$358M$351M$344M$576M$555MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$698M$580M$602M$542M$711M$944M$555M$529M$500M$719M$699MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$504M$370M$705M$396M$411M$379M$437M$437M$340M$357M$398MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×1.6×0.9×1.4×1.7×2.5×1.3×1.2×1.5×2.0×1.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$615M$779M$776M$776M$755M$755M$755M$755M$756M$756M$756MGoodwillGoodwill
$3.7B$4.2B$4.3B$4.3B$4.5B$4.5B$3.8B$3.7B$3.6B$3.8B$3.8BTotal assetsAssets
$2.2B$2.2B$2.7B$2.4B$2.0B$2.6B$2.0B$1.8B$1.7B$1.7B$1.6BTotal debtDebt
$2.1B$2.1B$2.7B$2.4B$1.7B$2.1B$1.9B$1.7B$1.6B$1.6B$1.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.1×1.7×1.8×2.0×1.8×2.2×2.3×1.6×1.6×1.6×1.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$975M$1.2B$1.0B$997M$913M$976M$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.5B$1.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%0.9%0.9%0.9%1.0%0.9%0.7%0.6%0.7%0.9%0.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
111M121M121M119M120M121M122M124M134M140M134MShares out (diluted)Shares
$19.55$18.73$19.31$20.77$19.59$18.69$19.44$19.51$18.08$18.83$20.38Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.33$1.21$1.20$1.40$0.94$0.64$1.41$0.87$0.24$1.82$2.04EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.98$1.93$1.23$1.85$2.77$1.77$1.62$1.66$1.22$-0.43$0.18Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.98$1.93$0.65$1.85$2.77$1.77$1.62$1.66$1.22$-0.89$-0.23Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.75$1.88$1.90$1.95$1.80$0.25$0.23Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.73$1.23$1.62$0.98$0.91$0.57$0.74$0.59$0.59$1.41$1.41Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.75$9.93$8.62$8.35$7.61$8.09$9.54$10.44$9.96$10.78$11.17Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−0.4%/yr−0.8%/yr
EPS+3.5%/yr+14.1%/yr
Dividends / share−32.1%/yr (5-yr)−32.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+7.6%/yr+9.3%/yr
Book value / share+2.3%/yr+7.2%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Electronic Monitoring And Supervision Services-3.6%
    “Electronic Monitoring and Supervision Services Revenues for Electronic Monitoring and Supervision Services decreased by $11.9 million in 2025 compared to 2024 primarily due to decreases in average participant counts under the Intensive Supervision and Appearance Program ("ISAP").”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Reentry Services+3.2%
    “Reentry Services Revenues for Reentry Services increased by $9.0 million in 2025 compared to 2024 primarily due to increases of $6.9 million due to new day reporting center contracts.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
140Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
6%low FY2021
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
10.0×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($59M)owner earningsvs.$254Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($59M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $132M it takes just to hold its position. It put $65M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($125M).

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$254M$32M$107M$172M$77M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$132M+$126M+$126M+$133M+$135M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$24M+$18M+$15M+$16M+$19M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$337M+$66M+$30M−$33M+$51M
Cash from operations$73M$242M$278M$288M$283M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$132M−$79M−$73M−$90M−$69M
Owner earnings($59M)$164M$205M$198M$213M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$65M
Free cash flow($125M)$164M$205M$198M$213M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-2%7%8%8%9%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $132M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $65M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $24M), owner earnings is nearer ($83M).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $257M ÷ interest expense $161M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.6B · 6.1× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $69M − debt $1.7B
    What this means

    Netting $69M of cash and short-term investments against $1.7B of debt leaves $1.6B owed, about 6.1× a year's operating profit (6.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 5%–9%; 6% latest = NOPAT $193M ÷ invested capital $3.1B
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -5%–14%; latest ($59M) = operating cash $73M − maintenance capex $132M
    Industry peers: median 3%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -2% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. It chose to put $65M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($125M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $24M of SBC) leaves ($83M).

  • Thinly cash-backed
    Cash from ops $73M ÷ net income $254M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.50×
    Expanding
    Capex $198M ÷ depreciation $132M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.6B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.01×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.7B vs $362M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 6 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −11%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.98/share (latest year $1.90), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $11.27/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 12% early, 12% lately, median 12%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 9.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +2.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 6 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“We are also subject to increasing legal requirements with respect to the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning applications and tools (including in relation to hiring and employment practices) and biometric information.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$699M
  • Cash & short-term investments$80M
  • Receivables$573M
  • Inventory$41M
  • Other current assets$4M
Current liabilities$398M
  • Debt due within a year$1M
  • Accounts payable$59M
  • Other current liabilities$338M
Current ratio1.75×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.65×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.20×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$301Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$1M due · $80M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+16.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$626Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$1.7B$70M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.

  • Reinvested$1.2B · 45%
  • Dividends$1.1B · 44%
  • Buybacks$195M · 8%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$84M · 3%
  • Returned to owners$1.3B

    86% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.1B as dividends and $195M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $583M and cash and short-term investments rose $12M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$18.43

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 5M shares were bought for $91M, about $18.43 each.

  • Net change in share count20.2%

    The diluted count rose from 111M to 134M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.25/sh

    Paid in 6 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 32% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained

    Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$873M23% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity50%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$354Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.2B of capital spent building

$21M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021George C. Zoley$11.3M$10.8M$213M
2021Jose Gordo$1.6M$1.7M$213M
2022Jose Gordo$4.5M$7.0M$198M
2023Jose Gordo$3.1M$4.1M$205M
2024Brian Evans$5.6M$13.9M$164M
2025David Donahue$3.3M$2.3M($59M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$24M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 9% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Geo Group Inc (The) REIT is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?20.2%

    Diluted shares grew 20.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $195M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?16% → 21% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $356M to $573M while revenue grew 25%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (16% of revenue then, 21% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CCSCentury Communities Inc.$4.1B7.9%6%-1%
ECGEverus Construction Group Inc.$3.7B12%6.7%29%4%
HOVHovnanian Enterprises Inc.$3.0B1.8%3%7%
IBPInstalled Building Products$3.0B30%9.7%17%7%
GEOGeo Group Inc (The) REIT$2.6B12.2%8%8%
BZHBeazer Homes USA Inc.$2.4B16%3.9%5%3%
GRBKGreen Brick Partners Inc.$2.0B26%15.8%15%-0%
LGIHLGI Homes Inc.$1.7B25%13.3%11%-7%
Group median8.8%9%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Geo Group Inc (The) REIT has delivered.

Geo Group Inc (The) REIT’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Geo Group Inc (The) REIT earns about $221M on its 8.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −2.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−29%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($31M) on 134M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $1.5B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($188M) runs well above depreciation ($134M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $26M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Geo Group Inc (The) REIT (GEO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GEO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GENVR its page in the Manual GERN →

Industry order: ← FVRR the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter GETY →