Share count
101Mpeak FY2025
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GNS, Genius Group Limited
Revenue is Academy (56%), Resorts (26%) and School (17%).
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$8M
+10.6% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 23% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −233% through the cycle on a 34% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on going-concern doubt, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −79%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Academy at 56%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Academy56%$5M
- Resorts26%$2M
- School17%$1M
By geographyEurope middle east africa63%Pacific33%North america south america3%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $8M | $8M | $18M | $23M | $8M | $8M | $8M | RevenueRevenue |
| 46% | 33% | 47% | 52% | 31% | 34% | 34% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ($3M) | ($4M) | ($42M) | ($21M) | ($21M) | ($26M) | ($26M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −35.1% | −50.3% | −232.7% | −91.7% | −281.9% | −311.5% | −311.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($3M) | ($4M) | ($56M) | ($6M) | ($25M) | ($55M) | ($55M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| ($2M) | ($3M) | ($7M) | ($12M) | ($46M) | ($11M) | ($11M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $41K | $39K | $1M | $3M | $1M | $2M | $2M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $949K | $1M | $47M | ($9M) | ($23M) | $43M | $43M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $234K | $78K | $223K | $131K | $7K | $2M | $2M | CapexCapex |
| 3.1% | 0.9% | 1.2% | 0.6% | 0.1% | 22.9% | 22.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($2M) | ($3M) | ($8M) | ($13M) | ($46M) | ($13M) | ($13M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −28.4% | −35.3% | −42.0% | −55.6% | −611.4% | −149.9% | −149.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($2M) | ($3M) | ($8M) | ($13M) | ($46M) | ($13M) | ($13M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −30.9% | −35.8% | −42.0% | −55.6% | −611.4% | −149.9% | −149.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| -39% | -164% | -1390% | -118% | -21% | -24% | -21% | ROICROIC |
| -42% | -119% | -779% | -40% | -34% | -62% | -62% | Return on equityROE |
| −42% | −119% | −779% | −40% | −34% | −62% | −62% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $2M | $2M | $6M | $643K | $3M | $3M | $4M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $948K | $1M | $5M | $2M | $2M | $1M | $1M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $113K | $93K | $1M | $755K | $467K | $683K | $683K | InventoryInvent. |
| $1M | $1M | $6M | $3M | $2M | $2M | $2M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $5M | $6M | $24M | $10M | $42M | $24M | $24M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $5M | $7M | $23M | $17M | $12M | $28M | $28M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.9× | 0.9× | 1.0× | 0.6× | 3.7× | 0.9× | 0.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1M | $1M | $32M | $11M | $8M | $45M | $45M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $17M | $18M | $91M | $43M | $101M | $137M | $137M | Total assetsAssets |
| $223K | $151K | $967K | $377K | $10M | $25K | $10M | Total debtDebt |
| ($2M) | ($2M) | ($5M) | ($267K) | $7M | ($3M) | $6M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -2.9× | -11.1× | -31.6× | -5.5× | -18.8× | -7.3× | -7.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $7M | $4M | $7M | $14M | $74M | $89M | $89M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||
| 16.2M | 16.2M | 2.3M | 5.6M | 24.2M | 101M | 101M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.47 | $0.51 | $8.04 | $4.06 | $0.31 | $0.08 | $0.08 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.19 | $-0.27 | $-24.65 | $-1.02 | $-1.03 | $-0.54 | $-0.54 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.13 | $-0.18 | $-3.37 | $-2.26 | $-1.92 | $-0.12 | $-0.12 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.15 | $-0.18 | $-3.37 | $-2.26 | $-1.92 | $-0.12 | $-0.12 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.10 | $0.02 | $0.00 | $0.02 | $0.02 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $0.46 | $0.23 | $3.16 | $2.53 | $3.05 | $0.88 | $0.88 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1/7.14 into 2022 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×2.45 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×4.35 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×4.2 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −29.4%/yr | −29.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +5.5%/yr | +5.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +13.8%/yr | +13.8%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−24%low FY2022
Gross margin
34%low FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($13M)owner earningsvs.($55M)net incomelow FY2024
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $55M loss into ($13M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($55M) | ($25M) | ($6M) | ($56M) | ($4M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$2M | +$1M | +$3M | +$1M | +$39K |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$43M | −$23M | −$9M | +$47M | +$1M |
| Cash from operations | ($11M) | ($46M) | ($12M) | ($7M) | ($3M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$2M | −$7K | −$131K | −$223K | −$39K |
| Owner earnings | ($13M) | ($46M) | ($13M) | ($8M) | ($3M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | — | — | −$39K |
| Free cash flow | ($13M) | ($46M) | ($13M) | ($8M) | ($3M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -150% | -611% | -56% | -42% | -35% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -7.3×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($26M) ÷ interest expense $4M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $2M + ST investments $1M − debt $10M
What this means
Netting $4M of cash and short-term investments against $10M of debt leaves $6M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle6-yr median, range -1390%–-21%; -21% latest = NOPAT ($21M) ÷ invested capital $97MIndustry peers: median -18%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran -21% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle6-yr median margin, range -611%–-28%; latest ($13M) = operating cash ($11M) − maintenance capex $2MIndustry peers: median -250%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -150% of revenue this year, a -56% median across 6 years.
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($11M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($55M) · cash from operations ($11M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.10×MaintainingCapex $2M ÷ depreciation $2M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $8M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.86×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $10M vs ($4M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.18/share (latest year $-0.35), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.56/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −106% → −228% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −106% early to −228% lately, median −233% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −9%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2025 · −311.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“Our mission is to disrupt the current education model with a student-centered, lifelong learning curriculum that prepares students with the leadership, entrepreneurial and life skills to succeed in today's rapidly evolving, AI-driven world.”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$24M
- Cash & short-term investments$4M
- Receivables$1M
- Inventory$683K
- Other current assets$18M
Current liabilities$28M
- Debt due within a year$25K
- Other current liabilities$28M
Current ratio0.86×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.84×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.14×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($4M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$25K due · $4M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Cash runway0.3 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$35Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($16M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$12M$2M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$4Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$55M40% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity50%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 6 years buying other businesses, against $3M of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Genius Group Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2025.
All 3 tests turned up something to look into. A record that trips every wire is one to understand slowly.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−102.7% vs −31.9%
The business ran at a loss early in the record (an owner-earnings margin of −31.9%) and the loss has widened to −102.7% across the last three years, with the latest year at −149.9%. Ask the filing where the widening sits — price, cost, or spending growing faster than revenue — and what would narrow it.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$223K → $10M
Debt rose from $223K to $10M while owner earnings went from about ($4M) to ($24M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?14% → 22% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $1M to $2M while revenue grew 10%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (14% of revenue then, 22% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RCATRed Cat Holdings Inc. | $41M | 18% | -562.0% | -53% | -250% |
| QXLQuantum X Labs Inc. | $27M | 95% | -9.4% | -2% | 3% |
| QBTSD-Wave Quantum Inc. | $25M | 68% | -724.6% | -1142% | -582% |
| GEGGLGreat Elm Group, Inc. | $16M | 93% | -46.5% | -12% | -3% |
| NXTTNext Technology Holding Inc. | $12M | 59% | -24.0% | -1% | -29% |
| GNSGenius Group Limited | $8M | 40% | -162.2% | -79% | -49% |
| PDYNPalladyne AI Corp. | $5M | 30% | -916.4% | -333% | -500% |
| DJTTrump Media & Technology Group Corp. | $4M | 55% | -3360.9% | -18% | -943% |
| Group median | — | 57% | -362.1% | -36% | -149% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Genius Group Limited's US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Genius Group Limited is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
$
The assumptions
Revenue, delivered1%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−150%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Genius Group Limited (GNS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GNS, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← GMHS its page in the Manual GOOS →
Industry order: ← GLBE the Software chapter GOOG →