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GLBS, Globus Maritime Limited

Marine Shipping capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

We are an integrated dry bulk shipping company, providing marine transportation services on a worldwide basis.

We own (or charter through finance leases), operate and manage a fleet of dry bulk vessels that transport iron ore, coal, grain, steel products, cement, alumina and other dry bulk cargoes internationally.

Our operations are managed by our Glyfada, Greece-based wholly owned subsidiary, Globus Shipmanagement Corp., which we refer to as our Manager, which provides in-house commercial and technical management for our vessels and provided consulting services for an affiliated ship-management company.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · US listing is the ordinary share

GLBS · Globus Maritime Limited

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$44M

+26.8% YoY · 30% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $44M 5-yr avg $43M

Operating margin 10.2% 5-yr avg 23.9%

ROIC 2% 5-yr avg 6%

Owner-earnings margin 26% 5-yr avg 22%

Free cash flow margin 26% 5-yr avg −66%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 41% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −8.3%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMDec 2025
											Income statement
$9M	$14M	$17M	$16M	$12M	$43M	$62M	$31M	$35M	$44M	$44M	RevenueRevenue
($7M)	($4M)	($1M)	($34M)	($11M)	$18M	$24M	$6M	$3M	$5M	$5M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−83.1%	−28.9%	−8.3%	−215.4%	−97.2%	41.4%	38.3%	20.1%	9.7%	10.2%	10.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($10M)	($6M)	($4M)	($36M)	($17M)	$15M	$24M	$5M	$431K	($2M)	($2M)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
($4M)	$631K	$4M	$213K	($6M)	$21M	$27M	($4M)	$11M	$11M	$11M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$5M	$6M	$6M	$6M	$4M	$4M	$6M	$5M	$6M	$10M	$4M	DepreciationDeprec.
$1M	$1M	$2M	$30M	$8M	$2M	($3M)	($14M)	$5M	$3M	$10M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$0	$245K	$26K	$54K	$54K	$72M	$0	$0	$105M	$0	$0	CapexCapex
0.0%	1.8%	0.1%	0.3%	0.5%	165.0%	0.0%	0.0%	301.4%	0.0%	0.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($4M)	$386K	$4M	$159K	($6M)	$17M	$27M	($4M)	$5M	$11M	$11M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−41.4%	2.8%	22.0%	1.0%	−53.6%	38.8%	43.6%	−14.3%	14.5%	25.7%	25.7%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($4M)	$386K	$4M	$159K	($6M)	($51M)	$27M	($4M)	($94M)	$11M	$11M	Free cash flowFCF
−41.4%	2.8%	22.0%	1.0%	−53.6%	−117.2%	43.6%	−14.3%	−269.0%	25.7%	25.7%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$14K	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	—	—	—	$0	Dividends paidDiv. paid
-9%	-8%	-3%	-60%	-17%	11%	12%	3%	1%	2%	2%	ROICROIC
-47%	-15%	-9%	-368%	-41%	10%	14%	3%	0%	-1%	-1%	Return on equityROE
−47%	−15%	−9%	−368%	−41%	10%	14%	—	—	—	−1%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$163K	$3M	$46K	$2M	$19M	$45M	$53M	$74M	$47M	$26M	$26M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$243K	$177K	$577K	$240K	$153K	$1M	$109K	$1M	$1M	$654K	$654K	ReceivablesReceiv.
$516K	$661K	$650K	$2M	$1M	$852K	$3M	$1M	$1M	$2M	$2M	InventoryInvent.
$5M	$4M	$6M	$5M	$5M	$1M	$4M	$362K	$4M	$2M	$2M	Accounts payablePayables
($4M)	($3M)	($5M)	($3M)	($3M)	$755K	($411K)	$2M	($1M)	$904K	$904K	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$2M	$4M	$3M	$5M	$22M	$50M	$62M	$79M	$53M	$31M	$31M	Current assetsCur. assets
$31M	$48M	$43M	$9M	$13M	$12M	$17M	$10M	$35M	$11M	$11M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.1×	0.1×	0.1×	0.6×	1.7×	4.1×	3.7×	8.3×	1.5×	2.7×	2.7×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$94M	$92M	$87M	$56M	$86M	$186M	$225M	$231M	$321M	$289M	$289M	Total assetsAssets
$42M	$0	$2M	$37M	$31M	$26M	$38M	$46M	$59M	$52M	$52M	Total debtDebt
$42M	($3M)	$1M	$34M	$12M	($19M)	($15M)	($28M)	$12M	$25M	$25M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-2.7×	-1.8×	-0.7×	-7.2×	-2.7×	5.5×	10.2×	1.4×	0.5×	0.6×	0.6×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$21M	$44M	$41M	$10M	$42M	$146M	$171M	$176M	$176M	$176M	$176M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
65.1M	64.4M	799M	1.04B	959M	14.8M	20.6M	20.6M	20.6M	20.7M	176M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$0.13	$0.22	$0.02	$0.02	$0.01	$2.93	$3.00	$1.52	$1.69	$2.14	$0.25	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.15	$-0.10	$-0.00	$-0.03	$-0.02	$1.01	$1.18	$0.26	$0.02	$-0.08	$-0.01	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.06	$0.01	$0.00	$0.00	$-0.01	$1.14	$1.31	$-0.22	$0.25	$0.55	$0.06	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.06	$0.01	$0.00	$0.00	$-0.01	$-3.43	$1.31	$-0.22	$-4.56	$0.55	$0.06	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	—	—	—	$0.00	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$4.83	$0.00	$0.00	$5.11	$0.00	$0.00	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.32	$0.68	$0.05	$0.01	$0.04	$9.89	$8.29	$8.55	$8.57	$8.51	$1.00	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2017 are restated ×10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×12.42 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Share counts before 2020 are restated ×25 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×1/64.77 into 2021 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×8.49 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+36.1%/yr	+180.8%/yr
Book value / share	+44.0%/yr	+186.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

21Mpeak FY2019

ROIC

2%low FY2019

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

2.2×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$11Mowner earningsvs.($2M)net incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $2M loss into $11M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($2M)	$431K	$5M	$24M	$15M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$10M	+$6M	+$5M	+$6M	+$4M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$3M	+$5M	−$14M	−$3M	+$2M
Cash from operations	$11M	$11M	($4M)	$27M	$21M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	—	−$6M	—	—	−$4M
Owner earnings	$11M	$5M	($4M)	$27M	$17M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	−$99M	—	—	−$68M
Free cash flow	$11M	($94M)	($4M)	$27M	($51M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	26%	14%	-14%	44%	39%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 0.6×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income $5M ÷ interest expense $8M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $25M · 5.6× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $26M − debt $52M

What this means
Netting $26M of cash and short-term investments against $52M of debt leaves $25M owed, about 5.6× a year's operating profit (11.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -3%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -60%–12%; 2% latest = NOPAT $4M ÷ invested capital $201M

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 3%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -54%–44%; latest $11M = operating cash $11M − maintenance capex $0

Industry peers: median 12%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 26% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years.
Are earnings backed by cash? $11M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($2M) · cash from operations $11M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 0%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $11M

What this means
Of $11M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.00×

Harvesting

Capex $0 ÷ depreciation $4M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $44M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.74×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $52M vs $20M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.00/share (latest year $-0.00), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.01/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 4 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −40% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −40% early to 13% lately, median −8% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Worst year 2019 · −215.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$31M

Cash & short-term investments$26M
Receivables$654K
Inventory$2M
Other current assets$2M

Current liabilities$11M

Accounts payable$2M
Other current liabilities$9M

Current ratio2.74×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.54×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio2.32×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$20Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$176Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($82M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$52M$188K of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $61M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$177M · 292%
Dividends$14K · 0%

Returned to owners$14K
0% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $14K as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
Source of funding−$116M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $116M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Net change in share count169.9%
The diluted count rose from 65M to 176M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Globus Maritime Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?169.9%
Diluted shares grew 169.9% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Marine Shipping

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
KEXKirby	$3.4B	—	7.7%	4%	10%
MATXMatson	$3.3B	96%	11.4%	11%	12%
TDWTidewater Inc.	$1.4B	—	-12.5%	-6%	3%
INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock	$843M	—	12.3%	3%	33%
PANLPangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd.	$632M	—	7.7%	10%	10%
LPGDorian LPG Ltd.	$482M	—	35.2%	7%	38%
GNKGenco Shipping & Trading Limited	$342M	—	-1.1%	-0%	31%
GLBSGlobus Maritime Limited	$44M	—	0.7%	-1%	9%
Group median	—	—	7.7%	3%	11%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Globus Maritime Limited's US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Globus Maritime Limited has delivered.

Globus Maritime Limited’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Globus Maritime Limited earns about $4M on its 8.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 25.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($4M) Net of stock comp

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−22%/yr

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $11M on 20681M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $25M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh GLBS against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Globus Maritime Limited (GLBS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GLBS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GLBE its page in the Manual GLNG →

Industry order: ← GASS the Marine Shipping chapter GLNG →